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Part II
Introduction
The Centre for Eastern Studies has decided to
embark on the project entitled ‘Turkey after the
start of negotiations with the European Union
– foreign relations and the domestic situation’
for twomajor reasons: the start of the accession
negotiations between Ankara and the European
Union in October 2005, and the significant part
which Turkey plays in western Eurasia (the Cau-
casus, the countries in the basins of the Black
and Caspian Seas, the Middle East and the Bal-
kans) which We wish to present our readers
our second report discussing Turkey’s relations
with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia, the
aspect of Turkish foreign policy regarding the
Black Sea, and the role of Turkey as a transit
country for oil and gas from the Middle East and
the Caspian regions. The evaluation of Turkey’s
standpoint and potential regarding the afore-
mentioned issues is especially important, consi-
dering the tensions existing in Turkey’s rela-
tions with the EU and the USA, as well as the
West’s increasing engagement in the Caucasus,
Central Asia and Black Sea regions. In this pro-
cess, Ankara may play the role of a significant
ally for the West. However, it may just as readily
play the role of its rival, who could co-operate
with other countries and may seriously frustrate
the implementation of the EU and US’ goals. The
Report was developed between autumn 2006
and autumn 2007, over which time the project
participants searched for publicly available do-
cuments in Poland, Turkey, EU countries and the
USA, and went on five research trips to Central
Asia, Russia, Turkey and Caucasus, where they
met local analysts, officials and researchers.
The authors of this Report would like to express
their gratitude to everyonewho has shared their
opinions with them, and to the Polish diploma-
tic service, particularly to Minister Andrzej Ana-
nicz, for their expert support and assistance in
the authors’ work on the Report.
This Report does not present the official stance
of the Polish government on the issues discus-
sed therein; instead it reflects the personal
views of its authors, who have made their best
efforts to ensure that their work is reliable.
Adam Balcer
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C E S R e p o r t
Theses
1. Turkey’s location has strategic geopolitical
importance because it borders regions which
have become increasingly significant in terms
of security, economy and politics (the Black Sea
region, the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia).
Although Turkey does not have its own oil and
gas fields, it may still become a key transit coun-
try as it borders major exporters of those raw
materials. Turkey’s demographic, economic and
military potential makes the country one of the
most significant actors in the region, especially
in the Black Sea basin and in the Caucasus, and
to a lesser extent in Central Asia. Evaluation of
Turkey’s potential in this part of the world is
an especially vital issue in the context of exist-
ing tensions in Ankara’s relations with the EU
and the USA, and of the growing Western enga-
gement in those regions. Turkey may play the
role of a significant ally for the West. However,
it may just as readily play the role of its rival,
who could co-operate with other countries and
may seriously frustrate the implementation of
the EU and US’ goals.
2. In spite of existing tensions, relations with
the EU and the USA, and Middle Eastern issues
(Iraq) are still the top priorities of Turkish fo-
reign policy. Turkey’s approach to the Caucasus,
Central Asia, Russia and the Black Sea area de-
pends on the character of Ankara’s relations
with the West. Turkey wants to enhance its en-
gagement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the
Black Sea areas, hoping to thus strengthen its
position in contacts with the West, or to guaran-
tee a reliable alternative to the Euro-Atlantic
line of development, in case of a serious crisis
in relations with the USA and the EU.
3. Turkey and Azerbaijan have very close rela-
tions for cultural and economic reasons. The
only thing that could worsen Turkish-Azerbai-
jani relations in the future is an improvement
in relations between Turkey and Armenia, which
is very unlikely.
4. Armenia is Turkey’s only neighbour of which
it has not established diplomatic relations with
and whose border is closed. The causes of this
status quo originate from the 1990s and such
events as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish allegations that Ar-
menia has made territorial claims, and Turkey’s
refusal to recognise the deportations and mas-
sacres of Armenians during World War I as a ge-
nocide.
5. Georgia is an important country for Turkey,
mainly because the route for transport of oil
and gas from the Caspian Sea area runs through
Georgian territory. Since the implementation of
strategically important transport & communica-
tions projects, which are partly located in Geor-
gia, was initiated, ensuring stability there has
become one of the top priority goals in Turkish
policy towards that country. A potential military
conflict in Abkhazia or South Ossetia could de-
stabilise the entire region and thus endanger
Turkish economic interests in the Southern Cau-
casus.
6. Turkish policy towards Central Asian coun-
tries in the early 1990s was accompanied by tre-
mendous enthusiasm and hope for creating
a commonwealth of Turkic states. However, that
enthusiasm did not translate into the develop-
ment of any coherent strategy for developing
contacts and influence in that area, due to which
Turkey’s engagement in the region broke down
as early as the mid-1990s. Currently, Turkey’s
engagement can be mainly noted in the econo-
mic field (especially in the sector of small- and
medium-sized enterprises, as well as in the areas
of education and security). Turkish engagement
has some chance of revival in the context of co-
operation in the energy industry and transport
infrastructures.
7. The shape of Ankara’s policy towards the Black
Sea region is strongly dependent on its relations
with Washington and Brussels. The worsening
of Turkeyís relations with the EU and the USA has
caused a revision of Turkish policy towards the
Black Sea region. The attempts by the external ac-
tors, the United States and the European Union,
to increase their presence in the region have
brought Turkey closer to Russia, which is equal-
ly unwilling to see their role grow. In its policy
towards the Black Sea region, Turkey wants to
maintain the status quo and is uninterested in
any major geopolitical changes in the region.
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C E S R e p o r t
8. Turkish-Russian relations have significantly
improved since the beginning of this century.
The two countries, which have often been stra-
tegic rivals, are now partners engaged in inten-
sive political dialogue, rapidly developing trade
& energy co-operation, and deepening co-opera-
tion in the areas of defence and security. How-
ever, there are significant barriers preventing
the establishment of a fully-fledged Turkish-Rus-
sian alliance. Relations between Turkey and Rus-
sia are still characterised by mutual distrust and
numerous conflicts of interests. In effect, Turk-
ish-Russian relations slightly cooled between
2006 and 2007. The situation may still change.
In particular, Turkey and Russia could come clos-
er together as a consequence of any of the follo-
wing potentialities: Turkish military interven-
tion in southern Iraq regardless of EU and US pro-
tests; the disintegration of Iraq and the emergen-
ce of an independent Kurdistan; a US attack on
Iran; a suspension of negotiations on Turkey’s
accession to the EU and a loss of perspective for
accession in the foreseeable future; and the EU’s
failure to establish a common energy policy and
the consequent possible diversification of ener-
gy supplies (especially natural gas) to EUmember
states.
9. Although Turkey does not have oil or gas fields
of its own, its geographical situation is very
favourable because the country borders on im-
portant major exporters of those raw materials.
In effect, Turkey has become an object of signi-
ficant interest for Russia, the EU and the USA.
The Turkish ruling class sees its country as a na-
tural bridge connecting Europe with the Middle
East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. As a conse-
quence of this concept, energy policy has been
adopted to make sure that Turkey plays the role
of a transit state for both exporters and impor-
ters of hydrocarbons. One goal of Turkish policy
is to use the proximity of the oil and gas fields to
diversify its own imports. However, Ankara’s am-
bitions have been curbed by the economic, tech-
nological and political barriers existing among
the exporters of oil and gas in the Caspian and
Black Sea regions and in the Middle East.
Adam Balcer, Jerzy Rohoziƒski,
Wojciech Konoƒczuk, Wojciech Tworkowski,
Rafa∏ Sadowski, Marek Menkiszak,
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
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CHAPTER I
Azerbaijan and Turkey:
the light and shade of
‘Turkish’ brotherhood
Jerzy Rohoziƒski
Theses
1. Turkey and Azerbaijan have very close rela-
tions for cultural and economic reasons. The
only thing that could worsen Turkish-Azerbai-
jani relations in the future is an improvement of
relations between Turkey and Armenia, which
is very unlikely.
2. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have become
increasingly pragmatic since the Baku–Tbilisi–
–Ceyhan pipeline was built. Turkey’s energy se-
curity and its position as a transit country de-
pend on Azerbaijan’s stability. From Ankara’s
point of view, internal stability is more impor-
tant than any process of democratisation in
Azerbaijan.
3. Turkey is playing a major part in modernis-
ing the Azerbaijani army to meet NATO stan-
dards. However, its role in bringing the coun-
try closer to the European Union’s structures is
very small.
1. The general background
of relations between Turkey
and Azerbaijan
1.1. The historical heritage
Azerbaijan’s border with Turkey is as short as 9 km.
This is not the border of Azerbaijan proper but of
its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Repub-
lic, which is isolated from the rest of the country.
Nevertheless, their common culture brings the
two states extremely close to one another. Turk-
ish and Azeri are the closest languages in the
Turkic language family. Dialects of Turkish in east-
ern Anatolia merge smoothly develop into Azeri
dialects. Residents of the lands which are locat-
ed in contemporary Azerbaijan used to call them-
selves Turks until 1937; it was Joseph Stalin who
renamed them as Azerbaijanis. Between the tenth
and eleventh centuries, the lands of Anatolia and
Azerbaijan were conquered and inhabited by
Oghuz Turks, the founders of the Ottoman Em-
pire, from which modern Turkey eventually de-
veloped1. However, Asia Minor and Azerbaijan
were parts of the same state for just a few deca-
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des over this nearly millennium-long period. Ne-
vertheless, there were numerous common cultu-
ral elements, especially among residents of east-
ern Anatolia and Azerbaijan, such as their noma-
dic lifestyle and the presence of Shia religious mo-
vements. Differences between Anatolian Turks
and Azerbaijanis deepened as a majority of the
latter gradually accepted Shia Islam as their reli-
gion, while most Ottoman Turks were Sunni Mus-
lims2. As a result, Shia Azerbaijanis in many Otto-
man-Persian wars (from the early sixteenth to the
early nineteenth centuries) usually fought along-
side Persians against the Sunni Ottoman Empire.
The religious factor became less important in the
second half of the nineteenth century, when the
idea of a secular, Pan-Turkic identity emerged. Ali
bey Huseynzade and Ahmet Agaoglu, who were
Azerbaijanis, greatly contributed to the develop-
ment of the idea of pan-Turkism in the Ottoman
Empire. Attempts to Ottomanise the Azeri lan-
guage were signs of openness to the Ottoman Em-
pire in Azerbaijan3. These mutual inspirations
would later be reflected in adopting the same re-
form, one with far-reaching consequences: Soviet
Azerbaijan switched to the Latin script in 1924,
and Kemalist Turkey did the same in 19284. The
introduction of the Cyrillic script later on in the
former area loosened the language bond between
the two countries, although it was tightened
again when the Latin alphabet was reintroduced
in independent Azerbaijan.
In 1918, the Ottoman Empire was the first coun-
try to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan.
Ottoman troops had fought alongside Azerbai-
janis against Armenian armed forces. Baku even
considered the possibility of establishing an Otto-
man-Azerbaijani federation at the time. However,
the Turks were not interested and occupied Azer-
baijan for several months. When the Ottoman
Empire capitulated in October 1918, some of the
Turkish officers joined the Army of Azerbaijan,
which was being created then. However, Turk-
ish-Azerbaijani relations did not improve. The new
government in Turkey, which was headed by
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, sought Bolshevik military
support during the intervention of the Entente,
and in effect accepted their occupation of Azer-
baijan in 1920.
1.2. Mutual perceptions
According to a survey conducted in 2003 under
the supervision of Arif Yunusov, 64% of respon-
dents in Azerbaijan declared a positive attitude
towards Turkey, which appeared to be most pop-
ular among residents of Baku and western Azer-
baijan. The Absheron Peninsula, which is inhabit-
ed predominantly by Shia Muslims, was also more
pro-Turkish than pro-Iranian5. Turkish mass cul-
ture (TV and music) is very popular in Azerbai-
jan; however, Azerbaijani opinion-formers seem
to be increasingly disappointed with Turkey6.
Positive sentiments towards Azerbaijan have
been invariably strong in Turkey. In a survey con-
ducted in 2004 by the Pollmark research centre,
more than two-thirds of respondents stated they
had a ‘positive perception’ of the Turkic peoples.
Christians, Jews and Arabs got much worse re-
sults; most Turks shared a negative image of those
groups. In a survey carried out in the same year
by Pollmark, more than 20% of Turks were of the
opinion that their country should establish clos-
er relations with Turkic countries above all7. The
result of a poll carried out in autumn 2006 by
ANAR was very similar. In 2006, 71% of respon-
dents in a survey conducted by A&G believed
that the country was their ‘friend’. This was the
best result from among nine countries, and only
in the case of Azerbaijan did more than half of
the respondents choose the same answer8.
2. The evolution of political
contacts
2.1. Great expectations
and the triumph of pragmatism
Turkey was the first country to recognise inde-
pendent Azerbaijan, on 9 December 1991. After
the eruption of the Azerbaijani-Armenian con-
flict9, Turkey offered aid to Azerbaijani refugees
and condemned the Armenian aggression. Turk-
ish businessmen were the first foreign investors
in Azerbaijan. Turkish retired military officers be-
came engaged in training the Azerbaijani army.
Moreover, Turkey supplied military equipment
to Azerbaijan, albeit to a limited extent. In 1993,
Turkey closed its border with Armenia, although
it did not impose a total transport blockade, allow-
9
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C E S R e p o r t
ing humanitarian aid to enter. No other country
has offered so much support to Azerbaijan as Tur-
key has.
Abulfaz Elchibey, a politician with clearly pro-Turk-
ish views, came to power in Azerbaijan in June
199210. President Elchibey was sure that the ‘Turk-
ish model’, i.e. a secular republican democracy,
nationalism and occidentalisation, was the right
solution for Azerbaijan as well. Elchibey also be-
lieved that Azerbaijanis were Turks. He even want-
ed to replace Azerbaijani with Turkish as the offi-
cial language of Azerbaijan, which met with strong
public protests. Numerous agreements with Tur-
key were signed during his presidency. At that
time, the theses of ‘two states, one nation’ appear-
ed in both Turkish and Azerbaijani official dis-
course11. Regardless of President Elchibey’s ef-
forts, Turkey did not agree to military participa-
tion in Azerbaijan’s fight for Nagorno-Karabakh,
aware of the danger of going to war against Rus-
sia, which supported Armenia. There was a strong
difference of opinions on policy towards Armenia
inside Turkish political elites, between the mo-
derate Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and the
‘hawkish’ President Turgut Ozal12. The Demirel
government’s policy towards Armenia was sharp-
ly criticised by both the Turkish opposition and
the Azerbaijani government for being too conci-
liatory. When Turkey and Armenia signed agree-
ments on the sale of electric energy in 1992, the
Azerbaijani foreign minister said this was a stab
in Azerbaijan’s back. However, the agreement did
not come into effect due to pressure exerted by
the Turkish opposition13.
When Geidar Aliev became president of Azerbai-
jan in June 1993, some politicians in Turkey saw
this as a victory for Russia, although Aliev had
maintained active contacts with Turkey as the
leader of Nakhchivan before 1993. He chose prag-
matism, trying to keep a balance between Russia,
Turkey, the USA and Iran. During his rule, Azer-
baijan rejoined the CIS, although at the same time
it was participating in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace project.
At the beginning, Aliev treated Turkey with some
reserve, seeing the country as Elchibey’s ally. In
September 1993, he withheld the implementation
of the agreements which his predecessor had
signed with Turkey, and removed 1,600 Turkish
officers who had been training the Azerbaijani
army. He even introduced entry visas for Turkish
citizens. Some political circles and opposition par-
ties in Turkey still put their hopes in the Popular
Front of Azerbaijan, the party of ex-President El-
chibey, who had been overthrown; a former am-
bassador of Turkey in Baku took part in an un-
successful coup against President Aliev in 1995.
All this had worsened mutual relations, which
however were improved by Aliev in 1996, when
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline became a mat-
ter of priority for both countries. Since that
time, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have become
pragmatic and are very active. Hundreds of visits
have been paid by Turkish prime ministers, presi-
dents, ministers and MPs in Azerbaijan, as well
as by their Azerbaijani counterparts to Turkey,
and numerous declarations and agreements have
been signed since 1995.
2.2. The issue of opening
the Turkish-Armenian border
The issue of the possible opening of the Turkish-
-Armenian border, which Turkey closed during the
Azerbaijani-Armenian war, plays a very impor-
tant part in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Ankara
closed the border because, it saw Armenia was
an aggressor occupying Azerbaijan’s territory. Cur-
rently, the EU and the USA are pressing Ankara
to reopen the border, which Azerbaijan strongly
opposes. According to a report by the US Depart-
ment of State, the then Secretary of State Colin
Powell, during his visit to Ankara in April 2003,
pressed Prime Minister Recep Erdogan to open
the border with Armenia without any precondi-
tions. This demand was reiterated by President
George Bush, Vice-President Dick Cheney, Secre-
tary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice to the Turkish Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gül during his visit in the USA
in July 2003. The European Union has also made
regular appeals to Turkey to open the Armenian
border, which invariably inflames public opinion
in Azerbaijan14. Inside Turkey, similar appeals have
been made by business and analytical circles15
and by the local government of Kars, a town lo-
cated near the Armenian border.
Since the situation in Iraq has worsened, the Ame-
ricans have stopped putting pressure on Turkey
to open the Armenian border because they need-
ed Turkish logistical support in their military
operations in the Middle East. During his visit to
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Azerbaijan in June 2005, Prime Minister Erdogan
stated that normalisation of relations with Arme-
nia would be possible on condition that the coun-
try withdrew its forces from all the Azerbaijani
territories it occupies.
2.3. Relations between Azerbaijan
and the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus
Azerbaijan has been trying to cement good rela-
tions with Turkey by maintaining active, albeit
unofficial, contacts with the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (KKTC), which is unrecognised
by the wider international community. When
Improtex Travel, a private Azerbaijani airline,
signed an agreement on establishing a regular
air route between Baku and Nicosia (Lefkosa),
a group of Azerbaijani MPs came to Nicosia in July
2005 to take part in the official celebration of
a Day of Peace and Freedom. Soon afterwards,
a group of sixty Azerbaijani businessmen came
to explore the possibilities of developing busi-
ness activity in the Turkish part of the island.
Prime Minister Erdogan saw such contacts as
a ‘de facto recognition’ of the republic16. In Au-
gust 2005, a delegation from Northern Cyprus
arrived by the first regular flight from Lefkosa to
Baku. The delegation was headed by former pre-
sident Rauf Denktash and his son Sardar Denk-
tash, the deputy prime minister and foreign mi-
nister of the republic. The two sides signed a de-
claration that “neither Turkey nor Azerbaijan
will leave the people of Northern Cyprus alone
with their problems”17. However, official recog-
nition of the KKTC by Azerbaijan seems impossi-
ble, because this would seriously undermine
Baku’s international position18.
2.4. Kurds in Azerbaijan
Currently, one of the few political issues which
may negatively affect (albeit to a limited extent)
relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan is the
issue of the Azerbaijani Kurds, who constitute
0.2% of the country’s population, according to
the recent census19. A report by the International
Crisis Group published in May 2004 mentioned
Kurdish organised crime and its monopoly of
illegal trade with Georgia and Turkey. The leader
of the Kurdish crime syndicate, Beylar Eyubov,
was allegedly the informal ‘ruler’ of the Azerbai-
jani city of Ganja20. It is rumoured in opposition
circles that Kurds allegedly play an important role
in Azerbaijan’s security services. The opposition
accuses Geidar Aliev of ‘co-founding’ the Kurdish
PKK party when he was in the Soviet KGB and
using its support thereafter21. In May 2006, the op-
position newspaper Realny Azerbaijan also wrote
about the shady business of Abdulbari Gozal,
a Baku mob boss, who was born in Maku (Ira-
nian Azerbaijan); he had allegedly collaborated
with the PKK and had been wanted by Turkish
counter-intelligence in Soviet times, when he was
allegedly closely linked to Geidar Aliev22. Obvious-
ly, such theses are difficult to verify, and could be
an attempt to depict President Aliev as being
an unreliable partner for Turkey23.
2.5. Turkey and the opposition
in Azerbaijan
Internal stability in Azerbaijan is a priority in Tur-
key’s policy towards this country. For this reason,
Ankara does not offer active support to the Azer-
baijani opposition because the issue of democra-
tisation plays a minor role in Turkey’s foreign
policy and because Azerbaijan is very important
for Turkish energy policy (see further in the text).
However, in the opinion of political analyst Bay-
ram Balci, if Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to
Azerbaijan in late June 2005 was intended to
‘bring Ilham Aliev a message from the USA that
the upcoming election must be fair’24, he did so
rather half-heartedly. Erdogan and Gül appealed
to the Azerbaijani government to make sure that
the election was ‘transparent’. However, it seem-
ed that the message was in fact addressed to the
European Union and not to Baku. Some Azerbai-
jani opposition activists have expressed their
dissatisfaction with Turkey’s recognition of the
results of the recent elections25.
Some opposition members in Azerbaijan have
contacts with Turkish politicians, although rare-
ly with those of the highest rank. When Ali Ke-
rimli, the head of the Azerbaijan Popular Front
Party, visited Turkey in June 2006, he talked to
Mehmet Dülger, chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee in the Turkish parliament, and to
Haluk Ipek from the Justice and Development
Party (AKP), the chairman of the Turkey-Azer-
baijan inter-parliamentary group26. At that time,
11
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C E S R e p o r t
Kerimli said the visit had been a tremendous
success and emphasised that the Turkish ruling
class was ‘critical of the present government of
Azerbaijan’. However, such words seemed to have
more in common with propaganda and self-pro-
motion than the real status of the visit. Prime
Minister Erdogan went on an official visit to
Azerbaijan in the same month.
3. Economy
3.1. The energy sector and
Azerbaijani investments in Turkey
The energy sector is an area where bonds between
Azerbaijan and Turkey are especially strong. The
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Ba-
ku–Tbilisi–Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline are the key
enterprises in this field. The idea of building oil
and gas pipelines connecting Azerbaijan and Tur-
key arose in the early 1990s, after the collapse of
the USSR. The strongest bargaining chip which
Turkey used to discredit any alternatives to the
BTC pipeline (such as the northern route to No-
vorossiysk) was the argument that it was neces-
sary to reduce both the workload in sea transport
and the traffic of tankers going through the Black
Sea straits. At first, Azerbaijan wanted the pipe-
line to go through Iran, which the USA opposed.
The deadlock in the negotiations was broken in
1999, when a pipeline was built between Baku
and the Georgian port of Supsa, so the option to
lay a pipeline through Georgia appeared, and was
finally chosen. Nevertheless, the OSCE and Pres-
ident Clinton’s administration still insisted on
the idea of a ‘friendship pipeline’ because they
wanted Turkey to combine the implementation
of the project with mediation activities to settle
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Turkish diplo-
matic service was very active in 1999 (visits to Ar-
menia, Azerbaijan and Russia), although this did
not result in a political agreement between Baku
and Yerevan27.
The construction of the BTC pipeline commenced
in September 2002. The pipeline opening ceremo-
ny took place in Turkey on 25 May 2005; the presi-
dents of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakh-
stan, and the president of BP were present. Addi-
tionally, the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzu-
rum gas pipeline, which will be used to transport
natural gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, was officially completed in 200728.
The oil industry is one of the few economic sec-
tors in which Azerbaijan has invested in Turkey.
GNKAR, the State Oil Company of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, as the key investor, signed an agree-
ment in late 2006 with the Turkish firm Turcas,
which provides for building a petrochemical
complex in Ceyhan, among other projects29.
3.2. Trade exchange and investments
Between 1993 and 2001, Turkey was the third larg-
est investor in Azerbaijan, preceded by the USA
and the United Kingdom. The total value of its in-
vestments was US$3.8 billion, which was equival-
ent to 12.6 percent of all FDI30. Western invest-
ments in Azerbaijan’s energy sector have clearly
increased in recent years. This trend has caused
a significant reduction of Turkey’s share in for-
eign direct investments. Nevertheless, Turkey is
still one of the major investors in the country.
Moreover, Azerbaijan is also increasingly inter-
ested in investing in the Turkish energy sector.
1,267 Turkish firms were registered in Azerbaijan
in 2006; however fewer than half of them operat-
ed in reality. The most important Turkish com-
panies operating in Azerbaijan include the Turk-
ish National Petroleum Company, Turkcell (a cell
phone operator), Azersun (light industry and
other branches), Anatolu Holding (food produc-
tion), Koc Holding (car manufacture, banking ser-
vices and retail trade), Teletas (telecommunica-
tion), a group of Attila Dogan’s firms (including
oil industry, a joint venture with the Azerbaijani
firm of Anshad Petrol), Borova (building), Ekpar
(leather, construction and investments in other
countries, including Turkmenistan), Enka (con-
struction), the Tekfen group (trade, services, light
industry and investments in other countries in-
cluding Uzbekistan), Tepe (construction), Yücelen
(tourism, construction and medical services) and
Zafer (construction). Turkish investors put a lot
of money into bars and restaurants, and have also
opened a chain of Ramstore supermarkets. The
Azerbaijan International Society of Turkish Indu-
strialists & Businessmen (TUSIAB) is the most
important organisation representing Turkish
capital in Azerbaijan.
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In 2006, Turkey was the third largest trade part-
ner for Azerbaijan, in terms of both exports and
imports. Turkey’s share in total trade turnover in
Azerbaijan reached nearly 7 percent31. In 2007,
Turkey became the first trade partner for Azerbai-
jan (turnover 14.3%, export 17.3 %, import 10.9%)
Turkey has been trying to help Azerbaijan by of-
fering loans to the country. In 1992, Türk Exim-
bank granted it one loan of US$250 million. Some
problems arose during the launch of the loan pro-
cedure, such as delays in preparing projects and
sending the approved projects to Turkey, which
the Azerbaijani government was responsible for.
Turkey agreed to defer the repayment of the cre-
dit instalments. Since 1992 Azerbaijan, along with
Turkey, has been a founding member of the Black
Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) project. It is
also a member of the Turkish International Co-
-operation & Development Agency (TIKA), and is
active in the forum of Friendship, Brotherhood
and Co-operation Congress of the Turkic States
and Communities (TUDEV).
3.3. Trade between Turkey and the
Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan
Nakhchivan, which is blockaded by Armenia on
the northern and eastern sides, is dependent on
trade with Turkey, and sometimes even on Turk-
ish aid (as is the case with electric power supplies,
40% of which come from Turkey, and the remain-
der from Iran). After the bankruptcy of wine far-
ming in Nakhchivan (it was impossible to export
wine to Iran for ideological reasons, or to Turkey
due to the state monopoly on alcoholic products),
Turkey supported the development of the con-
fectionery industry in the exclave. In 2004, the
volume of mutual trade exchange reached US$34
million, including US$4 million in exports from
Nakhchivan to Turkey32.
Frontier trading between Nakhchivan and the
Turkish town of Igidir played an exceptional role
between 1992 and 2002 in mutual trade exchange.
This Turkish town, located close to the border, was
enjoying a real economic boom thanks to the
trade in cheap fuel from Nakhchivan. A few busi-
ness fortunes were built in Nakhchivan as well.
Fuel trading was very profitable because until
recently the price of petrol in Turkey was nearly
six times higher than in Azerbaijan. However, in
2002, Turkey imposed high taxes on fuel traders
in Idgir as well as charges for border crossing.
This aroused dissatisfaction and suspicion on both
sides of the border. It was speculated that the
decision was a result of the privatisation of Petrol
Ofisi company, which had been bought by the in-
fluential capital group of Attila Dogan. Neverthe-
less, illegal trade in fuel, albeit on a smaller scale,
is still flourishing.
3.4. Barriers to Turkish investments
in Azerbaijan: corruption
The very high level of corruption is a serious prob-
lem for Turkish investors in Azerbaijan. It accom-
panies almost all major investments33. Turkish
authorities’ abilities to support their business-
men are limited, as was demonstrated in the case
of the Barmek company. Barmek was going to
start electric energy distribution in Azerbaijan
pursuant to an agreement signed in 2001. How-
ever, the company’s management were accused
and blackmailed by Azerbaijani senior state offi-
cials; in the early spring of 2006, the managers
were even jailed. Turkish Prime Minister Erdo-
gan pleaded the company’s cause, which did not
help; in the end, the firm had to withdraw from
Azerbaijan. It cannot be ruled out that in this case
the Azerbaijani government’s desire to monopo-
lise the energy market was not the only reason
for this turn of events; Russia might also have
wanted to enhance its influence on the Azerbai-
jani market (President Putin visited Azerbaijan
in February 2006). The Azerbaijani government
reacted to the Turkish businessmen’s complaints
by establishing a special commission to combat
corruption. However, the position of the commis-
sion’s chairman was filled by Ramiz Mekhtiev, the
head of the presidential administration, who is
believed to be one of the most corrupt people in
the country34. Moreover, in 2006 the Azerbaijani
media wrote that the government was planning
changes in the structure of the country’s largest
cellular telephone network Azercell, which is part-
ly owned by Turkcell. The changes were intended
to affect the Turkish stakeholders adversely.
However, it seems that Turkish businessmen have
not been discouraged by such problems; they ac-
cept corruption as a part of the ‘local rules of the
game’ and do not intend to ‘civilise’ Azerbaijan.
This can be demonstrated by the fact that the
numbers of Turkish investments in Azerbaijan and
13
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businessmen visiting the country have not de-
creased (for more detailed data see the section
Tourism below). It is believed in Azerbaijan that
some Turkish companies do not comply with ethi-
cal standards.
3.5. Transport
Another big investment in the Southern Caucasus
with Turkish shares is the construction of the
258-kilometre-long Kars–Akhalkalaki–Tbilisi–Baku
railroad, which will connect Turkey with Georgia
and Azerbaijan. Turkey suggested building the
railway connection as early as 1993, when it clo-
sed its border with Armenia. However, it had to
wait until 7 February 2007, when Prime Minister
Erdogan and Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili and
Ilham Aliev signed a framework agreement in
Tbilisi confirming the participation of Turkey,
Georgia and Azerbaijan in the project. The con-
struction work is planned to be completed by the
end of 2008. The three countries intend to incur
the costs of the investment, the total estimated
value of which is US$600 million, by themselves.
Turkey will give US$200 million in credit to Geor-
gia for building 29 kilometres of a new railroad
as well as to modernise old railways on Georgian
territory. The USA and the EU will support the pro-
ject on condition that Armenia joins it. In turn,
Yerevan has made its participation dependent on
a re-opening of the Turkish-Armenian border,
which is opposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey35.
3.6. Tourism
According to information from the Azerbaijani Mi-
nistry of Culture and Tourism, between 2001 and
2005, the number of Turkish citizens visiting Azer-
baijan increased steadily until 2004 (52,156 in
2001; 53,975 in 2002; 69,100 in 2003; 71,609 in
2004 and 70,755 in 2005). However, in the opin-
ion of Elchin Gafarli, head of the international
tourism department in the ministry, most of them
are businessmen, because ‘Azerbaijan is not an
attractive country for Turkish tourists’. Never-
theless, co-operation in the field of tourism be-
tween the two countries has been developing
quite rapidly (especially Turkish investments in
hotel business). According to estimates from the
Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Turkey
is visited annually by nearly 400,000 citizens of
Azerbaijan36, most of whom probably go there to
earn money.
4. Security
4.1. Military and technical
co-operation
Turkey has accepted the role of Baku’s ‘teacher’ to
help it accelerate the reforms recommended by the
North-Atlantic Alliance. Azerbaijani officers gra-
duate from military academies in Turkey, and Azer-
baijani soldiers have taken part in peacekeeping
missions in Kosovo (since 1999) and Afghanistan
(since 2001) under Turkish command. Under an
agreement which was signed in June 2005, Turkey
offered US$2.1 million in financial aid for the mo-
dernisation of Azerbaijan’s army to comply with
NATO standards, and is planning further aid37.
Since the BTC pipeline started operating, Azerbai-
jan’s military security has become especially im-
portant for Turkey. When in summer 2001 an Ira-
nian patrol ships fired on an Azerbaijani ship which
was exploring the seabed in the southern part of
the Caspian Sea, Ankara immediately sent its F-16
fighter aircraft to a military parade in Baku38.
5. Cultural & educational
co-operation and NGO activity39
5.1. Religious co-operation
and Turkey’s missionary activity
in Azerbaijan
Since the early 1990s, Sunni Turkey has been com-
peting with Shia Iran for influence on religious
life in Azerbaijan. The Turkish Clerical Department
built the so-called Shehid Mosque in Baku in ho-
nour of those killed in the war against Armenia.
One secondary school and eight mosques (three
in Baku, and one each in Gusar, Agdas, Nakhchi-
van, Yevlakh and Mekhtiabad) are operating in
Azerbaijan under the auspices of state religious
institutions from Turkey.
The religious influence of Turkey is more inten-
sive at the non-governmental level. Turkish reli-
gious movements are treated with suspicion by
the secular establishment in Turkey, while in Azer-
baijan they can find a safe harbour. The commu-
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nity of Osman Nuri Topbas, whose teachings re-
fer to the Sufi ideology of the Naqshbandiyya bro-
therhood, runs a Koranic and a vocational school
in Sheki, and a madrasa in Agdas. The Suleymanci
movement, which had been initiated by Suleyman
Tunahan (who died in 1959), started missionary
activity in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. How-
ever, it totally withdrew from official activity (it
was refused registration) and started clandestine
operations40. The Sufi Naqshbandiyya brotherhood
and the Association of Muslim Students in Azer-
baijan faced similar problems there. In 1995, the
Turkish diplomat Farman Darimoglu, who was
a member of the brotherhood, was accused of
participation in an attempted coup and deported,
and the brotherhood was banned. Its members
found shelter in the north-western part of the
country and in the Nakhchivan exclave. In the
latter region they are actively engaged in under-
ground missionary activity, and the leader of the
tariqa, Sheikh Mekhman Zakhid Gotkun, occasio-
nally comes to visit it from Turkey. In turn, the
association, which officially disbanded in 1997,
is involved in missionary activity at the Haji
Sultan Ali Mosque in Baku, as well as in Lenko-
ran and Veravul41.
The Nurcular movement, which is associated with
the Turkish religious scholar Fethullah Gülen, has
the strongest influence in Azerbaijan. The move-
ment started penetrating Azerbaijan at the end
of 1991, when Gülen’s envoy, Mehmed Ali San-
gul, went to carry out reconnaissance there. Gü-
len himself came a year later and met President
Elchibey. The president allowed him to launch the
Saman Yolu television station, publish the Zaman
newspaper and register many companies and
foundations. Gülen’s movement further streng-
thened its position in Azerbaijan during the pre-
sidency of Geidar Aliev, although the local press
expressed anxiety about the organisation’s actions
in 2001 and 2002. Currently, the activity of Gü-
len’s followers in Azerbaijan is financially sup-
ported by such Turkish companies as Istigbal (fur-
niture sales), Romanson (watch sales) and Ulkar
(the confectionery trade).
Gülen’s movement is strongly tied to the ruling
Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP),
which has Islamic roots. The visit by Prime Mini-
ster Erdogan to Baku in January 2003 was orga-
nised by a businessman linked to Nurcular42.
Schools, which avoid open proselytism and try
to attract young people by the high quality of
their education instead, play a special part in Gü-
len’s movement43. The schools provide accommo-
dation in dormitories and organise summer
camps for their students. Their graduates often
receive job offers from Turkish firms44.
5.2. Non-governmental organisations
and foundations
The Azerbaijani Atatürk Foundation (Azerbaycanda
Atatürk Merkezi), which propagates official co-ope-
ration between Turkey and Azerbaijan, operates
in Baku. The Türksoy organisation engages in cul-
tural and educational activity promoting the unity
of the Turkic-speaking world, and offers courses
in religion, the English, Arabic and Turkish lan-
guages and computer usage. In turn, the organi-
sation named Kamer Ozel Talebe Yurdu, which
receives financial backing from the building com-
pany Kamer Ltd., is linked to the Suleymanci mo-
vement, and offers accommodation for poor child-
ren and young people.
5.3. Education
Turkey has actively supported the development
of education in Azerbaijan by promoting institu-
tional associations and reforms based on the
Turkish system. On 29 February 1992, the Azer-
baijani government and a Turkish delegation sign-
ed an agreement on Turkey’s support for the re-
introduction of the Latin script, launching school
education reform, establishing Turkish language
schools, supplying textbooks and teaching aids
to schools and training courses for Azerbaijani
students in Turkey. On 3 May 1992, an agreement
on co-operation in teaching, expert services, tech-
nology and scientific research was signed in Baku.
Universities in Azerbaijan accept the results of
entrance examinations taken at Turkish univer-
sities, thanks to which Turkish students may
study in Azerbaijan without any problems.
The Caucasus University (Qafqaz Universitesi) was
established in 1993 in Khirdalan near Baku using
money donated by Turkish businessmen linked
to the Nurcular movement. A Department of Reli-
gion (Ilahiyat Fakültesi) was opened at the Baku
State University, and a secondary school associa-
ted to the faculty was established on the initiative
of the Turkish Ministry of Religion. The Turkish
15
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World Management Faculty, financed by the Turk-
ish World Foundation (Turk Dunyasi Vakfi), is ope-
rating at the Economic University in Baku. The
non-governmental organisation Cag Oyretim,
which is linked to the Nurcular movement, ma-
nages a network of secondary schools, which are
located in Baku, Sheki, Zakatale and Lenkoran,
among other places. Baku has two secular secon-
dary schools, Anadolu Lisesi and Atatürk Lisesi,
which are financed by the Turkish government.
According to the Turkish Education Minister Hus-
sain Chelik, who visited Baku in early November
2006, nearly four thousand Turkish students were
studying at the time in Azerbaijan, and nearly
1500 Azerbaijani students were studying in Tur-
key45. Tens of thousands of Azerbaijani and Turk-
ish students have been on student exchange since
1992, when the agreement was signed.
To sum up, Turkey – along with Iran – is the most
actively engaged country in the social, educatio-
nal and religious areas in Azerbaijan. From the
perspective of the secular Azerbaijani govern-
ment, the Turkish presence in the country’s so-
cial life is much more welcome than the engage-
ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Azerbaijani
experts on religion believe that relations with
Turkey have become more attractive for conser-
vative and religious circles in their country since
2002, when the AKP, a party with Islamic roots,
formed the government in Ankara.
6. Conclusions and forecasts
The ‘honeymoon’ phase in Turkish-Azerbaijani
relations is certainly over. Azerbaijan no longer
perceives Turkey as its ‘elder brother’, and Tur-
key itself has given up its ambitious plans from
the early 1990s to ‘civilise’ its post-Soviet kins-
folk. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Tbili-
si–Erzurum pipelines have established strong
bonds between the two countries for many years.
Turkey’s energy security and its role as a transit
country will be increasingly dependent on the
stability of the situation in Azerbaijan, which
subsequent Turkish governments will have to
keep in mind. As a result, Turkey will not offer
any major support to the Azerbaijani opposition.
The real addressees of Ankara’s appeals for ‘de-
mocratisation’ or ‘transparency’ in political life
in Azerbaijan will be the EU or the USA rather the
than Azerbaijani authorities.
However, mutual relations will not be free from
friction. Turkey will feel a growing internal and
external pressure to normalise relations and open
borders with its Armenia, which is becoming in-
creasingly isolated. This will cause anxiety in Azer-
baijan. However, the effectiveness of such pres-
sure on Turkey will depend on how realistic the
prospect for its EU membership is at any given
moment.
Turkey, which is in a sense a diplomatic ‘hostage’
to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, would like
it to be resolved. However, its settlement is very
unlikely in the immediate future because the
government of Azerbaijan is in turn ‘hostage’ to
its public opinion (which is one of the few cases
when they care about it).
In the field of the economy, Turkish businessmen
will not fight against the omnipresent corrup-
tion in Azerbaijan; instead, they will become in-
creasingly better ‘adapted’ to the local conditions.
Corruption will not discourage Turkish capital
from investing in Azerbaijan.
In the immediate future, Ankara will help to re-
form the Azerbaijani army to meet NATO stan-
dards. In the long term, Turkey’s progress on its
way to EU membership could strongly encourage
Azerbaijan to become seriously interested in Euro-
pean integration. On the other hand, if Turkey
focuses on integration with the EU, it may ne-
glect its eastern policy. In turn, if the EU blocks
the process of integration with Turkey, which is
now quite likely, this could cause Ankara to in-
crease its activity in the East, including in the
Caucasus.
Jerzy Rohoziƒski
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1 Azerbaijani historiography strongly emphasize legacy of
ancient Christian Caucasian Albania to reduce role of Arme-
nians in the history of the region.
2 Nearly 15% of residents of Turkey are Alevis, members of
an Islamic movement which is theologically close to Shiism.
Nearly a million Shia Muslims live in eastern Turkey, and
almost 35% of residents of Azerbaijan are Sunni Muslims.
Their number has been growing as a consequence of work
by missionaries from Turkey.
3 T. Âwi´tochowski, Azerbejd˝an i Rosja. Kolonializm, islam
i narodowoÊç w podzielonym kraju, Warsaw 1998, pp. 37–48.
4 Ibid., pp. 134–137, cf. Ali Faik Emir, Türk Dis Politikasi
Perspektifinden Guney Kafkasya, Istambul (2003).
5 The survey results were presented during the academic
and practical conference entitled ‘Islam in post-Soviet Azer-
baijan; issues regarding freedom of conscience and religious
security’, (11 July 2003) Baku.
6 In the opinion of the political analyst Leyla Alieva, who is
linked to the opposition, Turkey – especially when governed
by political parties with Islamic roots – long ago stopped
playing the role of a ‘window to the West’ and a mediator
in the process of European integration. According to Jamil
Hasanli, a historian from the Azadlig opposition bloc, Azer-
baijan’s relations with Turkey are now just a ‘component of
relations with the West’. While some time ago ‘Turkey used
to have stronger influence, other Western countries are now
more active than Turkey’. Nevertheless, in his opinion, Azer-
baijan is still a strategic partner for Turkey because there are
two blocs in the region: USA–Turkey–Azerbaijan and Iran–Ar-
menia–Russia. Interviews conducted by Jerzy Rohoziƒski in
May 2006 and Mateusz Laszczkowski in August 2005.
7 Pollmark, http://www.pollmark.com.tr/
8 Halk Ab’ye guvenmiyor, Milliyet, 24 October 2006, http://
www.milliyet.com/2006/10/24/siyaset/asiy.html
9 The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict broke out in 1988, when
Nagorno-Karabakh, the autonomous region in Azerbaijan
75% of whose population are Armenians, declared unification
with Armenia. At first, it was limited to local persecutions and
ethnic cleansings in Azerbaijan and Armenia. In late 1991,
when both Azerbaijan and Armenia had declared indepen-
dence, it turned into a full-scale war. The fighting lasted un-
til May 1994. One of the consequences of the conflict was the
emergence of the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,
which is strongly linked to Armenia. The Armenian forces
occupied 14% of Azerbaijan’s territory.
10 Assim Mollazade, deputy president of Elchibey’s party,
the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, said then, ‘This proximity
cannot be explained by national affinity (in the nationalist
meaning) alone because our relations with other ‘Turkic’
countries, such as Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, are worse
(...) We have chosen Turkey because (...) it has become for us
(...) a springboard to the West and membership of NATO.
Quotation form D. Helly, Le paysage politique du nouvel
Azerbaidjan independant, Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Mediter-
ranee Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien’, N 26, http://
cemoti.revues.org/document305.html
11 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Official Website, Two
States, One Nation became historical in Istanbul, http://
www.ibb.gov.tr/en-US/Haberler/HaberDetay.html?
HaberId=978
12 For more information on this subject, see the chapter by
Wojciech Konoƒczuk discussing Turkish-Armenian relations.
13 Nazim Cafersoy, Elcibey donemi Azerbaycan Dis Politi-
kasi, Ankara 2001, p. 129.
14 ‘Echo’: Official Baku doesn’t believe that Ankara will open
Frontiers with Armenia, 8 September 2006, http://www.
demaz.org; Zardusht Alizade, an activist of the Helsinki
Committee, stated that in Azerbaijan both the government
and the opposition are critical of any prospect of normalis-
ing Turkish-Armenian relations ‘not because they do not
understand the advantages of the process but because this
would be very disadvantageous to the selfish interests of the
political elites’. The interview was conducted in May 2006.
15 B. Gultekin, Prospects for Regional Cooperation on NATO’s
South Eastern Border. Developing a Turkish-Russian Coope-
ration in the Southern Caucasus, ‘Final Report – Manfred
Wörner Fellowship 2004/2005’, 30 June 2005, pp. 54–68 and
134–143. The report, which was published on NATO’s official
website, provoked a very indignant comment in the opposi-
tion newspaper Ayna–Zerkalo. The irritation was sparked by
the fact that the work did not contain a single chapter on
Azerbaijan (it had chapters devoted to Georgia and Arme-
nia), and only one sub-chapter mentioning the frontier trade
with the Nakhchivan exclave. M. Jafarli, Turetsky uchony
Burju Gultekin napisal knigu, otrazhayuschuyu interesy Ar-
menii, Zerkalo, 20 June 2006.
16 Azerbaijani Delegation Visits Turkish Cyprus, Zaman,
18 July 2005.
17 V Baku pribyla delegatsiya rukovodstva TRSK, Zerkalo,
30 August 2005.
18 In the opinion of Leyla Alieva, Azerbaijan will never offi-
cially recognise the KKTC because firstly, this would do it
much harm in the international arena, especially in contacts
with the EU, and secondly, this would set a dangerous pre-
cedent in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh. The interview
was conducted in May 2006. The publicist Fariz Ismailzade
believes that the Turkish side has nevertheless been disap-
pointed by the lack of a more defined stance by Baku to-
wards Northern Cyprus. He also recalled that in May 2004,
when Azerbaijan’s delegates were absent from the voting
at the Council of Europe on the opening of an official diplo-
matic agency of the KKTC (a resolution which was not pass-
ed), the Turkish delegation accused them of betrayal. F. Is-
mailzade, Turkey-Azerbaijan: the Honeymoon is over, East
West Studies, 3 March 2006, http://www.eastweststudies.
org/makale_detail.php?tur=223&makale=203.
19 According to Institut Kurde de Paris, Kurds constitute
nearly 1.8% of Azerbaijan’s population. Institut Kurde de
Paris, The Kurdish diaspora, http://www.institutkurde.org/
en/kurdorama/.
20 Azerbaijan: Turning over a New Leaf, International Crisis
Group. Europe Report, No. 156, Baku–Brussels, 13 May 2004,
pp. 9–13 and 20–22.
21 The interview with Leyla Alieva was conducted in May
2006.
22 Stroibarony, Realny Azerbaijan, 19 May 2006.
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23 Such allegations were made by the opposition newspa-
per Yeni Musavat in 2002. Another opposition newspaper,
Ayna–Zerkalo, in turn reported the detention of 33 PKK
fighters in Azerbaijan’s territory. Azerbaijani Defence Mini-
ster Mamed Aliev stated that the allegations were ground-
less. Prime Minister Erdogan hypothesised in 2005 that PKK
units could be operating under the guise of Kurdish cultural
centres in Azerbaijan. F. Ismailzade, The Age of Pragmatism,
Eurasia Insight, 23 February 2003, http://www.eurasianet.
org/departments/insight/articles/pp022303_pr.shtml
24 The interview was conducted by Mateusz Laszczkowski
in July 2005.
25 Zardusht Alizade said in an interview in 2006, ‘Turkish
observers and delegates have always recognised our total-
ly fixed elections as complying with European standards’.
26 Vizit Ali Kerimli v Turtsiyu prodolzhayetsa, Zerkalo,
30 June 2005.
27 B. Gultekin, Prospects for Regional Cooperation on NATO’s
South Eastern Border. Developing a Turkish-Russian Coope-
ration in South Caucasus, Final Report – Manfred Wörner
Fellowship 2004/2005, 30 June 2005, pp. 57–61.
28 Turkey finishes laying Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline,
Today.Az, 6 March 2007, http://www.today.az/news/business/
37479.html
29 IA Regnum, 6 December 2006.
30 Data: UNCTAD, IMF, Ministry of Economic Development
of Azerbaijan. UN-ESCAP, Foreign direct investment in Cent-
ral Asia and Caucasian economies: policies and issues, ‘Stu-
dies in Trade and Investment’ No. 50 (ESCAP, Bangkok), p. 70n.
31 National Bank of Azerbaijan, http://www.nba.az/down
load/melumatlar/tediyye_balansi/en_ted_balansi_sentyabr.
pdf
32 B. Gultekin, Prospects for Regional Cooperation on NATO’s
South Eastern Border. Developing a Turkish-Russian Coope-
ration in South Caucasus, Final Report – Manfred Wörner
Fellowship 2004/2005, 30 June 2005, pp. 134–143.
33 R. Musabekov, Korruptsiya v Azerbaijane, Centralnaya
Aziya i Kavkaz 7/2000, http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac07
_2000/12.musabekov.shtml. Western oil corporations have
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CHAPTER II
Historical baggage –
relations between Turkey
and Armenia
Wojciech Konoƒczuk
Theses
1. Armenia is the only country bordering with
Turkey with which Ankara does not maintain
diplomatic relations; the border between the
two countries is closed. The causes of this date
back to the beginning of the 1990s, and have
their origin in the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey’s ac-
cusations that Armenia was making territorial
claims, and Turkey’s refusal to recognise the
deportations and massacres of Armenians dur-
ing World War I as genocide.
2. Turkey has declared that normalisation of
relations with Armenia depends on settling the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, and consequen-
tly, on progress in relations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, another im-
portant actor in Turkish-Armenian relations is
the Armenian diaspora which supports Yere-
van’s hard line against Ankara, and is quite in-
fluential in Armenia proper.
3. Turkish-Armenian relations have considerable
impact on Turkey’s relations with other coun-
tries. Particularly, the international community’s
assessment of the events of 1915 (mass murder
of Armenians by Turkish Ottoman forces) are
becoming a major problem in Turkey’s foreign
policy. The European Union’s (EU) influence on
relations between Turkey and Armenia is grow-
ing. Progress in Turkey’s integration with the
EU could lead to the normalisation of Turkish-
-Armenian relations.
4. Possible agreement between Turkey and Arme-
nia will change the geopolitical situation in the
Southern Caucasus and have a positive impact
on settlement of the Karabakh conflict. It will
also weaken Russia’s influence in the region.
1. General outline of Turkish-
Armenian relations
Armenia is Turkey’s smallest neighbour (29,800
km2 in surface area), and its border with the east-
ern Turkish provinces of Kars and Igdir1 is 268
km in length. Armenia lies between the Turkish-
-Georgian and Turkish-Azerbaijani (with Nakhchi-
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van) borders, on the shortest route linking Turkey
with Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
Relations between Turkey and Armenia are cen-
turies long. Their historical legacy is one of the
main problems which make it more difficult to im-
prove political relations between the two coun-
tries. The state of the Armenians, which existed
since pre-Christian times on the territory of to-
day’s Armenia and eastern Turkey, was conquer-
ed by the Byzantine Empire in the mid-eleventh
century, then came under the rule of the Seljuk
Turks. The last Armenian state, the Kingdom of
Cilicia, situated on the Mediterranean Sea on the
territory of today’s southern Turkey, was conquer-
ed by Turkey in 1375. In the sixteenth century,
the bulk of territories inhabited by Armenians
were incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Ar-
menians enjoyed religious and cultural autono-
my in the Ottoman administrative system of mil-
lets2. The political loyalty of the Armenians con-
tributed to the fact that until the end of the nine-
teenth century they were referred to as the ‘most
faithful of millets’. As the importance of natio-
nalist movements grew in the 1890s, Turkish-Ar-
menian relations worsened, which led to the first
pogroms against Armenians3.
The years of World War I constituted the most
tragic period of Turkish-Armenian relations. The
events of 1915 in eastern Anatolia are perceived
by the two parties in radically different ways; ac-
cording to Armenians, it was an act of genocide
planned by the Turkish authorities, claiming up
to 1,500,000 Armenian lives. From the Turkish
point of view, Armenians supported Russians in
the Turkish-Russian war, and in retaliation they
were displaced to Syria and Iraq. This led to the
deaths of between 300,000 and 600,000 people,
mainly caused by diseases, famine, and ‘exacer-
bated by massacres committed by groups of
Kurds. At the same time, as a result of actions un-
dertaken by Armenian and Russian guerrillas, the
bulk of whose soldiers were Armenian, the Mus-
lim population also suffered (a few thousand,
according to Turkish estimates)4. After the estab-
lishment of the Turkish Republic, the problem of
the genocide of Armenians was nearly absent
from Turkish public debate until the mid-1960s5.
The issue returned together with the campaign
initiated by the Armenian diaspora to recognise
the massacre of 1915 as genocide. Turkey then
hardened its position, and all attempts to ques-
tion the official historical version were consider-
ed a crime. Only the process of democratisation
connected with Turkey’s efforts to start negotia-
tions with the EU has led to any much wider pu-
blic discussion on the subject6.
After Armenia declared independence in 1918, two
short Turkish-Armenian wars broke out (May–June
1918, September–December 1920). The Soviet Ar-
my’s invasion of the Southern Caucasus a few
months later put an end to the Armenian state,
which was incorporated into Soviet Russia. The
Turkish-Armenian border was demarcated by the
Treaty of Kars of October 1921, by virtue of which
Turkey gained territories considered by Arme-
nians as their historic lands. Under the Soviet re-
gime, in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
there was only one Turkish-Armenian border post
in Dogu Kapi/Akuryan, which served as a point of
economic exchanges. Contacts between Turks and
Armenians were very limited, however, and Arme-
nian territory was heavily militarised, as it was
situated close to the border with Turkey – a NATO
member. The Soviet era was a period of isolation
for both societies, and as a result Turks and Arme-
nians do not know much about each other.
The situation changed radically after Armenia’s
declaration of independence in 1991 when Turkey
closed its border with Armenia, which again re-
stricted bilateral contacts.
Research on the mutual perceptions of the Turk-
ish and Armenian societies published in 2005 by
the organisations from Turkey (TESEV) and Arme-
nia (HASA) reveals that Turks have a low level of
knowledge about Armenians, and vice versa; this
shows that the two nations do not know each
other due to lack of information and difficulty in
establishing contacts7. The research also shows
that Armenians have more stereotypes, prejudices
against and fears of Turks than vice versa. Arme-
nian perceptions of Turks area negative, whereas
Turks see Armenians in a more neutral and less
negative way8. In Turkey, the ‘Armenian question’
nowadays provokes two types of interconnected
reactions9. On one hand, some of the Turkish rul-
ing class claim that there is more transparency
in politics and that history is being revised. On the
other, the ruling class’s growing impact on pub-
lic opinion and its increased presence in public
life has strengthened Turkish national identity,
which has been forged in opposition to accusa-
tions of crimes perpetrated on the Armenian po-
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pulation. Among Armenians, the key factor in-
fluencing their perception of Turks is the histori-
cal memory of the genocide. The Armenian na-
tional identity has to a great extent been formed
in relation to the tragedy of 1915, which is today
the most significant element uniting Armenians
all over the world. For the numerous Armenian
diaspora (which to a large extent is composed of
descendants of Armenians who once lived on Turk-
ish territory and survived the genocide), it is the
most important issue allowing them to preserve
the distinctive national identity. At the same time,
it largely determines the Armenian diaspora’s
approach to the Turkish state. Despite the closure
of the Turkish-Armenian border since the 1990s,
Turkey has become a place where Armenians
come looking for work. The number of Armenians
working in Turkey is estimated at around 70,000.
However, this number is not big enough to influ-
ence the way the two nations perceive each other.
In Turkey (mainly in Istanbul), there are about
60,000–70,000 Armenians descended from former
citizens of the Ottoman Empire10. They constitute
a non-distinctive part of Turkish society, although
they have maintained a sense of separate identi-
ty and the group is well organised11.
2. Evolution of political contacts
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognise
Armenia as an independent state on 16 Decem-
ber 1991. This was caused by Ankara’s interest
in seeing sovereign countries established in the
Southern Caucasus, which would create a sort of
a buffer zone separating Turkey from Russia,
weaken Russian influences and offer Ankara pos-
sibilities of extending its geopolitical ascendan-
cy in the region. The creation of the independent
Armenian state provoked some fears in Turkey
related to possible Armenian territorial claims
and the initiation of the international process of
recognising the genocide, which would provide
support for the efforts made by the Armenian
diaspora. In April 1991, even before the break-up
of the USSR, the Turkish ambassador to Russia
visited Yerevan. During meetings with Armenian
leaders, he was assured that Armenia would not
make any territorial claims in regard to Turkey.
Since then, Turkish-Armenian relations, already
heavy with their historical burden, have become
even more complicated because of the conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh which started in 1988.
The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan was
the direct cause of Turkey’s decision to take the
side of Azerbaijan, and resolve not to establish d-
iplomatic relations with Armenia. Unofficially, An-
kara presented three preconditions to Yerevan:
1) abandoning its territorial claims in regard to
Turkey; 2) abandoning its aggressive policy to-
wards Azerbaijan; 3) ceasing accusations of geno-
cide of Armenians. Turkey’s fears of Armenia’s
efforts to revise borders were provoked by the fol-
lowing words in the Declaration of Independence
adopted on 23 August 1991: ‘The Republic of Ar-
menia stands in support of the task of achieving
international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in
Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia’ (art. 11)12.
Ankara also states that by virtue of the Armenian
constitution (art. 13), the Armenian national em-
blem features Mount Ararat, situated on Turkish
territory, which proves that it has claims over
Turkish territory13.
In August 1992, a Turkish delegation came to Yere-
van to discuss the prospect of development of bi-
lateral relations. The only outcome was the sign-
ing of agreements on the sales of 300 million kW
of energy and wheat supplies to Armenia. The
agreement on the sales of wheat was suspended
a few months later, and the energy agreement
was cancelled by Turkey the same year because of
strong protests from Azerbaijan. In the following
months, the impact of the Karabakh conflict on
Turkish-Armenian relations rose considerably, and
in April 1993 Turkey decided to close its border
with Armenia, believing that this act would weak-
en Armenia’s position. Since then, the Turkish po-
licy towards Armenia has been strictly linked to
Azerbaijan’s policy towards Armenia.
In the period immediately after the independent
Armenian state was re-established in 1991, the
Turkish government was not unanimous in its po-
litical line towards Armenia. The then-President
Turgut Ozal advocated a firm and aggressive poli-
cy, and believed that Armenia should be ‘scared’;
‘dropping a few bombs’ on the border territories
in Armenia would make them soften their position
towards Karabakh14. Suleyman Demirel, who was
Prime Minister at that time, was in favour of
a more cautious and non-confrontational policy.
In the end, Demirel’s opinion prevailed; he re-
placed Ozal as president in 1993. Despite a lack
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of decision on diplomatic relations with Arme-
nia, Ankara did not abandon attempts to establish
alternative contacts with Yerevan, for example, by
inviting Armenia to become a member of the
Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). In June
1992, at the Istanbul summit where the BSEC was
founded, a meeting was held between Prime Mini-
ster Demirel and the Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian. For Armenia, relations with Turkey,
apart from the issues of Karabakh and relations
with Azerbaijan, have become the most important
foreign policy problem. After 1991, Ankara’s de-
clared will to open up to post-Soviet Turkic-speak-
ing republics and an attempt to revive the con-
cept of pan-Turkism increased the Armenians’ feel-
ing of being threatened15. Since the beginning of
the 1990s, the Armenian authorities have tried
to normalise relations with Turkey without put-
ting forward any preconditions. Yerevan initially
decided not to politicise the problem of the geno-
cide so as not to further complicate with Turkey
any relations. However, neither this Armenian po-
licy nor the cease-fire signed in 1994 in Nagorno-
-Karabakh led to a breakthrough: no dialogue be-
tween Ankara and Yerevan began, and the border
remained closed. Since the mid-1990s Turkish-Ar-
menian relations have been in a deadlock. The
launch of a project to transport energy supplies
from Azerbaijan though Turkish territory to the
West has contributed to Turkey’s toughened and
uncompromising policy towards Armenia. The
government in Baku expects Turkey to back their
political line towards Yerevan, even though this
had not always been beneficial to Turkish inte-
rests. Turkish-Armenian relations have thus be-
come to some extent a ‘hostage’ to Azerbaijani-
-Turkish relations. The close collaboration between
Azerbaijan and Turkey has increased Armenia’s
isolation in the region, as was exemplified by Ar-
menia’s exclusion from the project of construc-
tion of the Baku–Ceyhan oil pipeline16.
2.1. The Nagorno-Karabakh problem
in Turkish-Armenian relations
As a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh, the third party, Azer-
baijan, has become involved in relations between
Turkey and Armenia. Throughout almost the
whole period of the conflict, Armenia has feared
Turkish military intervention in support of Azer-
baijan. Ankara, despite regular threats made
against Yerevan, has refrained from direct invol-
vement on the Azerbaijani side17. In a way, Turk-
ish policy has reached an impasse. On one hand,
Turkey did not want to see relations with the West
and Russia worsened, which any military inter-
vention by them would certainly cause. On the
other, it is obliged to respond to the expectations
of Azerbaijan and other Turkic-speaking republics
which expect Ankara to take an active position in
the conflict. Turkey’s influence on the conflict over
Karabakh was restricted to lobbying in favour of
Azerbaijan in the international arena, which how-
ever was quite effectively countered by the Arme-
nian diaspora. Ankara has gone further than just
verbally supporting Baku, and since the end of
1991 it has started to secretly supply Azerbaijan
with arms, equipment and a certain number of
‘military experts’. Turkey has also begun to train
Azerbaijani officers in Turkish military schools.
However, even Armenian specialists admit that
Turkish aid, taking into account Turkey’s poten-
tial and interest in extending its geopolitical as-
cendancy in the region, has been limited18. In rela-
tion to the threat of an Armenian intervention
against the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan,
Ankara ‘reminded’ Armenia that the Treaty of Kars
states that Turkey is a guarantor of security and
the borders of the region. In May 1992, President
Ozal demanded that the Turkish government send
troops to Nakhchivan in order to defend it against
possible Armenian attack19. Turkey’s cautious
attitude in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is
a result of many factors: its relations with the EU,
Kurdish separatism, the Cyprus question, difficul-
ties in relations with other neighbouring coun-
tries, Russia’s position, the unstable economic si-
tuation, and the actions of the Armenian lobby
in the West20. In this situation, launching a mili-
tary operation against Armenia could exacerbate
Ankara’s problems in the international arena21.
The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh remains one
of the crucial issues making the normalisation of
Turkish-Armenian relations difficult.
2.2. The issue of the Turkish-
-Armenian border
On 3 April 1993, Ankara announced its decision
to stop supplying wheat and all other humani-
tarian aid to Armenia through Turkish territory22,
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which amounted to a closing of the Turkish-Ar-
menian border and the imposition of an econo-
mic embargo on Armenia. Since then, Turkey has
constantly associated the question of reopening
the border with Armenia with a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the withdrawal
of Armenian troops from the occupied regions of
Azerbaijan23. Armenia has not advanced any pre-
conditions for reopening the border. The question
of the closed Turkish-Armenian border is also link-
ed with the problem of recognising Armenia’s pre-
sent borders. Ankara has criticised Yerevan for
seeking to revise them by questioning the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Kars. Armenia claims it has
frequently declared that it has no territorial claims
to Turkey. When Armenia joined the Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, it con-
firmed that it had no desire to change the state’s
borders. In the interview for the Turkish Daily
News, the President of Armenia Robert Kocharian
stated that ‘Turkey’s recognition of the genocide
of Armenians will not result in Armenia making
any territorial claims’24. Similarly, the Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian has often declar-
ed that Armenia would respect the provisions
included in the Treaty of Kars25. On the other hand,
in April 2005 while emphasising Armenia’s lack
of territorial claims, President Kocharian said: ‘And
on our agenda today is the issue of genocide reco-
gnition. Future presidents and future politicians
will deal with the legal consequences of that’26.
However, Turkey expects the Armenian parliament
to adopt a special declaration which would affirm
the existing borders and stipulate that Armenia
would not make any claims on Turkish territory.
It appears that this condition from Ankara is simp-
ly a pretext not to reopen the border with Arme-
nia. On the other hand, the Armenian government
cannot adopt such a parliamentary resolution as
it would be received negatively by both Arme-
nian society and the diaspora because of strong
revisionist feelings27.
Opinions that Armenia wishes to rebuild a ‘Great-
er Armenia’ are frequently encountered among
Turks28. Additionally, no influential groups in Tur-
key would be interested in reopening the border.
Only the authorities of the eastern regions believe
it would stimulate their economic development29.
On both the Turkish and the Armenian sides there
are some opinions that Turkish sanctions are in-
effective, and – paradoxically – opening the bor-
der and establishing diplomatic relations will in-
crease Turkey’s possibilities for influencing Arme-
nia. Despite periodically appearing rumours that
Ankara is inclined to open its border with Arme-
nia, at the moment this is quite unlikely. The so-
lution to the problem hinges mainly on a break-
through in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations30.
The EU could have a positive impact on the two
sides; Ankara will be ever more obliged to take the
EU’s opinion into account, particularly with regard
to its progress towards European integration, and
Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora organisations
in the EU countries are also trying to get support
from Brussels. In several EU documents regarding
Turkey, appeals to unblock the Turkish-Armenian
border have been made. In September 2006, the
European Parliament called on Ankara to ‘take the
necessary steps, without any preconditions, to es-
tablish diplomatic and neighbourly relations with
Armenia, to lift the economic blockade and quickly
open the border’31. Growing pressure from the EU
(albeit only if relations between the EU and Turkey
are good), and to some extent from the US, may be
the factor which will lead to the opening of the
border even without any simultaneous progress
in negotiations to settle the Karabakh conflict32.
2.3. The problem of the genocide
of Armenians
Under President Levon Ter-Petrossian (1991–1998)
Armenia abandoned its policy of politicising the
genocide problem and raising it in the interna-
tional arena. The first president of post-Soviet in-
dependent Armenia was the proponent of a mo-
derate policy towards Turkey. In his opinion, de-
manding that Turkey recognise the massacres and
deportations as genocide could create an image
of Armenia as a state making territorial claims
on its neighbours, and could thus weaken Arme-
nia’s justified efforts to get hold of Nagorno-Ka-
rabakh33. Ter-Petrossian’s successor, Robert Kocha-
rian, radically changed Armenia’s policy towards
the problem, and international recognition of the
genocide became one of the priorities in Arme-
nia’s foreign policy34. This shift in policy was also
the result of the conviction that raising the issue
of the genocide would strengthen Armenia’s inter-
national position, including its position in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh35. In this way,
23
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another question was added to many problems
in Turkish-Armenian relations; this problem be-
came one of the most important and difficult.
Turks reject accusations of their complicity in the
massacres of Armenians in 1915, fearing at the
same time that international recognition of the
genocide (especially by the American Congress)
would be equal to financial claims from Armenian
diaspora organisations. The problem of not recog-
nising the slaughter of Armenians as a genocide
by Turkey, and the problem of Turkish-Armenian
relations in the wider context, is having an in-
creasingly large impact on Ankara’s relations with
the EU36 as Europe starts to perceive the question
as part of the broader all-European history and
memory37. For several years now, the atmosphere
surrounding the genocide problem has been
changing in Turkey. At least ten books and arti-
cles presenting a point of view different from the
official one have been published; conferences have
been held and a related public debate has been
started. Armenians are watching these changes
with satisfaction38. Another sign of the changes
was the letter sent in March 2005 by Prime Mini-
ster Recep Tayyip Erdogan to President Robert Ko-
charian containing a proposal to set up a joint hi-
storical commission whose task would be to make
a judgement on the events of 1915. The initiative
was backed by some Turkish historians who re-
cognise the genocide (including Taner Akcam).
Ankara’s offer marked a substantial turnaround
in Turkish policy; however, it was rejected by the
authorities in Yerevan who responded that the ge-
nocide was a fact which was not open to debate.
In regard to Armenia’s intensified efforts for in-
ternational recognition of the genocide, the Turk-
ish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül announced at
the end of 2006 that Ankara was considering
a new strategy towards the Armenian campaign,
part of which will be to go to the International
Court of Arbitration39. Gül also believed that the
issue of the genocide would be one of the priori-
ties in Turkish foreign policy in the coming years.
In a foreseeable future there is probably little
chance of Turkey and Armenia reaching any agree-
ment on the genocide because of the uncompro-
mising position of both sides. Some Armenians,
however, think that the problem should be moved
from the political ground to the legal and inter-
national dimension. A certain change in Yerevan’s
position may have been signalled by President
Kocharian’s statement in February 2007 that Ar-
menia is ready to set up a joint Armenian-Turk-
ish governmental commission (but not a histori-
cal one) to discuss the events of 191540.
2.4. The influence of the Armenian
diaspora on relations between Ankara
and Yerevan
The Armenian diaspora is a very important fac-
tor influencing Turkish-Armenian relations. It is
estimated that there are about 8–10 million Ar-
menians, of whom only one-third (3.2 million)
live in the Republic of Armenia. Armenians living
in various countries (they are particularly nume-
rous in Russia, the US and France) have created
efficient organisations which are influential ad-
vocacy groups on the politics of the countries they
live in. The strongest Armenian lobby exists in
the US, where the diaspora is grouped into two
major organisations: the Armenian Assembly of
America and the Armenian National Committee
of America. The diaspora’s main goal is to achieve
the recognition of the 1915 massacres as geno-
cide by Turkey and the international community.
Many parliamentary declarations recognising the
genocide of Armenians have been made possible
due to influence from the Armenian lobby. The
Armenian diaspora is able to exert influence not
only on the governmental politics of the coun-
tries they live in, but also on Yerevan’s politics as
well. After Armenia regained independence, the
influence of Armenians living outside the coun-
try increased considerably thanks to their finan-
cial resources; a few representatives of the diaspo-
ra have come to hold important state positions.
The first Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Hova-
nissian (1991–1992) was an Armenian from the
US; the present Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian
(in office since 1998) was born in Syria and studied
at American universities. The impact of the dias-
pora on Yerevan’s politics strengthened particu-
larly after Robert Kocharian became president.
In Turkey, the opinion that the Armenian diaspora
is one of the major obstacles in reaching Turkish-
-Armenian agreement is widespread, and if Yere-
van was the only party in negotiations, agreement
could be achieved much more quickly41. From
the Turkish point of view, organisations of Arme-
nians living in the West are more conservative
and uncompromising, and negatively affect the
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possibilities for reconciliation between the two
states and nations42.
The Armenian diaspora in Russia, which is cur-
rently the largest Armenian community outside
Armenia itself43, is very specific in character. It is
not as influential as the Western diasporae, and
does not try to exert any influence on Turkey, Rus-
sia or other countries’ policy towards Ankara.
A reverse process can even be seen; the Armenian
diaspora is one of Moscow’s more significant in-
struments of pressure on Armenia, and some of its
structures were even created at the Kremlin’s ini-
tiative. The biggest Armenian organisation in the
Russian Federation (the Union of Russian Arme-
nians, headed by Ara Abramian) has close ties
with the authorities, and so organisations of Ar-
menians in different countries have accused it of
wishing to put the diaspora at Russia’s service44.
2.5. Attempts to bring about Turkish-
-Armenian agreement
Turkish-Armenian relations have remained frozen
since the beginning of the 1990s; however, the
two parties have periodically made attempts to
establish a dialogue. An occasion for Turkish and
Armenian representatives to meet is provided,
among other events, by BSEC summits and UN Ge-
neral Assembly sessions. In Istanbul there is a per-
manent Armenian BSEC representative office that
fulfils the function of an unofficial Armenian di-
plomatic mission in Turkey. Although regular in-
formation appears in the media that the two par-
ties are close to reaching agreement, there have
been no signs in recent years that would allow
such a conclusion to be drawn. Even Turkey’s in-
significant attempts to establish a dialogue with
Armenia provoke negative reactions of Baku. Great
expectations to normalise the relations between
Ankara and Yerevan can be linked with Turkey’s
integration into European structures. Armenia
supports this process, believing that the closer
Turkey is to EU membership, the easier it will be
to bring about a breakthrough in Turkish-Arme-
nian relations. Other actors apart from the EU are
trying to get involved in the normalisation pro-
cess between Turkey and Armenia. In July 2001,
at the initiative of the US, the Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was created; its
members were well-known Turkish and Arme-
nian social activists, scientists and retired diplo-
mats. The TARC’s objective was to initiate an offi-
cial dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. How-
ever, both Yerevan and Ankara distanced them-
selves from the TARC45. The Armenian government
believed that the Commission was an attempt to
suppress the issue of the genocide as an interna-
tional problem; the Turkish government feared
that the Commission’s activities could make it ne-
cessary for Turkey to assume responsibility for
the events of 1915. Furthermore, the attitudes of
the US-based diaspora organisations in the US
were not unanimous. The Armenian Assembly of
America reacted positively to the efforts made by
the Committee, whereas the Armenian National
Committee of America saw it as a dismissal of the
idea that the genocide of Armenians should be
recognised. In February 2003, the International
Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), a human
rights organisation based in New York, issued
a legal opinion commissioned by the TARC on the
question whether the events of 1915 could be
recognised as a genocide in the light of interna-
tional law46. The report stated that ‘the events in-
clude all elements of the crime of genocide as de-
fined by the United Nations Convention [on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide to Events which Occurred During the Early
Twentieth Century]’. The publication of the ICTJ’s
report and a lack of sufficient political support
from Washington47 caused the TARC to finish its
work in April 2004, and present seven recommen-
dations for the governments of Turkey and Ar-
menia48. Although the Committee did not reach
its set objective, it should be seen as a valuable
initiative. ‘It was the first attempt to establish an
institutional dialogue between the societies of
Turkey and Armenia and the Armenian diaspo-
ra’49. In April 2007, at the initiative of the Eli
Wiesel Foundation for Humanity, 53 Nobel Prize
laureates signed an appeal calling for reconcilia-
tion between Turkey and Armenia50.
3. The economy
Turkey’s closure of its border with Armenia in
April 1993 hampered bilateral economic develop-
ment, but did not stop it altogether. Goods were
exchanged in transit through the territory of Geor-
gia, and trade exchange has been growing sys-
tematically. According to data from the National
25
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Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia,
in 2005 export to Turkey amounted to US$2.47 m
(0.25% of all Armenian exports), and US$66.9 mil-
lion of imports (3.7% of Armenian import)51.
In 2007 the trade turnout between Turkey and
Armenia was 133.7 million US $ (3% of Armenian
foreign trade). Unofficial figures reach US$150–
–200 million annually52. Armenia occupies a mar-
ginal place in Turkey’s overall balance sheet. On
the other hand, Turkey is officially the eleven
among the Armenian trading partners. In May
1997, at the BSEC summit in Istanbul, a group of
Turkish businesspeople set up the non-govern-
mental Turkish-Armenian Business Development
Council (TABDC), based in Istanbul and Yerevan.
This is currently the only initiative aimed at the
development of economic contacts between the
two countries53. The TABDC’s position is similar to
that of Yerevan, which believes that economic con-
tacts should not depend on political relations. As
research by the World Bank in 2000 showed,
opening the border would contribute to a sub-
stantial increase in economic contacts between
Turkey and Armenia. However, it would mainly
benefit the Armenian economy, which is incom-
parably smaller than the Turkish one, and con-
sequently more sensitive to short-term changes.
Armenia could double the volume of its exports,
which would quickly lead to the growth of GDP
by 30%54. It would also result in savings of
US$50 m annually on transit through Georgian
territory, but on the other hand it would cause
a rise in imports into Armenia. Contrary conclu-
sions were presented in the report published in
July 2005 by the Armenian-European Policy and
Legal Advice Centre (AEPLAC) based in Yerevan.
The report argues that benefits for the Armenian
economy brought by the opening of the border
with Turkey will be insignificant, and will not
cause a radical improvement in the country; GDP
will grow by as little as 0.67%. Critics of the report
state that the report was a political commission,
and its objective is to maintain the present Arme-
nian oligarchic economic system, which could not
survive the opening of the border55. That would
also contribute to the development of Turkey’s
eastern provinces, which could then substantially
increase production thanks to access to the Arme-
nian market. As early as 1995, the mayor of Kars
announced that opening the border posts with
Armenia would provide an important economic
impulse to the region56. In recent years Turkey
has undertaken several actions to improve the
terms of trade exchange. In 1996, Ankara return-
ed to the liberal visa system with Armenia (stop-
ped in 2001) which allows Armenian citizens to
obtain a visa at Turkish airports without the
need to have it before entering Turkey. For some
years Armenian interest in tourism to Turkey,
both to its eastern part and to sea resorts on the
Mediterranean coast, has been growing57.
4. Security
Conflicts in the region of the Southern Caucasus,
particularly the tense relations between Turkey
and Armenia, have made the region especially
important to Turkey’s security. Persuaded by the
feeling of threat from Turkey and Azerbaijan, Ye-
revan has established a close political and mili-
tary alliance with Russia. This alliance has forced
Armenia into an asymmetric dependence on Mos-
cow, and the resultant Russian influences in the
region constitute a significant geopolitical factor,
with considerable impact on Turkey’s security.
Similarly, Armenia’s closer ties with Iran and its
political and military collaboration with Greece,
even though they do not pose a direct threat to
Turkey’s security, are certainly unfavourable to An-
kara58. The presence of Russian troops in Armenia
(at the base in Gyumri) is another unsettling fact
for Ankara59. Russia has provided support for Ar-
menia during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (parti-
cularly since 1992), which had a great impact on
Ankara’s moderate involvement in this conflict.
In May 1992, when there was a danger of Turkey
intervening militarily in support of Azerbaijan, the
Russian marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov threaten-
ed that a potential Turkish intervention could lead
to the break-out of ‘the third World War’60. In Au-
gust 1997, Yerevan and Moscow signed an agree-
ment on mutual assistance, co-operation and
friendship providing for military support in case
of an external attack. Additionally, Armenia is
a founding member of the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), a military alliance of
post-Soviet countries created under the auspices
of Russia and assuming the collective defence of
its member states61. In 1998, a fleet of MiG-29
fighter planes and the Russian S-300 air defence
system were deployed on Armenian territory62.
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Russia is interested in maintaining the status quo
in Turkish-Armenian (and Armenian-Azerbaijani)
relations, as their normalisation would inevitably
lead to a significant decrease in Russian ascendan-
cy in the region63. In the 1990s, Armenia was accu-
sed in the Turkish media of supporting the Kur-
distan Workers’ Party (PKK)64. There were allegedly
Kurdish training camps on Armenian territory, and
the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was supposedly
residing in the town of Lachin in 1994. These ac-
cusations were never confirmed, and Turkish
journalists sent to Armenia did not find any evi-
dence of the Kurdish party’s activities. Turkey’s
charges were meant to discredit Yerevan in the
international arena.
5. The socio-cultural dimension
Because of the lack of political relations, Turkey
and Armenia do not collaborate in the fields of cul-
ture and science. Few initiatives are undertaken
by the non-governmental organisations of both
countries. This can be exemplified by the project
of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development
Council which, among other activities, supports
student exchanges, and has led to the signing of
a protocol between the Middle East Technical Uni-
versity in Istanbul (ODTU) and the Yerevan State
University. In recent years, study visit program-
mes for journalists from the two countries have
also been developing.
6. Conclusions and forecasts
Contemporary relations between Turkey and Ar-
menia were born in a particular regional context
(the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) and burdened by
historical events (the genocide of Armenians).
To a large extent, current Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions have their roots in the events of the begin-
ning of the 1990s. Ankara’s policy has remained
unchanged for many years: Turkey makes the im-
provement of relations with Yerevan dependent
on the settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Ka-
rabakh, an end to the Armenian occupation of
Azerbaijani territory, and the abandonment of Ar-
menian territorial claims towards Turkey. A se-
rious issue that complicates the normalisation of
bilateral relations is the problem of the genocide
of Armenians. This problem is becoming an in-
creasingly important challenge for Ankara and has
impact on Turkey’s relations with many coun-
tries and the EU. Although Turkey remains loyal
to its opinion about the events of 1915, in the
recent years the approach to this problem has
clearly been changing in Turkey. This change is
being positively received by Armenians, even
though they deem it insufficient. The economic
blockade of Armenia, in effect since 1993, has
not become an effective instrument of pressure.
Paradoxically, it can be assumed that if Turkish-
Armenian diplomatic relations were established,
Ankara’s possibility of influencing Yerevan would
be greater. It would also weaken Russia’s influ-
ence in Armenia, thus changing the geopolitics
of the region. In Turkey, there are currently two
main approaches to relations with Armenia. Ac-
cording to the first and dominating one, the pre-
sent policy should be continued as eventually it
will lead to concessions made by Armenians.
According to the second approach, the Turkish
policy de facto hinges on Azerbaijan’s policy to-
wards Yerevan, which limits Ankara’s possibilities
of influencing the region of the Southern Cauca-
sus. Proponents of this approach claim that Tur-
key is acting against its own interests and the
opening of the border and establishing economic
contacts with Armenia will result in rapproche-
ment of the two nations and development of Turk-
ish eastern provinces. Armenia’s position on re-
lations with Turkey has also not changed over
the years – it advocates establishment of diplo-
matic relations without any preconditions. Simul-
taneously, Yerevan has not abandoned actions
which Ankara considers unfriendly, including
efforts to recognise internationally the 1915 geno-
cide of Armenians and – from the Turkish point
of view – attempts to revise the borders, which
is reflected in Yerevan’s reluctance to recognise
their present route in a special parliamentary re-
solution. No breakthrough in relations between
Turkey and Armenia can be expected in the com-
ing years because none of the parties is likely to
agree to change its policy. Settlement of the prob-
lems is also made more difficult by the lack of an
institutional dialogue between the two states. It
can therefore be assumed that two factors may
significantly contribute to Turkey and Armenia
reaching agreement. The first is connected with
the EU’s pressure on Turkey, which if progress in
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the European integration of Turkey is made, may
lead to unblocking the border and establishing
diplomatic relations with Yerevan. The second fac-
tor is the improvement of relations between Ar-
menian and Azerbaijan, which will have a direct
impact on reaching a breakthrough in relations
between Turkey and Armenia. However, as the
prospect of solving the Karabakh conflict in the
near future remains quite unlikely, the EU may
be the factor that will have a decisive impact on
the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations.
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CHAPTER III
A Caucasian ally?
Turkish-Georgian
relations
Wojciech Konoƒczuk
Theses
1. Georgia is an important country for Turkey
principally because it is situated on the trans-
port route of Caspian energy supplies. The stra-
tegic Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the
Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline link the two
countries, and constitute the crucial reference
point in their co-operation. Until the contracts
for the construction of the oil and gas pipelines
were signed at the end of the 1990s, Georgia
occupied an insignificant place in Turkey’s for-
eign policy, and Turkey did not show an active
approach towards Georgia.
2. With the implementation of strategically im-
portant transport projects running through
Georgian territory, support for Georgia’s stabi-
lity has become the priority objective of Turkish
policy towards this country. A potential armed
conflict in Abkhazia or South Ossetia could de-
stabilise the whole region, and would thus pose
a threat to Turkish economic interests in the
Southern Caucasus.
3. After the ‘rose revolution’ a slight deteriora-
tion in Turkish-Georgian relations came about
as a result of Georgia’s unequivocally pro-Ame-
rican policy, the growing involvement of the
US in the Southern Caucasus and the increasing
rapprochement between Turkey and Russia,
which contrasts with the very poor state of
Georgian-Russian relations.
4. In its official declarations Turkey has suppor-
ted Georgia’s territorial integrity, but maintains
intensive economic contacts with Abkhazia,
a fact which causes periodic tensions in Turkish-
-Georgian relations. Particularly after the chan-
ges in Turkish-Russian relations, the Georgian
authorities started fearing that Abkhazia might
become a sort of co-dominion of Turkey and Rus-
sia. Georgia believes that solving the Abkhazian
problem requires collaboration with Turkey, but
equally thinks that Ankara has not been using
its full potential in this area.
5. The rapidly growing economic exchange be-
tween Turkey and Georgia has been gaining
more and more importance in Turkish-Georgian
relations. Although Georgia occupies an insigni-
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ficant place in Turkey’s external trade, Turkey
has become the key economic partner for Geor-
gia. Turkey’s economic presence in Georgia is
more visible than its political presence, and in
the near future it will only continue to increase.
1. An outline of Turkish-
-Georgian relations
Georgia, a small country (69,000 sq km) situated in
the Southern Caucasus, is one of Turkey’s smallest
neighbours, bordering the North-East regions of
Artvin and Ardahan1. The length of the Turkish-
-Georgian land border is 252 km, and their border
on the Black Sea is 22 km long. Turks and Geor-
gians have been neighbours since the end of the
eleventh century, and the history of their relations
is full of armed conflicts in which Turks usually
played the role of aggressors who dominated
Georgian duchies. From the sixteenth century the
western part of Georgia came under Turkish rule;
then at the beginning of the nineteenth century
it was annexed by Russia, which in the following
decades incorporated the bulk of Georgian lands
into its territory. At the end of World War I Turkey
attempted to take over Georgian provinces; for
some time Turkish troops occupied Ajaria and part
of Javakhetia, but Georgians won the defensive
war (April–June 1918). After a short period of inde-
pendence (1918–1921), Georgia was incorporated
into Soviet Russia and the Turkish-Georgian bor-
der was demarcated by virtue of the Treaty of Kars
of October 1921. The route of the border as con-
firmed at that time was recognised by indepen-
dent Georgia in 19922.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South-
ern Caucasian countries have emerged as the
main areas of Turkish foreign policy. Georgia has
become an important country for Turkey because
of its geographical situation, its role as a transit
country separating Turkey from Azerbaijan and
the states of Central Asia, and because of the lack
of Turkish-Armenian relations. Georgia’s role as
the ‘gates’ of Turkey to the remaining countries
of the region, together with the fact that it is sit-
uated on the route of energy supplies from the
Caspian Sea, is the principal factor shaping con-
temporary Turkish-Georgian relations. For Georgia,
Turkey became a ‘window overlooking Europe’
at the beginning of the 1990s, an alternative to
Russia. In the period of the Cold War the Georgian
Socialist Soviet Republic, like the whole Southern
Caucasus, was considered an area of potential con-
flict between the USSR and NATO, as Turkey was
a member of the latter. The Turkish-Georgian bor-
der was tightly closed, and the border region hea-
vily militarised, which led to contacts between
Turkey and Georgia being severed for almost se-
venty years. It was not until 1988 when the first
border post was opened in Sarp (on the Georgian
side; Sarpi near Batumi), which was a signal of
a thaw, and the approaching end of the Cold War.
In 1994, another Turkish-Georgian border post was
opened in Türkgozü-Posof/Vale. Due to the deca-
des-long isolation, the Turkish and Georgian socie-
ties do not know much about each other. The per-
ception of Turks in Georgia is on the one hand
shaped by a long history of vilifying them in the
Russian Empire and the USSR3, but on the other
hand by a history of Georgian-Turkish relations
where Turks are stereotyped as invaders. This pic-
ture has been modified by the short experience of
contacts after 1991, mainly economic exchanges.
As a result, the attitude of Georgians towards
Turks is marked by mistrust and a certain degree
of suspicion. In the consciousness of Turks, Geor-
gia is present to only a small extent; Georgians are
their least known neighbours. The process by
which the societies of Turkey and Georgia can
learn about each other may be encouraged by an
increase in bilateral trade exchange and the abo-
lishment of visas between the two countries4.
Since the second half of the 1990s, Turkey has be-
come a place where Georgians go to look for jobs.
Although it is not the most frequently chosen de-
stination for those seeking jobs, around 80,000
Georgian citizens are estimated to be working
there5. According to Georgian estimates, there are
at least a few tens of thousands of Turks working
in Georgia, mainly in the trade sector. In Turkey,
there are also 14 associations and foundations re-
presenting immigrants from Georgia who are in
close co-operation with associations of Georgian
Muslims from the Artvin region6. Both diasporae
maintain active economic ties with Georgia. The
Laz, an ethnic group of Georgian descent which
has to a large extent assimilated to Turkish cul-
ture, are a separate minority; they live in North-
-East Turkey7. Their sense of attachment to Geor-
gia is quite weakly developed, and they do not
exert any influence on Turkish-Georgian relations.
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2. The evolution of political
contacts
The creation of new states in the Southern Cau-
casus has obliged Ankara to redefinie its position
in the region and initiate a new Turkish policy to-
wards this area. The policy’s main assumption
was decided support for sovereignty of Georgia
and the remaining Southern Caucasian states.
On 16 December 1991, Turkey was the first state
in the world to recognise Georgia’s indepen-
dence8. In May 1992, both countries established
diplomatic relations, and a month later President
Suleyman Demirel was the first leader of a for-
eign state to pay an official visit to Georgia, a ges-
ture which symbolised Turkish ambitions to play
a key role in the region. One of the effects of the
visit was an agreement on friendship, co-opera-
tion and neighbourly relations signed on 30 July
1992. In the period of the Georgian civil war and
the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Tur-
key granted Georgia a low interest rate loan worth
US$50 million and provided humanitarian aid,
which improved Turkey’s image in Georgian so-
ciety. Ankara equally contributed to the cease-fire
in South Ossetia in 1992. After the military opera-
tions came to an end and the situation in Geor-
gia assumed relative stability, in January 1994
Eduard Shevardnadze, the then leader of the coun-
try9, went to Turkey on an official visit – the first
trip by a Georgian leader to a country outside the
post-Soviet area. The visit’s greatest success was
the introduction of Georgia onto the internatio-
nal arena without the mediation of Russia10. The
term ‘strategic partnership’ was used to refer to
Turkish-Georgian relations for the first time. How-
ever, during the first years of Georgia’s indepen-
dence, Turkish policy towards the country was not
very active and was of limited scope. This result-
ed from the fact that Ankara then treated its re-
lations with Azerbaijan and Central Asian coun-
tries as a priority, and the crucial objective of An-
kara’s policy towards Tbilisi was to guarantee its
stability (however, it is hard to say that Turkey has
undertaken any specific actions with this end).
Consequently, Turkey has not gained a significant
influence on the situation in Georgia, and the like-
lihood of it ever doing so was in fact small. Anka-
ra’s second major task was not to allow the situa-
tion in Georgia and the entire region to be domi-
nated by Russia11. Turkey then started opting for
a policy of balancing out Russian influences.
Tbilisi advocated a more active Turkish policy, to
provide it with a counterweight to Russia’s policy.
In an attempt not to allow Russia’s influence to
return (and to some extent, that of Iran), Ankara
backed Georgia’s integration with international
organisations: the United Nations, the Council of
Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-ope-
ration in Europe and – since the mid-1990s – col-
laboration with NATO within the framework of
Partnership for Peace. In June 1992, Georgia be-
came a founding member of the Black Sea Eco-
nomic Co-operation (BSEC), a structure for regio-
nal co-operation created at Turkey’s initiative12.
Since the mid-1990s Georgia has been gaining new
importance for Turkey as the project for energy
supplies from Azerbaijan was launched. Although
the shortest transport route went through Arme-
nia, due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and
the lack of Turkish-Armenian diplomatic relations,
Georgia became the key transit country. For this
reason, Turkey has attached great importance to
Georgia’s stability. The newly-established Turkish-
-Georgian relations were confirmed by the visit of
the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz in Tbi-
lisi in March 1998, during which he called Georgia
a ‘country with which Turkey shares common in-
terests, towards which Turkey has a will to in-
crease collaboration in all spheres, and whose in-
dependence is beneficial to the peace and stabi-
lity of the Southern Caucasus’13. In January 2000,
Ankara and Tbilisi announced a joint initiative en-
titled the Stabilisation Pact for the Southern Cau-
casus. The project was meant not only to enhance
Turkey’s significance in the region but also ensure
the EU and Russia’s greater commitment to its
transformation14. However, Armenia and Azerbai-
jan’s distant approach to the concept and Russia’s
mistrust caused the initiative to end in failure.
2.1. Turkey and the situation
in Ajaria
Turkey maintains special ties with Ajaria, a Geor-
gian province situated on the Black Sea coast on
Georgia’s south-western border with the Republic
of Turkey, and inhabited mostly by Georgian Mus-
lims. By virtue of the Treaty of Kars, Turkey is the
guarantor of the borders, autonomy and freedom
of religion for Muslims from Ajaria. After Georgia
regained its independence, this provision start-
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ed causing concern for the Georgian authorities,
which feared that Turkey would want to inter-
fere in its internal affairs. These concerns did not
prove to be true, although Ankara does indeed
maintain active relations with Ajaria. In the 1990s,
when the danger of Ajarian separatism grew, Turk-
ish diplomacy softened tensions between Tbilisi
and Batumi. In 2000, when the then leader of the
region Aslan Abashidze intended to stand for the
presidential elections, thus challenging the in-
cumbent Eduard Shevardnadze, the Turkish Pre-
sident Suleyman Demirel persuaded him to chan-
ge his mind. Ankara also contributed to solving
the conflict in Ajaria in May 2004 as well as the
ouster of Abashidze, which put an end to a dozen
years of this autonomous region’s de facto sepa-
ration from Georgia. The limitation of Ajaria’s
autonomy after 2004 caused a periodic deterio-
ration in Turkish-Georgian relations.
2.2. Turkey and the conflict
in Abkhazia
Officially, Turkey supports Georgia’s territorial in-
tegrity15; because of its own problems with Kurd-
ish separatism, Turkey attaches great importance
to the principle of the immutability of borders.
However, the situation in Abkhazia is one of the
major issues complicating Turkish-Georgian re-
lations. The presence of an Abkhazian population
in Turkey (numbering about 400,000–500,000) has
some influence on Turkish policy regarding this
problem16. The Abkhazians living in Turkey (also
called Cherkess) are trying to press Ankara to in-
crease its involvement in support of Abkhazia, al-
though their possibilities of exerting influence on
the Turkish policy are limited. The self-appoint-
ed Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba (who
ruled from 1993–2005) visited Turkey many times
in attempts to win support for the province’s in-
dependence, although he was never officially re-
ceived by the Turkish authorities. Towards the end
of the 1990s, Turkey tried to be more active in
solving the problem of Abkhaz separatism, which
however ended in failure. Irrespective of Ankara’s
political passivity towards the Abkhazia problem,
Turkish-Abkhaz trade relations are developing in-
tensively. Until recently, despite the Georgian for-
mal prohibition, Turkish trading ships delivered
cargos to Abkhaz ports without any obstacles, and
the trade exchange was continually rising. The si-
tuation changed in 2004 after the US delivered pa-
trol boats to Georgia which could effectively mo-
nitor the Georgian sea border. The Georgian coast-
line patrol started imposing fines on Turkish ships
(as on Russian, Ukrainian and Bulgarian ones)
which travelled to Abkhazia without permission;
a few ships were even confiscated17. Because of
the developing rapprochement between Turkey
and Russia, the Georgian authorities started fear-
ing that Abkhazia could become a sort of co-domi-
nion between Turkey and Russia. At the same
time, Georgia realises that solving the Abkhazian
conflict requires collaboration with Ankara, which
would be able to exert some influence on Abkha-
zia. Today, Turkey is Abkhazia’s biggest trading
partner – over 50% of Abkhaz export in 2006 went
to the Turkish market18, Turkish investments in
the Abkhaz economy are also considerable. Geor-
gia appreciates the possibilities of the Turkish im-
pact on Sukhumi; however, it believes that the
Turks have a potential which they do not want
to use19. In Georgia, the idea of replacing Russian
peace-keeping troops in Abkhazia by multinatio-
nal peace-keeping forces with a large participation
of Turkish soldiers has been expressed many ti-
mes. As Abkhazia and Russia have objected to it,
the idea has not so far been implemented.
2.3. The problem of the Meskhetian
Turks
One of the problems in Turkish-Georgian relations
is the situation of the Meskhetian Turks20. Turkey
supports their repatriation to Georgia, although
it has not put the Georgian authorities under any
particular pressure on this issue. Tbilisi has for-
mally agreed to their return, but it fears the relat-
ed costs and ethnic conflicts between the displa-
ced people and the Armenians living in the region
which the Turks abandoned (Samtskhe-Javakhe-
tia). In 1999, during negotiations about joining
the Council of Europe, Georgia committed itself to
adopting a legal framework within two years
which would make it possible to repatriate the
Meskhetian Turks and reintegrate them with
Georgian society. Their return would be planned
within 12 years after Georgia became a member
of the Council of Europe21. However, Tbilisi has
delayed the process, and it has not so far even
started. At the end of 2005, a parliamentary com-
mission on repatriating the Meskhetian Turks
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was set up; its head was Georgia’s minister for
conflict resolution Giorgi Khaindrava. The com-
mission’s members visited places in Uzbekistan,
Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where the
Meskhetian Turks lived. However, after Khaindra-
va was dismissed in July 2006, the commission’s
activity stopped. In June 2007, the Georgian par-
liament finally adopted a law which allows the
repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks; the process
is set to begin in 2008 and finish in 2011. How-
ever, this does not mean that the majority of the
Meskhetian Turks will return to Georgia, or that
those who decide to come back will be able to
settle in Samtskhe-Javakhetia, where their ances-
tors once lived.
2.4. Turkish-Georgian relations
after the ‘rose revolution’
The Georgian ‘rose revolution’ of November 2003
was an important landmark in the history of Turk-
ish-Georgian relations. Turkey quickly established
contacts with the new government led by Mik-
heil Saakashvili; however, it reserved a cautious
approach to the revolution itself and its implica-
tions. This stems from the fact that in Turkish fo-
reign policy, questions of democracy are not prio-
rities. Ankara appreciated the fact that the new
authorities stabilised the internal situation and
put Georgia on the path to economic develop-
ment. The greater stability of the country, com-
pared to that of the Shevardnadze era, allowed
Turkey to finish implementing its strategic pro-
jects to transport energy from the Caspian Sea re-
gion, in which Georgia is a key transit country. It
also allowed new transport initiatives to be ini-
tiated, above all the construction of a railway line
running from Kars through Tbilisi to Baku (see
more in Chapter III). Despite the intensive develop-
ment of political and economic contacts, there
was a certain deterioration in Turkish-Georgian re-
lations after the ‘rose revolution’. This has usually
been explained by the new authorities’ lack of
experience in conducting a policy towards Turkey,
together with Georgia’s unequivocal choice of
a pro-American orientation in its foreign policy
combined with a radical deterioration in its rela-
tions with Russia22. The issue of the relations of
Turkey & Georgia with Russia & the US is exerting
an increasing influence on the shape of Turkish-
-Georgian relations. A growing rapprochement be-
tween Ankara and Moscow has been observed
for at least the last three years, whereas at the
same time Georgian-Russian relations have wor-
sened. Simultaneously, the American intervention
in Iraq substantially affected Turkish relations
with the US; Ankara’s growing mistrust of Wa-
shington’s involvement in the Black Sea region
also had an impact on American-Turkish rela-
tions23. Meanwhile, Georgian-American relations
intensified under the rule of Mikheil Saakashvili,
mainly because of the creation of a strong central
administration (which was a significant difference
in comparison with the weak rule under Shevard-
nadze) and the priority given by Tbilisi to inte-
gration with NATO. As a result, Turks tend to be-
lieve that due to the Georgian authorities’ pro-
-American stance and the increasingly visible
rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow,
Turkey no longer serves as an element balancing
Russian influences in Georgia, and its place is per-
ceived as being taken by the US. A certain change
in Turkish policy in the region has equally been
observed by Washington, which initially saw Tur-
key in the role of an intermediary to bring about
Georgian-Russian agreement. Russia is trying to
use its rapprochement in its relations with Anka-
ra to hamper American involvement in Georgia24.
Turkey is also concerned about how Georgia has
been conducting its policy towards Russia, which
considers confrontational and uncompromising.
According to press information, Ankara tried to
press Tbilisi for a more conciliatory policy towards
Russia. In the context of the tense Georgian-Rus-
sian relations, Turkey’s main preoccupation is not
to allow a conflict to break out which could de-
stabilise the region and threaten the energy sup-
ply projects. Turkey’s involvement in the case of
a potential Russian intervention is quite unlikely,
however, but Turkey’s negative position has been
and remains one of the factors preventing Russia
from adopting a policy of force towards Georgia.
Tbilisi is trying to alleviate Turkey’s discontent-
ment with some aspects of Georgian foreign poli-
cy, for example by means of regular bilateral meet-
ings with the highest-ranking state officials25.
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3. Economic relations
The Turkish presence is much more visible in the
economic than the political sphere. The history
of contemporary Turkish-Georgian economic con-
tacts can be divided into three major periods:
(1) in the years from 1991 to 1996, small Turkish
enterprises began to operate on the Georgian mar-
ket, although they were mostly ill-prepared for it,
and as a result bilateral turnover did not reach any
considerable significance; (2) after 1996, Turkish
investments started in Georgia, the agreements
for the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum
(BTE) gas pipeline were signed, and trade exchange
slightly increased26; (3) after the ‘rose revolution’,
bilateral trade grew substantially, large Turkish
firms made investments in Georgia, and the BTC
and BTE pipelines became operational; in addi-
tion, the agreement to construct a railway from
Kars to Tbilisi was concluded. Turkish-Georgian
economic co-operation is asymmetric; Georgia is
of little economic importance to Turkey, whereas
Turkey is, along Russia, Georgia’s key economic
partner. In 2007, bilateral economic exchange
amounted to US$900 million, of which Turkish
exports reached US$728 million.
In the last three years, a huge increase in Turkish
exports to Georgia has been observed. In 2003,
exports from Turkey to Georgia reached a mere
US$112 million, whereas over the following four
years it rose by US$788 million. In 2006 Turkey
overtook Russia as a main trade partner of Geor-
gia. However, in the overall balance of Turkish
external trade, Georgia’s share remains quite in-
significant, and stands at 1%. For Georgia, Turkey
is its major economic partner; in 2007 it account-
ed for 14% of all Georgian exports and 15% of its
imports27. In the coming years, it is probable that
bilateral trade exchange will continue to grow
quickly. For Georgia, however, the problem is its
growing deficit in trade with Turkey, which will
be hard to reduce in the immediate future. Since
the beginning of the 1990s, the key objective of
Turkey’s policy towards the Southern Caucasus
has been to secure energy supplies from the Cas-
pian Sea region. In November 1999, the presidents
of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed an agree-
ment in Istanbul to transport Azerbaijani oil
through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline (its
target capacity is to be 50 million tonnes a year).
The construction of the oil pipeline that will
change the geopolitics of the region started in
September 2002, and the first oil supplies arrived
at the Turkish port of Ceyhan in May 2006.
Almost at the same time, the construction of the
Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline was launched
(its target capacity is to be 20 billion cubic metres
a year); it went online in December 2006. Regard-
less of new routes for transporting Caspian oil
and gas, the importance of Turkish-Georgian ener-
gy co-operation is growing. For Georgia, Turkey
has become a partner, enabling it to reduce its full
dependence on Russian energy supplies. In Janua-
ry 2006, when the pipeline transporting Russian
gas to Georgia was damaged on Russian territory
as a result of an unexplained terrorist act28, Turkey
for the first time supported Tbilisi by providing
it with the missing amount of energy. In October
2006, Gazprom announced that from 1 January
2007 it was planning to increase its gas prices for
Georgia to US$230/1000m3. In response the Geor-
gian authorities, which believed that the deci-
sion was politically motivated, started negotia-
tions with Ankara about the possibility of buy-
ing the Turkish part of the gas transported by
the BTE pipeline. In December 2006, Tbilisi ma-
naged to persuade Ankara to sell off 0.8 billion
cubic meters of gas, which enabled Georgia to
prevent a looming energy crisis29. The Turkish
decision to sell part of its gas quite possibly de-
pended on the Georgian authorities’ agreement
to the construction of a railway connection run-
ning from Kars through Akhalkalaki & Tbilisi in
Georgia to Baku.
Turkey and Azerbaijan had started planning the
construction of the Kars–Baku railway line run-
ning through Georgian territory as early as 1993.
Initially, Georgia was sceptical about the project,
called the ‘railway Silk Road’30, as it feared a de-
stabilisation of the situation in Javakhetia (the
Georgian region inhabited mostly by ethnic Arme-
nians, through which the route of the railway
line was planned to run), increased Turkish in-
fluence in Georgia and the reduced importance
of Georgian ports31. The delay in implementing
the Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway project (KTB) was
also provoked by the negative positions taken by
the US and the EU, which are in favour of open-
ing the existing railway connection from Kars to
Tbilisi through the Armenian town of Gyumri, ar-
guing that the new project will exacerbate Arme-
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nia’s isolation32. In May 2005, the Turkish-Geor-
gian-Azerbaijani declaration to build the railway
route was adopted33. The final agreement was
signed on 7 February 2007 in Tbilisi by the presi-
dents of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan34. By vir-
tue of the document, Azerbaijan granted Geor-
gia US$200 million in a low-rate loan for 25 years
in order to finance the Georgian section of the
railway connection35. The remaining costs of the
project (US$400 million) will be covered by Tur-
key. The new railway route will be opened in three
years; it is intended to be a quicker and more se-
cure way of supplying Turkish goods to Azerbai-
jan & Central Asia, and of Azerbaijani goods to the
Turkish market36.
Turkey is also one of the largest foreign investors
in Georgia; according to data from the beginning
of 2006, Turkish investments in this country were
worth US$165 million, which puts them in fifth
place with a share of 7%37. Turkish companies are
very active participants in the Georgian privatisa-
tion programme, which started after the ‘rose re-
volution’. The authorities in Tbilisi are disturbed
by the expansion of Russian firms, and see in them
an extension of the Kremlin’s political influence,
and so they have been encouraging Turkish entre-
preneurs to invest more in Georgia. So far, Turks
have mainly invested in the food industry, tele-
communications, banking, tourism and infrastruc-
ture (for example, a consortium of Turkish compa-
nies has modernised the airports in Batumi and
Tbilisi). Energy projects also come within the
sphere of Turkish interests, above all the construc-
tion of hydroelectric plants. Although the level of
Turkish investments in Georgia has risen substan-
tially since 2003, Turkish entrepreneurs are still
quite cautious about investing in the Georgian
economy because of corruption, the poor infra-
structure, the poorly-developed banking sector
and insufficient legal protection.
4. Security
Georgia and the entire Southern Caucasus region
are perceived in Turkey as an important area for
Turkish security, although not of top priority. From
the point of view of the Turkish General Head-
quarters, Georgia at the beginning of the 1990s
was a real buffer zone separating Turkey from
Russia, which in the period of the Cold War was
treated as the main opponent, and of which since
1991 Ankara has been quite mistrustful. A break-
through event for Turkish-Georgian security co-
operation came with the signing of the agree-
ments to transport Azerbaijani oil and gas through
Georgian territory. As a result, Turkey started in-
tensively developing its military collaboration
with Georgia, and in the second half of the 1990s
Turkey became the most important state suppor-
ting reform and modernisation of the Georgian
army. In June 1997, Turkey and Georgia signed
a co-operation agreement on military education,
and in March 1999 a military co-operation agree-
ment, by virtue of which Turkish officers orga-
nised the training of Georgian soldiers, the mili-
tary police (gendarmerie) and border patrols. With
Turkish participation within the framework of
the Partnership for Peace, a new military school in
Tbilisi and training centres in several Georgian
towns were founded. Between 1999 and 2001,
Turkish workers modernised the military airport
in Marneuli, south of Tbilisi. Since 2003, a Geor-
gian squad under Turkish command has been sta-
tioned in Kosovo as part of the KFOR mission. An-
kara has also secured organisational and financial
support for the Georgian mission at the NATO
headquarters in Brussels38. From 1998 to 2002, Tur-
key granted the Georgian army aid worth US$30
million (for comparison, the annual Georgian mili-
tary budget was then US$20 million). An equally
important objective for Turkey in its support for
transforming the Georgian army was to strength-
en Georgia’s position towards Russia. It was in
Ankara’s interest to weaken and reduce Russian
influences in the region. Therefore at the organi-
sation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
summit in Istanbul in 1999, Turkey supported
Georgia’s demand for the withdrawal of Russian
military bases from Georgian territory. Moscow
committed at that time to evacuating two of its
four bases (in Vaziani near Tbilisi and in Gudauta
in Abkhazia) by 2001. Turkey also greeted with sa-
tisfaction Russia’s decision to sign an agreement
with Georgia in March 2006 to withdraw the two
remaining bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (right
near the Georgian-Turkish border) by 2008. Turk-
ish-Georgian collaboration was so intensive in the
1990s that President Eduard Shevardnadze belie-
ved it necessary to declare during his visit to An-
kara in March 1999 that the strategic partner-
ship of Georgia and Turkey was not directed
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against any third country, and that the question
of installing a Turkish military base in the Geor-
gian territory had never been considered39.
The Georgian president’s declaration was aimed
at Russia, which was increasingly concerned about
Turkey’s growing military involvement in Geor-
gia, particularly given the fact that since the end
of the 1990s Tbilisi has been more and more open
about seeking NATO membership. Turkey support-
ed those efforts; moreover, it became the strong-
est advocate of Georgia’s membership in NATO.
Turkish-Georgian military co-operation lost mo-
mentum after 2002, and Turkey was replaced as
Georgia’s major partner in the security field by
the US. This was connected with Washington’s
growing involvement in the Southern Caucasus,
and its most visible sign was the beginning of the
Train and Equip military programme in 2002,
which was geared towards Georgia and worth
US$64 million. Although the programme formal-
ly finished at the end of 2004, the US is continu-
ing to support the Georgian army. After the ‘rose
revolution’, integration with NATO became the
key objective of Georgian foreign policy40. Turkey,
which is watching the intensification of the US
presence in Georgia with growing displeasure,
officially continues to support Georgia’s desire
to join NATO. Unofficially, however, Turkey is opt-
ing for a slowdown in this process, so as not to an-
tagonise relations with Russia41. This is also mat-
ter which has brought the positions of Ankara
and Moscow closer together in their Georgian
policies, as Moscow is decidedly against Georgia’s
membership in NATO. Both states are equally op-
posed to the presence of foreign powers in the re-
gion, albeit to different degrees, and they manifest
their disfavour in different ways. There is rivalry
for influences over the region among those pow-
ers wishing to preserve the status quo (Turkey and
Russia) and states in favour of transforming the
region and integrating it rapidly with Euro-Atlan-
tic structures (led by the US)42. The result of Turk-
ish-Georgian contradictions over this issue will
to the greatest extent be determined by future
relations between Ankara and Washington.
5. The socio-cultural dimension
Cultural contacts between Turkey and Georgia
are far less intensive than between Turkey and
Azerbaijan or Central Asian countries; however,
they are systematically rising, and a Turkish cul-
tural presence in Georgia is visible. Although this
country is not a priority in Turkey’s external cul-
tural policy, Turks established quite extensive cul-
tural and scientific ties with Georgians after 1991.
The Turkish Ministry of National Education has
emphasised that among Turkey’s neighbouring
countries there are two that have particular sig-
nificance: Bulgaria and Georgia43. As early as July
1992, a bilateral agreement about development
of contacts in areas of culture, science, education
and sport was signed with Georgia. In its actions
Turkey adheres to the principle that co-opera-
tion in education is the best way of forging politi-
cal relations, particularly after 70 years of forced
isolation. Turks have placed special emphasis on
investments in Georgian higher education.
In 1993, the private Turkish Demirel College was
founded, in Batumi the Turkish-Georgian Friend-
ship College was opened and in 1995 the Geor-
gian president and the Turkish prime minister
participated in the opening of the International
Black Sea University based in Tbilisi. In recent
years, student exchange programmes have been
developing intensively; young people from Geor-
gia are interested in studies at Turkish universi-
ties because it is easier to obtain scholarships, and
Turkey is becoming more attractive as a place to
study. Turks are also starting studies in Georgia;
503 Turks studied at Georgian higher education
establishments in 200144. Turkish is being cho-
sen as a foreign language for study in Georgian
schools more often.
6. Conclusions and forecast
Although the Southern Caucasus has become
a strategically important region for Turkey, Turk-
ish foreign policy towards Georgia still has limited
capacities, and the political significance of the
Turkish factor is systematically falling. For Tur-
key the key objective in its policy towards Tbilisi
remains preserving the internal stability of the
Georgian state and preventing any armed con-
flicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia or a Geor-
gian-Russian conflict. Destabilisation of Georgia
would have a direct impact on the security of
energy supplies from the Caspian Sea as well as
the other transport and communications projects
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essential for Turkey’s economic and political inte-
rests. According to some Turkish experts, Georgia
in some respects is even more important for An-
kara than Azerbaijan. Georgia has serious ethnic
problems which affect Turkey; more Georgians
than Azerbaijanis visit Turkey, and a substantial
Muslim diaspora coming from Georgia lives in Tur-
key. The following arguments are also made: the
BTC and BTE transit pipelines running through
Georgian territory, the Kars–Tbilisi–Baku railway
project and the fact that Turkey is a more impor-
tant economic partner and investor for Georgia
than it is for Azerbaijan. For Georgia, the further
‘Europeanisation’ of Turkey is significant, as this
process translates directly into the geopolitical
situation in the whole region, as well as Georgia’s
plans of integration with the EU. Tbilisi also atta-
ches importance to Ankara’s stronger support for
Georgia’s integration with NATO, which is current-
ly the priority objective of Georgian foreign poli-
cy. There are also fears of a change in Turkey’s
ideological direction and an increase in the Mus-
lim factor, which could potentially pose a very
tough challenge for Georgian policy. It appears
that in the short and mid-term no fundamental
changes in Turkish-Georgian relations can be ex-
pected. In the next few years, a further increase
in bilateral trade contacts is quite likely to appear,
particularly when considering that the Russian
market has been closed to Georgian goods since
mid-2006, and in the future it will be difficult to
regain this opening. Economic factors are thus
forming increasingly strong ties between Turkey
and Georgia. Turkish-Georgian political relations
will principally be determined by the develop-
ment of the situation in the Black Sea and the
Southern Caucasus region, as well as the degree
of US involvement in the region and the EU pre-
sence there. It will be equally important to see
how sustainable and far-reaching the Turkish-Rus-
sian rapprochement will prove. The major goals
of Turkish policy towards Georgia, however, will
remain unchanged, because Turkey will for Tbilisi
remain one of the key states in the region with
which the best possible relations must be main-
tained.
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CHAPTER IV
Realism mixed with
romanticism: Turkey’s
relations with the states
of Central Asia
Wojciech Tworkowski
Theses
Turkey’s policy towards the states of Central
Asia at the beginning of the 1990s was charac-
terised by huge enthusiasm and the hope of
creating a community of Turkic countries. How-
ever, this enthusiasm did not translate into the
elaboration of a coherent strategy for develop-
ing contacts and influences in this region, and
therefore as early as in the mid-1990s Turkey’s
involvement in the region faltered.
Due to competition from bigger players (among
them the US, Russia, China and Iran) and its re-
latively insignificant resources, Turkey has had
to come to terms with a secondary role and
abandon its dreams about being the leader in
Central Asia.
Currently, Turkey is mainly involved in the eco-
nomic field (particularly in small- and medium-
sized enterprises), education and security.
In spite of resuming the tradition of summits
grouping together leaders of Turkic states in
2006, any deeper integration, let alone the con-
struction of a commonwealth of states announ-
ced at the beginning of the 1990s, stands no
chances of success as it is not in the interest of
the Central Asian countries.
Turkey can play an important role in co-opera-
tion in the fields of energy and transport infra-
structure. Involving Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan in three key projects, the Baku–Ceyhan oil
pipeline, the Baku–Erzurum gas pipeline and the
Baku–Kars railway line, is of paramount impor-
tance for Turkey’s interest in Central Asia.
Despite declarations of commitment from the
countries of Central Asia, it is difficult to assess
for the time being whether the actual collabo-
ration will be carried out in any more than
a symbolic dimension, particularly considering
that Turkey’s opportunities for taking action are
limited.
1. A general outline of Turkish-
-Central Asian relations
Post-Soviet Central Asia, an inland region with
a surface of nearly 4 million sq km and inhabited
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by about 60 million people, does not have any di-
rect borders with Turkey but it has quite close
cultural ties with it. The national languages of
four out of five states of the region (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) be-
long to the Turkic language family1. The Turkic
ethnic group was forged in the Altai mountains
(a range of mountains in Russian Siberia) and it
populated Central Asia in the fifth to seventh cen-
turies. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the ma-
jority of Turkic peoples embraced Sunni Islam,
and were then heavily influenced by the Persian
culture2. In the tenth century the Oghuz Turks
started to migrate from Central Asia westwards
into Anatolia. In Asia Minor, at the end of the thir-
teenth century, the Oghuz created the Ottoman
Empire which, although it stretched out to the
shores of the Caspian Sea at the peak of its deve-
lopment at the end of the sixteenth century, ne-
ver extended eastwards to the lands of Central
Asia. Contacts between Central Asia and Anatolia
were quite rare. In the ruling classes of Central
Asia (and to a lesser extent the Ottomans), there
was a limited awareness of the ethnic Turkic com-
munity, which was reflected in the use of the name
Turkestan to refer to Central Asia and Turkic to
describe the official language of the Ottoman Em-
pire3. At the turn of the twentieth century, the
idea of a national community of all Turkic people
(pan-Turkism) started developing among the eli-
tes in Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire. In the
decade from 1908 to 1918, under the Young Turk
regime, this concept became one of the most im-
portant state ideologies in the Ottoman Empire.
It arose later in Central Asia and had a weaker im-
pact4. This sense of community was challenged
in the 1920s and the 1930s by two revolutions: the
Kemalist revolution in Turkey and the Bolshevik
revolution in Russia. On the ashes of the Ottoman
Empire, Kemal Ataturk built the Republic of Tur-
key where all inhabitants of Anatolia were con-
sidered Turks, without pursuing the idea of cre-
ating a great Turkic nation encompassing all the
Turkic-speaking peoples. As a result of the con-
quest of Central Asia by the Bolsheviks5, the com-
munist authorities started the processes of con-
structing separate national identities (the Kazakh,
Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen ‘nations’) as well as
intensive Russification. Local elites were depriv-
ed of their status of actors in international poli-
tics, and their role was taken over by Moscow6.
Pan-Turkism survived only in the West and in Tur-
key, where itself it was marginalised by Kema-
lism. After World War II, when a democratic sys-
tem was introduced to Turkey, there was an in-
crease in the activity of pan-Turkish circles (ma-
gazines, associations). Immigrants from the USSR
and from Central Asia played an important role in
this process. In 1965 the National Movement Party
(MHP) was created (initially operating under a dif-
ferent name), an extreme right-wing party which
promulgated pan-Turkish slogans. The party still
exists in the present, although its popularity is li-
mited. The ‘Grey Wolves’ organisation is affiliated
with the MHP. In more than 40 years of its exis-
tence, the party very seldom held any power, and
usually remained outside the parliament.
In the Soviet period, Turkey’s contacts with the
Central Asian republics were very restricted. It was
not until March 1991 that the then President Tur-
gut Ozal visited Almaty on his way back from
Moscow. He thus reacted to the ongoing process
by which the Soviet republics acquired their au-
tonomy, although simultaneously his meetings
with Soviet leaders counterbalanced that visit.
The disintegration of the USSR and the indepen-
dence of five republics of Central Asia, however,
came as a total surprise to Turkey and forced the
country to create a policy towards the region off
the cuff, without any due consideration of what
its strategic goals might be, in an atmosphere of
enthusiasm caused by regaining the ‘lost brothers’
and an unexpected enlargement of the family of
Turkic states on the global political arena. That
policy was based on the atmosphere in Turkish
society at large. Public opinion polls reveal that
a positive mutual image is prevalent in Turkey and
the states of the region. According to research by
Pollmark from mid-2004, the vast majority of Turks
declared that they had a positive image of the
Turkic nations. In comparison, over half of the
Turkish population surveyed held a negative ima-
ge of Christians and Jews, and the majority was
negative about Arabs. On the Turkish political sce-
ne, the extreme right-wing pan-Turkish party MHP
remains the most fervent proponent of tighten-
ing ties between Turkey and the Central Asian
states. Support for the party has been fluctuating
between 8–17% since the beginning of the 1990s7.
The MHP’s chances of influencing Turkish politics
have been limited, as since 1991 a ruling coalition
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was only formed with the MHP in the period from
1999 to 2002. The party remained outside parlia-
ment between 1995 and 1999, and from 2002 to
2007. On the other hand, the MHP operates in the
countries of Central Asia (in the form of local asso-
ciations) and has some backing in the Turkish se-
curity sector. Support for pan-Turkism in Central
Asia is limited, being substantially weaker than in
Turkey.
Enthusiasm for strong bonds between Turkey and
the Central Asian countries has proved an insuffi-
ciently solid foundation for their sustainability. In
Turkey, citizens of the Turkic republics of Central
Asia were perceived as brothers; integration with
them – with Ankara in the role of their ‘elder bro-
ther’ and patron – appeared natural. The export
of the Turkish model of a secular state combining
Islam with the free market and democracy, sup-
ported by the West, seemed similarly natural8.
However, problems arose with adopting such
a model. Overly close ties with Turkey could pose
a threat to relations with Russia, which (after
a short crisis) still remained a significant player
in the region. Turkey’s paternalistic approach was
unacceptable to the ruling classes of the newly
formed states, who were very sensitive to the
question of sovereignty. This sensitivity was en-
hanced by the character of the people grouped
around the predominant presidential circles. The
leaders of the states of Central Asia considered
democracy a threat to their political monopoly.
The emphasis placed on the ethnic Turkic com-
munity was quite often interpreted as challeng-
ing the identities of the Central Asian nations.
A considerable conflict in these mutual percep-
tions was also provoked by Turkish initiatives in
the area of development aid for the countries of
Central Asia. In Turkey, Central Asia is generally
perceived as backward, underdeveloped and con-
taminated by the Soviet system. In reality, stu-
dents and officials offered scholarships or intern-
ships in Turkey frequently discovered that the le-
vel of literacy, education and health care in their
countries was often higher than in the poorest
regions of Turkey. A particular clash was caused
by co-operation in education; the Central Asians
were convinced that their education, for example
in the medical field, was at a higher level, and in
consequence they limited their student exchan-
ges. At the same time, collaboration proceeded
very well in other areas. Turkey, which was the
first to officially recognise the independence of
the new states, became a natural training ground
for diplomatic personnel which had not existed
earlier.
In the face of the above-mentioned factors, Tur-
key’s initiatives aimed at integrating the Turkic
nations through the concept of pan-Turkism were
doomed to failure. Governments in Central Asia
used them to achieve their own objectives (for
example, many schools were founded; see below)
and the propaganda of brotherhood ceased play-
ing a significant role in the consciousness of Turk-
ish society. On the other hand, with the Central
Asian states’ growing knowledge of the external
world and their economic development, Turkey
has become an interesting destination for their
citizens, firstly for those looking for jobs, and then
for tourists.
2. The evolution of political
contacts
The introduction of the policy of glasnost by Mik-
hail Gorbachev, which gave rise to political libe-
ralisation within the USSR and then to the inde-
pendence of the Central Asian countries, made Tur-
key euphoric. The country saw opportunities to
build relations with the new sovereign Turkic re-
publics, which, by definition, it considered as close
friends. This assumption later proved false, as the
presidents of the newly independent states came
to adopt much more pragmatic positions than
pan-Turkish romanticism.
As early as 1991, the presidents of the Central
Asian states went to Ankara9 treating their visit
as a natural way of searching an alternative to
close relations with Moscow, or at least as an at-
tempt to build diplomatic contacts outside the
post-Soviet area. The visits and their accompany-
ing wide-ranging, positive talks about potential
co-operation strengthened Turkey’s hopes for
a quick development of political collaboration
within the cultural and linguistic community.
This enthusiasm was also translated into concrete
actions. On 16 December 1991, Turkey was the
first state in the world to recognise independence
of the Central Asian states, thus showing solida-
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rity with their aspirations; the following year saw
a period of intense activity by Turkey in the re-
gion. In February, Hikmet Cetin, the then Turkish
Foreign Minister, paid a state visit to Central Asia,
and two months later Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel followed suit. Both politicians were ac-
companied by large delegations including busi-
ness representatives, which was a sign of high ex-
pectations in the field of economic contacts10. Du-
ring these mutual visits, many agreements and
contracts were signed regulating future co-ope-
ration on various levels. In Turkey, a series of insti-
tutions aimed at developing mutual contacts were
set up, including a special department at the Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, and the Turkish Interna-
tional Co-operation and Development Agency
(TIKA), that co-ordinates collaboration and aid pro-
grammes. A network of diplomatic missions in
all the states of the region was also established.
While forging a strategy towards the ‘fraternal’
states of Central Asia, however, Turkey made
a fundamental mistake in assuming that they are
equally eager to unequivocally define their basic
course of foreign policy. Whilst the supreme objec-
tive of the Turkic republics in Central Asia after
regaining independence was to diversify their fo-
reign policy and abandon Moscow’s umbrella, Tur-
key’s excessive pressure and unduly patronising
offers to play an intermediary role in representing
these countries in the international arena were
not well received. It appears that this was caused
by three factors. Firstly, despite the internal crisis,
Moscow still had an overwhelming ascendancy
in the post-Soviet South – its political, military and
economic influences, as well as those resulting
from the close infrastructural ties between Cen-
tral Asia and the Russian centre; in the case of Ka-
zakhstan the 7000-kilometre-long border with the
Russian Federation an was also an important fac-
tor. Secondly, independence offered wide pros-
pects for co-operation with various partners,
among which Turkey was quite an interesting
country but certainly not a strategic one, because
of its limited attractiveness in areas such as eco-
nomy and security. The Turkish offer faced sub-
stantial competition from Russia, China and the
US11. Thirdly, the collaboration proposed by Tur-
key implied an export of the Turkish model of
state, and the Central Asian ruling classes were
not inclined to adopt it.
The summit of the Turkish states held in Ankara
in October 1992 proved to be a wake-up call for
the romantic vision of the Turkic community of
interests12. Turkey put forward a concrete and ex-
ceptionally wide proposal for co-operation13. How-
ever, Turkish diplomacy did not prepare the presi-
dents of the Central Asian states who were atten-
ding the summit for such a radical acceleration
in their co-operation, which resulted in a consi-
derable deterioration in the atmosphere of the
meeting, and its closing without making any bin-
ding resolutions.
Due to the worsened mutual relations following
the summit, and their disappointment with Tur-
key’s high requirements, the states of Central
Asia developed their foreign policies in different
directions over the forthcoming years. They had
two top priorities: on the one hand, emancipation
from Russia, and on the other, normalisation of
relations with Moscow, which in some circum-
stances proved an indispensable and the most
effective partner. The mounting tension and sub-
sequent civil war in Tajikistan proved particularly
conducive to the development of relations with
Russia; in order to prevent the escalation of the
conflict into their territories, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakhstan established close co-opera-
tion with the Russian 201st Division, whose pre-
sence in Tajikistan ensured relative stability in
the region. Ankara could not be a partner in that
area because of the distance and its lack of suit-
able military instruments. Iran, which directly
borders Central Asia, became Turkey’s rival for
influence in the region. However, the attractive-
ness of Iran’s offer was diminished by Washing-
ton’s reluctance to strengthen Tehran’s position
in the region, as well as the Islamic character of
the Iranian regime, which caused concerns for the
secular rulers of Central Asia. After the shock pro-
voked by the lack of enthusiasm for integration
among the Central Asian leaders, Turkey’s foreign
policy became more pragmatic. Previous lofty an-
nouncements made by President Ozal and other
politicians about regional leadership in Central
Asia were forgotten and replaced by attempts at
constructive collaboration. The presidency of Su-
leyman Demirel (1993–2000) definitely played an
important role in rebuilding trust, as he dedicat-
ed much time to Central Asia, and built up good
personal relationships with the local govern-
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ments. He is still remembered as a symbol of the
Turkic community14. In October 1994, another
summit of the leaders of the Turkic states was
organised; it was lower-key than the previous
ones, and much better prepared politically. As Tur-
key abandoned its paternalistic approach, the par-
ticipants of the summit were able to resume talks
on the prospects of co-operation, and concluded
the meeting by signing the Istanbul Declaration
announcing future collaboration in all fields15.
In the following years, similar meetings of the
heads of state were held regularly until 2001;
after which a break of a few-years arose. Gradu-
ally the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazar-
bayev, emerged as the main champion of deepen-
ing pan-Turkish ties; however, it seems that the
idea of a Turkic union or commonwealth which
he advocates has been only a game within the
context of the perfectly balanced and diversified
Kazakh foreign policy16. After attempts to assassi-
nate Uzbekistan’s president, Islam Karimov,
Turkish-Uzbek relations worsened because Turkey
gave shelter to the leaders of the Erk and Birlik
opposition parties, Muhamad Solihov and Abdra-
himov Pulatov, at the beginning of the 1990s. In
1999 Karimov suspended student exchanges be-
tween Turkey and Uzbekistan. Relations deterio-
rated further thanks to Ankara’s condemnation
of the Andijan massacre in May 2005.
The latest sign that mutual relations are being
resumed was the first summit of the Turkic sta-
tes in five years, which was held in Turkish Anta-
lya in November 2006. The summit was another
sign of a pragmatic normalisation of relations
among the Turkic states. It was ignored only by
the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, who
was offended by Turkey’s support for the United
Nations report condemning Tashkent for violat-
ing human rights17.
Since the death of Saparmurat Niyazov, the presi-
dent of Turkmenistan (1991–2006) in December
2006 the Turkish-Turkmen relations have impro-
ved. In December 2007 the president of Turkey
visited Ashgabat for the first time since 2000.
Relations between Turkey and the states of Cen-
tral Asia have also been shaped by their co-ope-
ration in international organisations. The newly
independent states quickly became members of
the United Nations and the Organisation for Se-
curity and Co-operation in Europe, and were ad-
mitted to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program-
me (1994). However, the key to development was
intended to be the new states’ membership in re-
gional organisations. Turkey, which counted on
the role of an intermediary, introducing the new
states into the international arena and intend-
ing to reap the associated political benefits, nat-
urally backed the association of its ‘fraternal’ sta-
tes with the UN and NATO, as well as doing so fi-
nancially, by covering the costs of renting offices
for representative missions. In 1992, Ankara sup-
ported the membership of the five Central Asian
republics in the Economic Co-operation Organisa-
tion (ECO), which consequently became the most
powerful common economic institution in Mus-
lim countries; however, the ECO’s activities have
little practical impact (the ECO does not even
provide for the creation of a free trade zone).
In Central Asia, Russia still played a federating
role; under its auspices, subsequent organisations
regulating co-operation on different levels were
founded (the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation
are currently playing the most significant roles
in the area of politics and security; in terms of
economy, the countries of Central Asia, particu-
larly Kazakhstan, are much more involved in the
Eurasian Economic Community than in the ECO).
In the second half of the 1990s, the GUUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Mol-
dova) organisation was created at the initiative
of the US; Uzbekistan was a member for a period
of time18. On the other hand, Turkish aspirations
for EU membership and its regional interests
turned Ankara’s attention from the relatively
distant Central Asia to the areas geographically
closer to Turkey. Although Turkish politicians
raised the issue of inviting the states of Central
Asia to the BSEC, it appears that the Western
course has finally taken over in Turkish politics,
and Ankara’s interest in institutionalising trans-
regional co-operation is currently much weaker
than it once was.
Nowadays, Turkey’s relations with the republics
of Central Asia are characterised by a pragmatic
approach to collaboration. Mutual relations are
good, but not very intensive. After the collapse
of the USSR, Turkey’s offer of co-operation was
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based on huge enthusiasm, although it was not
followed up by any real possibilities of aid. Be-
cause of rampant inflation, an enormous budget
deficit and privatisation problems, Ankara had re-
latively few available financial resources, and they
were not employed as part of a well thought-out
strategy for developing Turkish influences in
Central Asia. Gradually, relations between the re-
gions came to focus on cultural co-operation, edu-
cation, business (mainly small- and medium-sized
enterprises) and security (see below). The states
of Central Asia, in the face of an irrational choice
of Turkey as their key strategic partner, decided
to base their foreign policies on other alliances,
or on diversification. On the other hand, in the
light of Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU and de-
velop co-operation in the Black Sea Basin, Central
Asia has now gone on the back burner for Turkey’s
interests. Despite that, thanks to the cultural affi-
nity, Turkey’s growing economic and political po-
tential may play an important role in the five re-
publics, particularly if the projects for transport-
ing Central Asian hydrocarbons through the
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum
pipelines are implemented.
3. Economic relations
The economy plays a key role in the pragmatical-
ly-forged relations between Turkey and Central
Asia. Stores in Central Asia are full of Turkish
goods, the wealthier members of society there
enjoy eating in Turkish restaurants, and buy pro-
ducts from Turkish suppliers. Turkish enterprises
co-own major mobile telecommunications opera-
tors (including K-Cell and K-Mobile in Kazakhstan)
and have developed a telecommunications infra-
structure; they build roads (e.g. the Bishkek–Osh
‘highway’ in Kyrgyzstan), and supply construc-
tion materials, sanitary fixtures and fittings (com-
peting principally with Chinese and Iranian com-
panies). Asia Minor is also a holiday destination
for an increasing number of tourists and a job
market for immigrants looking for jobs, although
the number of people arriving there remains li-
mited19. Even though the Turkish presence on the
local market is quite large, in the majority it is re-
presented by small- and medium-sized enterprises.
This is a result of the pioneering ambitions of
Turkish entrepreneurs, who flooded Central Asia
in the 1990s hoping for quick development and
a big growth potential in the local markets20. An-
other large group are Turks working for Western
(especially American) companies. These people
are well-educated, are considered as ‘Westerners’,
yet at the same time they have Turkish roots,
which brings them closer to the inhabitants of
Central Asia. So, they have often been employed
as ideal middle management staff and qualified
employees (such as engineers), who can bridge
the gap between local employees and the Ame-
rican management; the latter usually have poor
knowledge of the local contexts. The practice by
Turkish construction and energy companies ope-
rating in Kazakhstan of employing mainly Turk-
ish citizens has led the authorities in Kazakhstan
to introduce restrictions on the employment of
foreigners. This has sometimes equally provoked
ethnic conflicts with dissatisfied Kazakh emplo-
yees who perform similar jobs for substantially
less pay21.
3.1. Trade and investments
Turkey is among Central Asia’s top ten trading
partners, although it does not aspire to compete
with Russia or China. The trade exchange between
Turkey and Kazakhstan, the undisputed economic
leader in Central Asia, is the largest in the region.
Although it is growing constantly, it still only ac-
counts for just over 2% of Kazakhstan’s total trade
exchange. Similarly, Turkish investments in Ka-
zakhstan, which by the end of 2005 were worth
a total of US$939 million, make up merely 2.3%
of overall investments, which places Turkey as
the twelfth biggest foreign investor22. Although
Turkey holds a slightly higher position on the list
of economic partners in other countries of the re-
gion, it lags far behind the most significant play-
ers. For Turkey, the states of Central Asia are not
important trading partners; their share in Turkey’s
trade exchange does not exceed 1.5%. Among the
countries of Central Asia, Turkmenistan is Tur-
key’s essential economic partner. Turkey occupies
the 4th place in Turkmenistan’s exports, and the
first place in Turkmenistan’s imports. The ex-
change volume in 2007 increased to more than
10% of Turkmenistan’s foreign trade. Turkey is
also the most important foreign investor in Turk-
menistan, although foreign investments are not
large23. Turkmenistan’s importance for Turkey’s
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economic policy is due to its gas reserves and its
plans to export them through Anatolia to Europe
(see more in the chapter on energy issues).
The Turkish niches in the Central Asian economy
are principally in the construction work and tex-
tile industry24 in both export and investments.
Other important sectors are household deter-
gents and food products. Turkey faces serious ri-
valry, mainly from China, which offers much low-
ers labour costs (particularly in the construction
sector); however it has maintained its market
position thanks to its investments in infrastruc-
ture (Turkish enterprises have funded the con-
struction of the road linking the capital of Kyr-
gyzstan with the south of the country), as well
as decision-makers’ sympathies for Turkey, which
in turn are closely connected with concerns about
the Chinese economic expansion. The Turkish acti-
vity in the services sector is represented by many
small companies (restaurants, stores, launderet-
tes, internet cafes, hotels, travel agencies)25. Re-
lations between Turkish private investors and the
particular states of the region are coordinated by
joint business organisations.
Turkey imports mainly cotton and fabrics from
Central Asia, which are often manufactured lo-
cally with the participation of Turkish companies.
Metals and chemical products are still important
imported goods. Aluminium is imported by Tur-
key from Tajikistan. In recent years, the states of
Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, have show-
ed an increased interest in making investments
in Turkey26.
Turkey remains an important tourist destination.
Citizens of Kazakhstan make up a sizeable per-
centage of the tourists visiting Turkey. Rich holi-
daymakers from other countries of Central Asia
also go to Turkish resorts. Negative phenomena
of economic tourism, particularly voluntary or
forced prostitution, may also be observed. Accor-
ding to estimates, the number of women invol-
ved in prostitution varies from a few thousand to
a few tens of thousands of women, mainly from
the poorer countries of the region, Tajikistan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan.
3.2. Energy and transport
One of Central Asia’s major assets for Turkey was
the reserves of oil and natural gas situated in the
Turkmen and Kazakh areas of the Caspian Sea Ba-
sin. Turkey’s interest in importing the resources
harmonised with the idea promoted by Ameri-
can diplomats of exporting oil and gas to global
markets and bypassing Russia, which after the
collapse of the USSR had monopolised routes of
transport of hydrocarbons from former Soviet re-
publics. Two pipeline projects which would allow
not only Russia but also the Turkish straits to be
bypassed, thus supplying oil and gas to terminals
on the Mediterranean Sea coast, were elaborated
in order to enable export to Turkey and through
its territory. Oil and gas were to be transported
by means of a route crossing Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia (in the case of oil, to the port of Ceyhan (the
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline) and gas to Er-
zurum). The concept of the BTC pipeline was cre-
ated in the mid-1990s, and the final decision to
undertake construction was taken in 1999. The
pipeline was constructed from 2002 to 2005 by
a consortium led by BP, whose minority share-
holder (6.53%) became the Turkish oil concern
TPAO; it was officially inaugurated in July 2006.
From the beginning, the pipeline was a sticking
point in talks with Kazakhstan, which (it was
assumed) would along with Azerbaijan become
the main oil supplier, as there have been serious
doubts as to whether the oil from Azerbaijan
will be sufficient to fill the full capacity of the
pipeline. Although the Kazakh authorities
declared an interest in the project, they did not
get directly involved in it, and the state-owned
concern KazMunaiGaz did not buy any shares in
the project. The concept of building the linking
pipe under the Caspian Sea fell through due to
its cost and contentions over its division
between the states which have access to the sea.
Eventually, it was decided to construct a port
terminal in the Kazakh port of Kuryk, linked to
the oil reserves in Kashgan, which in 2010 will
be ready to transport oil to BTC27. However, the
Kazakh authorities seem distanced from the pro-
ject, and it is highly likely that their interest is
aimed to blackmail Russia into accepting better
conditions for transporting Kazakh oil by
bypassing the Caspian Sea in the north through
the Tengiz–Novorossiysk route.
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The situation is similar in case of the BTE project,
which is intended to extract gas from Azerbaijan
and Turkmenistan and supply it through Turkey
to the planned south-European Nabucco route.
The problem is the lack of a transporting infra-
structure; constructing the proposed trans-Cas-
pian gas pipeline linking the project with Turkme-
nistan would be enormously expensive. The ne-
cessary investments are estimated at US$5–12 bil-
lion, and the US is against the transport of gas
through Iran. Another problem is Russia’s animo-
sity towards the project; nowadays it controls
the Turkmen export of gas almost completely.
Turkey sees itself as an intermediary in the oil
and gas trades, and as a key link in the East–West
route; it is therefore in its interest to involve As-
tana and Ashkhabad in both projects. However,
it appears that Russian influences are too strong,
and Moscow will not allow this to occur. More-
over, particularly from the Kazakh point of view,
Turkey or Europe are not the only possible recip-
ients of its oil and gas. The southern oil pipeline
(BTC) faces fierce competition from the existing
transport route to China, which has also become
a vital recipient of gas. Another option is being
considered; routes crossing Iran or Afghanistan
and going to the Pacific Ocean coast. However, it
is difficult to implement this project because of
the unstable political situation in the two coun-
tries. It is also not certain how determined Tur-
key, which has already contracted to receive exces-
sive gas supplies (mainly from Russia), is to press
for the implementation of projects transporting
Central Asian hydrocarbons through its territory.
A new issue in relations among Turkey and the
states of Central Asia is the interest which some of
the latter, such as Kazakhstan, have been show-
ing in investing in Turkish energy infrastructure.
Along with the two routes of transporting energy
resources, another important infrastructure pro-
ject for Turkey is the Baku–Kars railway connec-
tion, an element of transport plans to revitalise
the Silk Road, bypassing Russia from the south.
The construction of the railway line which will
finally link the Southern Caucasus and Central
Asia with the European network began in 2007
and will take about three years. Its capacity will
be 30 million tonnes a year; Kazakhstan has al-
ready declared it could transport 10 million ton-
nes of goods28.
4. Security
Central Asia and Turkey are located in such a way
that they do not have a direct impact on each
other in terms of strategic security. However,
Ankara is concerned with the region’s stability
because of the potential importance of the South-
ern Caucasian transit corridor, and the close re-
lations between the Southern Caucasus – an area
of Turkey’s direct interest – and Central Asia. Al-
though the countries of Central Asia are far be-
yond the direct reach of Turkey’s possible mili-
tary commitment, Ankara has become involved
in some fields, principally by encouraging the
creation of modern armies which are indepen-
dent of Russia. This involvement is mainly appa-
rent in training. Military contacts were establish-
ed in 1992, when officers from Central Asia were
permitted to go to Turkish military schools; this
initiative was aimed at preparing new staff for
the local armies, which had formerly been domi-
nated by Russian officers corps (several thousand
officers were trained in Turkey in total). In 1993,
the Turkish HQ commander paid a working visit
to Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Fol-
lowing a series of mutual visits, agreements to
co-operate in training military staff were signed.
In 1994, Kazakhstan joined the Euro-Atlantic Part-
nership Council (EAPC, formerly the NACC) of the
Partnership for Peace programme, which implied
increased collaboration with NATO member sta-
tes. In the same year, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan joined the programme; Tajikistan
only joined the programme in 2002, after the end
of its civil war. Turkey became the natural part-
ner of the Central Asian states in co-operation
with NATO; moreover, it was assigned responsi-
bility for NATO interests in the region29. In 1996,
a Kazakh-Turkish agreement about co-operation
in the arms industry was signed, although it was
not implemented due to Russia’s resistance, and
too weak a push from the Turkish arms sector. In
the same year CENTRASBAT (the Central Asian
Battalion) was founded. It was a joint undertak-
ing by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
within the framework of the Partnership for
Peace; between 1997 and 2000 the battalion car-
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ried out common exercises with NATO units, in-
cluding Turkish ones.
Turkey works together with most national intel-
ligence services in Central Asia. Since September
1995 it has been involved – in a common initia-
tive with Russia and NATO – in organising train-
ing for local security services within the frame-
work of the Turkish International Academy
Against Drugs and Organised Crime30. The Turk-
ish government also signed a series of agree-
ments with the Central Asian states on fighting
organised crime, arms smuggling, terrorism and
separatism, although they were accompanied by
some tensions. In the second half of the 1990s,
Turkey gave shelter to Uzbek dissidents, which
led to radically mounting tension in relations
with Tashkent, which saw the activities of the op-
position refugees as threatening the unity of the
state. On the other hand, towards the end of the
1990s, Turkey frequently expressed its reserva-
tions about Kyrgyzstan’s mild policy towards the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was illegal
in Turkey itself.
Although Turkey’s weakness in regional security
policy has been exposed many times. Ankara did
not participate in the resolution of the conflict in
Tajikistan; Russia played the key role there, which
clearly showed the force of impact both coun-
tries had in the second half of the 1990s. Turkey
was not invited to peace talks about the Afghan
conflict, held since 1997 (despite having declar-
ed its will to attend them). The situation chan-
ged slightly after September 11. On the one hand,
the development of its collaboration with NATO
and the use of the region as a base for NATO ope-
rations in Afghanistan allowed Ankara to show
how useful it could be as a partner (among other
actions, a Turkish representative was appointed
as NATO liaison officer in Central Asia). On the
other hand, this led to a more direct collaboration
between Western headquarters and the new sta-
tes, which obliged Turkish diplomacy once again
to identify its role in this co-operation. The dete-
rioration in relations between the West and the
Central Asian states, resulting from Russia’s diplo-
matic offensive and the Western states’ criticism
of human rights violations, offers some oppor-
tunities for Turkey to increase its role in the re-
gion. Thanks to Turkey’s perception of regional
stability as its priority, Ankara is still seen as
a ‘constructive’ partner. However, Turkey’s bad
relations with Uzbekistan, the most densely po-
pulated country in the region, are still a cause for
concern.
5. Cultural and social
dimensions
Turkish enthusiasm for the newly independent
states of Central Asia at the beginning of the
1990s resulted mainly from the idea of the solida-
rity of Turkic nations, and its outcome was quick-
ly revitalised cultural, educational and religious
co-operation, funded from both public and pri-
vate resources.
Initially, Turkey tried to build a common plat-
form for all the Turkic languages. On 18 Novem-
ber 1992, the Turkish Ministry of Education or-
ganised a meeting for the Education Ministers of
the Turkic republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan). During the meeting
a statement about ‘a common Turkic language’
was made. On 8-10 March 1993, the Turkish Inter-
national Co-operation and Development Agency
(TIKA) Presidency held a meeting of representa-
tives of the Conference of the Alphabet and
Spelling of the Turkic Republics, during which it
was decided to introduce a common alphabet
composed of 34 letters, but this decision did not
come into force. Major institutions founded to pro-
mote the development of cultural co-operation
at the Ministry of Culture were the Joint Admi-
nistration of the Turkish Culture and Arts TURK-
SOY, created together by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tur-
key, and the General Directorate of Research and
Development of Folk Cultures HAGEM. These insti-
tutions staged a series of festivals, conferences
and exhibitions promoting Turkish culture in
Central Asia and vice versa. HAGEM has also spon-
sored much ethnographic research, and issued
numerous publications about culture of Central
Asia. Currently, the activity of the two institu-
tions is almost imperceptible, apart from within
circles of academics and aficionados of Turkish
culture. Another element of popularising the
cultural community has become the broadcast of
Turkish television channels and radio stations to
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post-Soviet areas. The aim of this move was,
among other goals, to build the awareness of
pan-Turkism, promote Turkish culture, and spread
information about Turkey’s foreign policy. The
biggest ambitions of building the cultural com-
munity were noticeable in the state-owned TRT
AVRASYA channel, although when it was renam-
ed TRT TURK it did not win many viewers. It is
mostly available in (often Russian-speaking) large
cities, and is not competitive compared to popu-
lar channels broadcast from Russia. Turkish pop
stars (such as Tarkan) and the private entertain-
ment channels STAR TV and SHOW TV enjoy
much more popularity31.
Co-operation in education was carried out on two
levels: through the mass funding of scholarships
for students (and secondary school students)
from Central Asia, and setting up Turkish educa-
tional institutions locally. On 29 January 1993, the
Turkish government created the Office of Turk-
ish Republics and Communities affiliated to the
Ministry of Education; this Office deals with all
joint educational actions and initiatives.
Until the end of 2006 Turkey granted 18,000 scho-
larships to Central Asian countries. The most im-
portant Turkish schools in the region are the Ma-
nas Kyrgyz-Turkish University in Bishkek, the In-
ternational Turkmen-Turkish University in Ash-
gabat and the Ahmet Yassavi Kazakh-Turkish
University. Situated far away from contemporary
centres of civilisation, but in one of the most sig-
nificant destinations of Muslim pilgrimages, the
Yassavi University embodies pan-Turkish ideas –
its students are representatives of nearly all the
Turkic nations, starting from Altai and Yaku-
tia/Sakha, through Central Asia and Tatarstan,
Azerbaijan, Turkey, Northern Cyprus and finally
the Bulgarian Turks. The students live together in
dormitories on a modern campus, and are taught
by the multinational teaching staff (the language
of studies is Turkish and sometimes English).
Apart from the universities, there are many Turk-
ish secondary schools and numerous privately
financed higher education establishments32.
Activities in the area of religion and the promo-
tion of a secular model of state which preserves
the Islamic identity have been coordinated by
the Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate. The in-
fluence of Turkish Islam was perceived positively
by the authorities in the states of Central Asia,
as an Islam separating religious matters from the
state issues; however it did not win broad sup-
port in local communities which were oscillating
between a post-Soviet lack of commitment or
even atheism, and a search for more radical mo-
dels of religiousness inspired by those of the Arab
world. Until 2001, the Directorate built or reno-
vated about ten mosques and delegated a num-
ber of clerics to work in the Turkic republics. Ma-
ny Turkish religious schools educating Kazakh
clerics were opened in the region; in Kyrgyzstan
and Turkmenistan, theology faculties financed by
Turkey were founded at local universities. More-
over, about a thousand future imams from all the
states of the region received education in Turkey.
The Directorate also funded the publication of re-
ligious materials in local languages, and supplied
tens of thousands of copies of Koran translations.
Additionally, the Turkish government co-financed
the pilgrimage to Mecca for small groups of peo-
ple from the Central Asian states until 2001.
The movement of the followers of Fetullah Gülen
plays a special role in Turkish relations with Cent-
ral Asia. This movement is widespread in Asia Mi-
nor, and aims to promote Islam and Turkism. Mo-
tivated by these reasons, it has been conducting
quasi-missionary activities in the countries of the
region. Its members, who are supported by an un-
official community, run companies and various
educational institutions (in particular, prestigious
high-level Turkish secondary schools) and have
been winning over new members through perso-
nal contacts. The Gülen movement is supported
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the
Islamic-democratic party in power in Turkey since
2002. However, its activity is frowned upon by
the Kemalist establishment, which considers it
a threat to the lay character of the state. In Central
Asia the movement is an important element of the
Turkish presence, and is often informally backed
by the diplomatic corps33.
Despite the intensity of Turkish efforts in the cul-
tural, social and religious dimensions, Turkey has
not succeeded in ensuring a strong position as
a close partner of the region; this is to a large ex-
tent due to Ankara’s misunderstanding of post-
Soviet realities, and its failure to adjust its stra-
tegies to local conditions and needs. Convinced of
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its cultural superiority, Turkey approached new
partners from the paternalistic position of the
‘elder brother’, and met with incomprehension
and sometimes even humiliation when it appear-
ed that the post-Soviet levels of education or wel-
fare system were higher than the Turkish one at
the beginning of the 1990s. The lack of suitable re-
sources coupled with an attempt to get involved
on all possible fronts was another crucial prob-
lem. Because there was no appropriate strategy
or coordination of actions, not to mention the
overemotional and sentimental attitude towards
cultural affinity, the Turkish presence in Central
Asia is nowadays confined to a narrow scope.
6. Conclusion and forecast
Turkey, which was originally seen as a natural can-
didate to play the role of the guide, leader and
mentor of the new states of Central Asia in the in-
ternational arena, because of its cultural ties and
geographical situation at the junction of Europe
and Asia34, has not managed to fulfil this role.
The failure of Turkish aspirations became visible
as early as the first half of the 1990s, and they
were symbolically buried at the summit of the
Turkic states in 1994, where a new rhetoric of
pragmatic collaboration replaced the romantic
visions of integration after the previous break-
down of relations. Many analysts place the blame
for this on Ankara’s chaotic and overemotional
policy, as it did not have a well thought-out stra-
tegy to meet the quite unexpected challenge.
It seems that Turkey’s involvement was limited
by historical and geopolitical conditions. Although
Turkey could undoubtedly have gained a strong-
er position in the region than the one it finally
held, the concept of its leadership was doomed
to failure from the very beginning.
While Turkish diplomats assumed similar enthu-
siasm for integration on the part of the states of
Central Asia, and took the cultural and political
backwardness of their ‘brothers’ for granted,
leaders of the new republics proved to be much
more aware and shrewder players. The geogra-
phical situation and assets of the Central Asian
republics (principally hydrocarbons) offered them
wide prospects in foreign policy, and simultane-
ously the guaranteed interest of the world powers,
which Turkey could not compete with in terms of
resources and co-operation opportunities. Break-
ing the bond between Central Asia and Russia
was made quite difficult by the deep economic
and infrastructural ties between the new states
and Moscow. On the other hand, Turkey overesti-
mated its powers, and relied too much on US sup-
port. In the end, Washington finally decided on
direct involvement in the region without an inter-
mediary, and used Turkish staff only partly as as-
sistants in introducing the economic policy and
investment expansion.
The differences in the geo-strategic interests of
Turkey and the Central Asian states gave rise to
increasingly wide discrepancies in the principal
courses of their foreign policies. This was partic-
ularly manifest in the various dimensions of the
integration processes, as implemented within the
framework of different alliances. Whereas Turkey
opted for European integration, the states of Cen-
tral Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, are continuing
a multi-vector policy of foreign co-operation, in-
cluding within the Russo-centric Collective Secu-
rity Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Russian-
Chinese Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. Tur-
key’s aspirations for EU membership do not have
any direct impact on the Turkic republics; their
relations with the EU are autonomous and Tur-
key would not rather play the special role of liai-
son officer, as was proved by the elaboration of
the EU’s strategy for Central Asia in mid-2007.
Despite this, the question of Turkish accession to
the EU remains important in the Central Asian
states approach to the EU’, as in the opinion of
the Central Asian elites it reveals a change in EU
mentality and ìa withdrawal from Huntington’s
destructive theories’35.
Turkey’s role in Central Asia currently focuses on
economic involvement; Turkish entrepreneurs
have gained a stable position in the construction
and textile sectors. Although Ankara remains
a partner in the areas of education and security,
none of the parties gives this co-operation top
priority. Simultaneously, the mutual perception
of Turkey and Central Asia is relatively positive,
particularly after both Ankara and Washington
stopped promoting the liberal, free-market and
democratic model of the Turkish state (which is
unacceptable for the leaders of Central Asia as
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they consolidate their power) as the solution for
Central Asia. Turkey and the US have concentrat-
ed instead on common interests, including re-
gional stability and economic growth.
As there are no direct strategic interests, no sud-
den intensification of relations between Turkey
and Central Asia should be expected in the fore-
seeable future. Some chances of rapprochement
may be provided by collaboration in the energy
field, as well as the transport of Central Asian re-
sources and goods to the West by means of routes
crossing Turkey and bypassing Russia. As the sta-
tes of Central Asia are aiming to maintain their
good relations with Moscow, however, it is quite
unlikely for co-operation in these areas to be-
come a priority for them.
Wojciech Tworkowski
1 The only non-Turkic country in Central Asia is Tajikistan,
where a variety of Persian is spoken and whose closest cul-
tural ties are with Iran and northern Afghanistan. The ‘Tur-
kic’ land link between Central Asia and Turkey is Azerbaijan.
2 The majority of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz embraced Islam
much later, in the eighteenth century.
3 The Ottoman elites considered the term Turk pejorative,
and used it to refer to peasants and nomads.
4 J. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From irredentism to cooperation,
Indiana UP, 1995.
5 Young Turks also took part in battles against Soviet expan-
sion. The most famous of them was Enver Pasha, who to-
gether with the basmachi rebels resisted the Red Army in
Bukhara and finally died at the hands of Soviet soldiers in
1922.
6 I. Bal, Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Re-
public, London 2000.
7 In the parliamentary elections in 2007, the MHP obtained
14% of the vote.
8 This position was clearly expressed by President Ozal as
early as the first summit of Turkic-speaking states in Anka-
ra, October 1992. Compare: P. Robins, Suits and Uniforms.
Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War Hurst & Company,
London 2003. p. 284–286
9 In September 1991 Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Na-
zarbayev visited Turkey; he was followed in December by
Saparmurat Niyazov, the President of Turkmenistan; Islam
Karimov of Uzbekistan and Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan.
10 As early as November 1991, the first Turkish-Uzbek busi-
ness council was created, and similar bodies were then set up
with the participation of other countries from the region.
11 In the first phase, the US planned to use Turkey as a means
of making a political impact in Central Asia. However, in
the mid-1990s the US went on to build up direct contacts.
12 In the years 1992–2001 seven summits of the Turkic sta-
tes were held. After a five-year break in November 2006, the
leaders met for the eighth time in Antalya in Turkey.
13 Including the creation of a common market and the con-
struction of a commonwealth.
14 The president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, ex-
pressed respect for Demirel’s role during the last summit of
the Turkic states, November 2006, and suggested appoint-
ing him as the first chairman of the Turkic Parliamentary
Assembly.
15 For more information about relations between Turkey and
Central Asia in that period, compare G. Winrow, Turkey and
the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Trans-
caucasus, MERIA Journal, Vol 1, No. 2, July 1997; http://
meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a5.html
16 As a rule, in the case of Turkey, President Nazarbayev
usually makes grandiloquent declarations which are not
followed up by any concrete actions. As with the Turkic com-
monwealth, Nazarbayev approached the issue of the Baku–
–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in a similar way; he pledged
support for the project, which was supposed to diversify
routes of oil export from Kazakhstan to the West. After the
completion of the oil pipeline, Kazakhstan even signed a me-
morandum regarding the transport of its oil through that
route. However, the collaboration has still not yet been im-
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plemented, and Kazakhstan’s declarations have only served
to soften Russia’s position on the question of transporting
Kazakh energy resources through the routes crossing its
territory.
17 Katik, M. Spirit of Cooperation Dominates Turkic Summit,
Eurasianet.org, 20 November 2006, http://www.eurasianet.
org/departments/insight/articles/eav112006.shtml
18 Uzbekistan suspended its membership in GUUAM in June
2002, and definitely quit the organisation in May 2005.
19 In 2007, almost 400,000 citizens of the states of Central
Asia visited Turkey, including 195,000 from Kazakhstan and
nearly 76,000 from Turkmenistan.
20 In many cases, it has transpired that cultural affinity does
not necessarily mean an ability to adapt to post-Soviet reali-
ties. Technologies and firms have often been taken over by
local partners, and Turkish businesspeople have not been
able to cope with the brutal realities of the Central Asian
market. Author’s interview with a Kazakh businessman,
Astana, June 2006.
21 In February 2005, a large fight broke out between Turkish
and Kazakh workers in the GATE company, which was in-
volved in the reconstruction of the Atyrau refinery. In that
year and the following one there were several such inci-
dents. For example, see Brawl Between Kazakh, Turkish
Workers Injures 140, RFE/RL 20 October 2006, http://www.
rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/10/07e94a3b-86dc-4718-aea0-
2c0dae4ebdc7.html
22 Data from the Embassy of Turkey in Kazakhstan.
23 The major Turkish investor in Turkmenistan is Ahmet Ca-
lik, a conservative businessman associated with the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) which has held power in Tur-
key since 2002. He was the Deputy Minister of the Textile
Industry for some time.
24 Turkish firms have been responsible for the construction
of 70% of buildings in the new Kazakh capital of Astana (in-
cluding the airport, the parliament building, the presiden-
tial palace, hotels and residential housing).
25 For instance, in Kazakhstan Turkey is the third in terms
of the number of registered companies after Russia and China
(data from 2003, provided by the Embassy of the Republic
of Turkey in Kazakhstan).
26 There are plans of a joint construction of a refinery on the
Black Sea.
27 For the time being the project remains on the drawing
board; construction has not yet been started.
28 The memorandum on economic co-operation between
Kazakhstan and Georgia, signed by the Kazakh Minister of
Transport Serik Akhmetov in Tbilisi on 2 April 2007 (RFE/RL
Newsline, 4 April 2007, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/
2007/04/2-TCA/tca-040407.asp#archive)
29 In that period of time Turkey was the only NATO mem-
ber which had military attaches in the states of the region.
Central Asian Security: The New International Context. Alli-
son A. & L. Johnson, SIIA – RIIA, 2001.
30 R. Weitz. Towards a New Turkey – NATO Partnership,
Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol.5, No. 2, 2006.
31 Y. Kalafat, ’Turkiye – Turk Cumhuriyetleri Kultur Iliski-
leri’, in 21 Yuzyilda Turk Dis Politikasi, ed. Idris Bal, Ankara
2004.
32 According to a Turkish diplomat with whom the author
spoke in Bishkek (May 2006), only a small number of pri-
vate universities officially called Turkish are financed from
Turkish funds. The rest function thanks to capital coming
mainly from Arab countries.
33 For more about the activity of followers of Gülen in the
states of Central Asia see: Balci, B. Fetullah Gülen’s Mis-
sionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spread-
ing of Turkism and Islam, Religion, State & Society, Vol. 31,
No. 2, 2003.
34 Prime Minister Demirel was persuaded to adopt such an
approach among other politicians by George Bush in Febru-
ary 1992 during the meeting in Washington he declared:
‘Turkey is a model for the states of the region, particularly
for the newly independent republics of Central Asia’.
P. Robins.., op. cit., p. 282–83.
35 The author’s interview with an official in the Kazakh Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, Astana, May 2006.
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CHAPTER V
Advocate for the status
quo? Turkish policy
towards the Black Sea
region – its form and
background
Rafał Sadowski
Theses
1. In its policy towards the Black Sea area, Tur-
key wishes to maintain the status quo and is not
willing major geopolitical changes in the re-
gion, especially the emergence of any new ac-
tive players, such as the United States.
2. The Turkish Black Sea policy is to a great ex-
tent reactive. This is an effect of the low prio-
rity granted to the Black Sea region in the poli-
cy of Ankara, which has been actively engaged
in other areas (Iraq, the Middle East and rela-
tions with the EU, the USA and Russia). Higher
priority is given only to selected issues, such as
preserving the Montreux regime and maintain-
ing Ankara’s strong position in the region by
restricting access to external players. Turkey is
not actively engaged in the Black Sea area be-
cause its vital interests in the region are not
under any serious threat.
3. The shape of Ankara’s policy towards the Black
Sea region strongly depends on its relationswith
Washington and Brussels. The worsening of re-
lations with the EU and the USA has caused a re-
definition of Turkish policy towards the Black
Sea region. Attempts by external actors, namely
the United States and the European Union, to in-
crease their presence in the region have result-
ed in an improvement in Turkey’s relations
with Russia, which also does not want the for-
mer actors’ role to grow either.
1. Introduction
The Black Sea region has gradually been gaining
significance in international politics since the
year 2001. This is mainly the effect of the growing
interest of the United States, the EU and NATO
member states in the region. This area has be-
come increasingly important for the USA after
11 September 2001 in the context of activities un-
dertaken as part of its ‘war on terrorism’ in Afgha-
nistan and the Middle East, as well its rivalry with
Russia (the US presence in the Caucasus, energy
issues, policy towards Ukraine, etc.). On the other
hand, the Black Sea region has aroused the increas-
ing interest of the European Union as a conse-
quence of its enlargement policy (the accession
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of Romania and Bulgaria, and membership nego-
tiations with Turkey) as well as the launching of
the European Neighbourhood Policy (which also
concerns other countries in the Black Sea region,
with the exception of Russia). In turn, the acces-
sion of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO and the
prospect of membership for Ukraine and Georgia
have strengthened the Alliance’s position in the
region, and have forced it to become more active.
The significance of the region has also increased
in the context of European energy security, and
also as a consequence of developing new pro-
jects for oil and gas transit from the Caspian Sea
area to Europe.
Since the role of the Black Sea region has started
growing in importance, the policies of the coun-
tries located there and of the global superpowers
towards the region have gained significance as
well. The intention of this text is to describe the
present shape of Turkish policy towards the Black
Sea region. To make Ankara’s policy in this area
more understandable, it is necessary to present
the regional political background. For this rea-
son, this analysis also includes such topics as the
geopolitical aspects of the Black Sea area, key
guidelines regarding the policies of the main re-
gional actors, and descriptions of the multilater-
al structures of regional co-operation. Since this
publication includes separate texts discussing
energy issues and Turkey’s relations with Russia
(the most important country in the region) and
the Caucasian states, these questions will be tack-
led in this analysis only to the extent necessary
to present the Black Sea aspect of Turkey’s for-
eign policy.
2. The Black Sea region
2.1. A new geopolitical order
in the region
Throughout its history, the Black Sea has been do-
minated by one powerful nation. In ancient times,
the sea coast was colonised by Greek settlers. Next
it fell under the influence of the Roman Empire
and its successor, the Byzantine Empire. Between
the late fifteenth and late seventeenth centuries,
it belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Between late
seventeenth century and 1870s, the northern coast
of the Black Sea was conquered by Russia. The
war fought between 1768 and 1774 was a break-
through, which allowed Russia to gain an advan-
tage. The region was then de facto divided into
the spheres of influence of Russia (the USSR from
1922) and of the Ottoman Empire (the Republic
of Turkey from 1923) until the collapse of the So-
viet Union in 19911.
During the Cold War period, the Black Sea region
was a secondary area of confrontation between
the West and the Communist bloc, while the main
arena of the conflict was located in Central Europe
and particular places in the world where open
military conflicts erupted (such as Vietnam, Korea,
Africa, Latin America, etc.). In the 1990s, the ma-
jor political events on the European continent
were mainly dominated by processes of integra-
tion with the European Union, system transfor-
mations in the Eastern & Central European coun-
tries, and military conflicts in the Balkans (which
had a much greater impact than those fought in
the Caucasus). For these reasons, the Black Sea
area itself was initially of minor significance in
the construction of the new post-Cold War geo-
political order.
The break-up of the USSR, the collapse of the So-
viet bloc and the emergence of new independent
countries created a new geopolitical system. The
divides which had determined the political situ-
ation in the region during the Cold War period
became insignificant. New platforms of regional
co-operation in such areas as the economy, social
life and politics appeared. The economic transfor-
mation of all the countries in the region enabled
the liberalisation and development of trade & in-
vestment co-operation between those states. The
opening of borders (except for the one between
Turkey and Armenia) and the simplification of bor-
der crossing procedures noticeably intensified
people-to-people contacts between various socie-
ties living in the region. The breakdown of the
Cold War order enabled new regional forms of in-
stitutional co-operation to be developed, the most
prominent example of which is the Organisation
of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC).
2.2. The Black Sea or the Wider
Black Sea?
The political definition of the Black Sea region is
not limited to those countries which have direct
55
A
d
v
o
c
a
te
fo
r
th
e
s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
?
T
u
rk
is
h
p
o
li
c
y
to
w
a
rd
s
th
e
B
la
c
k
S
e
a
re
g
io
n
–
it
s
fo
rm
a
n
d
b
a
c
k
g
ro
u
n
d
C E S R e p o r t
access to the sea (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Geor-
gia, Russia and Ukraine). In geopolitical terms, the
scope of the region is much larger, and includes
countries located in its close neighbourhood, na-
mely Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Black
Sea region may also be defined even more exten-
sively as the Wider Black Sea area, which stretches
out between the Southeastern Europe and the Cas-
pian Sea basin2. This is reflected in the shapes of
the regional co-operation organisations existing
there. The BSEC alone has 11 member states and
16 countries and international organisations
which have observer status3. The definition of the
Wider Black Sea used for the needs of this text,
along with the littoral countries (Bulgaria, Georgia,
Russia, Romania and Turkey), also covers coun-
tries located in its close neighbourhood, espe-
cially countries which have historical, cultural,
political and economic ties with the aforemen-
tioned states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova).
Sometimes Greece is also considered to be a part
of that area4.
The international significance of the region at-
tracts active engagement of major international
players, i.e. the USA and the EU. This is mainly
an effect of its location between such strategic
regions as Central & Eastern Europe, the Balkans,
the Middle East, the Mediterranean Sea, Russia,
Caucasus and Central Asia. The Black Sea region
is also the area where routes connecting North to
South and from the East to the West of Eurasia
intersect5.
2.3. A regional identity?
The Black Sea region as such does not have a clear-
ly defined identity, unlike other European regions
(e.g. Central Europe, the Balkans, Scandinavia,
etc.). Apart from the geographical and political
aspects, it is difficult to find any cultural and his-
torical determinants. In effect, the sense of regio-
nal identity is very weak. For this reason, some
specialists even believe that the distinction of the
Black Sea region is a ‘purely intellectual construct’6.
It exists at the meeting point of other regions
which have clearly defined cultural and histori-
cal identities, such the Balkans or the Caucasus.
All the Black Sea countries have stronger bonds
with those regions; for example Ukraine and Mol-
dova with eastern Europe; Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan with the Southern Caucasus; and Ro-
mania and Bulgaria with South-Eastern Europe.
Weak as the cultural & historical factors and the
regional identity are, the perception of the Black
Sea region as a separate geopolitical area never-
theless became clearer in the early 1990s. Profes-
sor Mustafa Aydin has noted that this was an ex-
pression of the political will of the region’s coun-
tries resulting from their interests, which allow-
ed them to transform the geographical area into
a separate region. Establishing the BSEC, which
is a regional co-operation organisation, in 1992
was a tangible sign of that7.
2.4. Regional challenges
The international significance which the Black Sea
area has acquired recently is a consequence of va-
rious emerging potential threats, which are main-
ly related to the political stability of the countries
in the region, international terrorism and Euro-
pean energy security. The stability of the Black
Sea countries is under threat due to the ‘frozen
conflicts’ existing in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Transnistria and Southern Ossetia. The likelihood
of these conflicts ‘defrosting’ is strong. Moreover,
serious political tension is present in relations
between particular countries in the region, such
as Turkey against Armenia and Russia against
Georgia, which may lead to serious international
political crises. Another major problem is the
weakness of the states, especially those which
were established in the 1990s, which creates
a potential threat of domestic crises8. Russia and
Turkey have been engaged in long-standing mil-
itary conflicts between the state and separatist
guerrilla forces (Chechnya and Kurdistan respec-
tively), which are being fought in areas border-
ing the coastal regions.
From the Western perspective (NATO and the EU
member states), the region gained significance
when the threat of terrorism from radical Islamic
circles arose (after the attacks in the USA on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004)9.
This also concerns Russia as there are links be-
tween Chechen guerrilla forces and Islamists from
the Middle East10, as well as Turkey, where Islamic
terrorist organisations are active (responsible
for the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003).
As a consequence of the interventions in Iraq by
the USA and its allies, and Afghanistan by the USA
and NATO together with the difficult situation in
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the Middle East (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the unstable situation in Lebanon and the Iranian
nuclear programme), the Black Sea region has
started to be perceived by European countries as
a sort of a buffer zone between Europe and these
unstable areas, and also as a platform from which
to launch military operations.
The Black Sea area offers a key route for the tran-
sit of energy raw materials, especially natural gas,
from the Caspian Sea region to Europe. Implemen-
tation of energy projects located in the Black Sea
region (such as the Nabucco project) is vital for
European countries in terms of energy security
and diversification of energy sources. This con-
cerns not only the Central European EU member
states but also countries in the Balkans and East-
ern Europe11. Developing the transport network
will also bring tangible economic and political
benefits to countries in the Black Sea region.
3. The key regional players
and their policies
Turkey is a key player in the Black Sea region,
thanks to its geographical location and politico-
economic potential. Other major political actors
in the region include Russia, the United States and
the European Union. Romania has shown quite
considerable ambitions, by initiating the Black Sea
Forum, among other moves; however, Bucharest
has rather limited possibilities of independent ac-
tivity in the region due to its relatively small po-
litico-economic potential. Therefore, the Roma-
nian initiatives have gained regional significance
mainly thanks to political support from other ‘big
players’, mainly the USA.
3.1. Russia
Russia is the most important of those countries
which have access to the Black Sea. In Soviet ti-
mes, Moscow used to control the entire northern
and eastern coastline (where the Ukrainian, Rus-
sian and Georgian Soviet republics were located),
and the western coastline was under its strong
political influence (Romania and Bulgaria belong-
ed to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon). Russia has
treated the Black Sea as its ‘near abroad’, in other
words, the sphere of its exclusive influence. Main-
taining political domination in the region is one
of the key goals of Russian Black Sea policy.
As a consequence, Moscow has taken active mea-
sures to prevent other players, mainly the United
States and the European Union, from strengthen-
ing their position in the region, and has made
attempts to counter changes in the former Soviet
republics of political orientation from pro-Russian
into pro-Western. For these reasons, Russia is not
interested in seeing any major political changes
in the region. Moscow is able to use both political
and economic pressure, especially with regard to
former Soviet republics. It has applied the strate-
gy of maintaining ‘controlled’ destabilisation in
the region through failure to settle the ‘frozen’
conflicts. These prevent the Caucasian countries
and Moldova from modernisation and establish-
ing closer relations with the West, and allow Rus-
sia to exert significant influence on the internal
situations in those countries. Ensuring their de-
pendence on Russian oil and gas supplies is an-
other significant instrument of influence.
3.2. The United States
Firstly, the United States and the European Union
are new players. Secondly, they are external actors
who do not belong to the region. The United Sta-
tes has become more interested in the region since
11 September 2001. The Black Sea is treated by
Washington as a place which can be useful as
a staging area for military operations in the Mid-
dle East and Afghanistan. At that time, US analy-
tical circles (especially the German Marshall Fund)
have developed the concept of establishing a re-
gional Black Sea dimension under the auspices of
NATO, which has been named ‘the Wider Black
Sea’12. The concept has received the greatest sup-
port in the region from Romania and Georgia.
The key US goals in the region are democratisa-
tion and the establishment of closer relations be-
tween the Black Sea countries (except for Russia)
and the West, including their accession to NATO
and the EU. This would contribute to a strength-
ening of the US position and an extension of its
influence in the region. Three fields of direct US
activity concerning the Black Sea countries can
be distinguished13. In the political field, the USA
has made efforts to support the development de-
mocratisation and free market reforms, which is
supposed to help bring the countries closer to
Western structures. In the trade and energy fields,
57
A
d
v
o
c
a
te
fo
r
th
e
s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
?
T
u
rk
is
h
p
o
li
c
y
to
w
a
rd
s
th
e
B
la
c
k
S
e
a
re
g
io
n
–
it
s
fo
rm
a
n
d
b
a
c
k
g
ro
u
n
d
C E S R e p o r t
Washington wants new infrastructure projects
(transport routes and pipelines) to be developed,
in order to make the countries in the region (as
well as the EU) independent of Russian oil and gas,
or export of the raw materials through Russian
territory. Finally, in the security field, the USA
has been trying to take active measures to com-
bat terrorism, organised crime and illegal arms
trade. Co-operation in this field includes assis-
tance to state security structures (training, dona-
ting equipment, etc.). As part of its Black Sea poli-
cy, the USA has been taking actions in co-opera-
tion with NATO structures and regional allies
(especially Romania).
3.3. The European Union
The Black Sea region has appeared on the Euro-
pean Union’s agenda as a consequence of the ac-
cession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, the
commencement of membership negotiations with
Turkey, and the implementation of the Union’s
largest foreign policy project, the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP), which also covers other
countries in this area, with the exception of Rus-
sia. In turn, Russia plays the special role of a stra-
tegic partner in the EU policy. Moreover, the Black
Sea region is very important in the context of di-
versifying energy sources for EU member states.
For the European Union, as for the USA, the key
areas of interest are energy, security in the broad
meaning of the term (both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ secu-
rity issues), democratisation and economic trans-
formation. The Union has become engaged in the
implementation of large infrastructural projects
(TRACECA the Transport Corridor Europe-Cauca-
sus-Asia, and INOGATE, Interstate Oil and Gas
Transport to Europe). The TACIS programme used
to be the most significant instrument of EU poli-
cy. Its goals included support for institutional &
legal reforms and the development of private
entrepreneurship & infrastructural networks. Since
2007, the tasks of the TACIS programme have been
assigned to the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was creat-
ed as part of the ENP. The Union has also been
trying to play an important part in resolving the
ëfrozen’ regional conflicts. The European Union’s
position in the region became stronger after ac-
cession negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania and
Turkey started, and after Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine had expressed their interest in EU mem-
bership. As a consequence, the BSEC passed a de-
claration in October 2005 appealing to the EU to
create a Black Sea regional policy and entrusted
Greece, as a EU member state, with the mission of
coordinating relations between the two organi-
sations.
Until recently, EU policy towards the region was
characterised by developing bilateral relations in-
stead of regional co-operation, and taking ad hoc
actions in response to events taking place there14.
Finally, on 11 April 2007, the European Commi-
ssion created a regional co-operation initiative
as part of the ENP, which was named Black Sea
Synergy15. However, it is complementary to the
other initiatives being developed by the EU in the
region (either the ENP or bilateral relations). Its
goal is to stimulate co-operation in the region as
well as between the region’s countries and the
EU. The tasks to be implemented as part of the
Black Sea Synergy include combating ‘soft’ threats
(illegal migration and organised crime), activities
aimed at resolving regional conflicts, developing
co-operation in the fields of energy, transport,
trade & science, and protecting the environment.
The Union also wants to focus on developing
cross-border co-operation and strengthening state
institutions and civil society in Black Sea coun-
tries. A special programme for cross-border co-
operation in the Black Sea region, financed by EU
funds, has been launched to achieve that16. Co-
operation with the BSEC, in addition to bilateral
contacts, is expected to be the main channel for
dialogue. The European Commission thus applied
for observer status, which was granted to it at
the BSEC summit in Istanbul in June 2007. The
recognition of the BSEC as an important partner
by the European Commission has to be seen as
a goodwill gesture addressed to Turkey, which
initiated the establishment of the organisation
and is a staunch supporter of its development.
A
d
v
o
c
a
te
fo
r
th
e
s
ta
tu
s
q
u
o
?
T
u
rk
is
h
p
o
li
c
y
to
w
a
rd
s
th
e
B
la
c
k
S
e
a
re
g
io
n
–
it
s
fo
rm
a
n
d
b
a
c
k
g
ro
u
n
d
58
C E S R e p o r t
4. Regional co-operation
organisations
4.1. Organisation of the Black Sea
Economic Co-operation
The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Co-
-operation (BSEC), which was created on Turkey’s
initiative in 1992, is the most important organi-
sation for regional co-operation. Turkey came up
with a proposal to establish an organisation of
this kind as early as 1990. In the opinion of some
commentators, the main reason behind the pro-
posal was the rejection of its application for mem-
bership by the European Community in 1989,
which Turkey had submitted two years before17.
At the beginning, its activity was concentrated on
promoting economic co-operation and taking joint
actions in the fields of transport, energy and en-
vironment protection. Later, the BSEC tried to han-
dle new topics such as combating crime, border
control, crisis management and preventing terro-
rism. Additionally, BSEC offers room for a forum
for ministers of the region’s countries to address
security issues. Although the scope of the issues
on the organisation’s agenda has broadened, eco-
nomic co-operation is still the BSEC’s main task.
However, the organisation has been facing a crisis
for some time now. The key points of criticism
against BSEC include the inefficiency of its activi-
ties, its limited field of interest to issues of eco-
nomic co-operation, and its failure to start a po-
litical dialogue within the organisation. Regard-
less of its quite well-developed institutional struc-
ture (including a secretariat, parliament and bank),
the BSEC still has problems with making decisions
efficiently. The limited level of funding is another
significant problem. Moreover, there are different
visions for the future functioning of the organisa-
tion among its members. Another serious prob-
lem is the existence of bilateral tensions be-
tween individual member states (Turkey/Armenia,
Turkey/Greece, Azerbaijan/Armenia, Russia/Geor-
gia, Russia/Ukraine and Russia/Moldova among
other conflicts)18.
Currently, the largest countries in the region, Rus-
sia and Turkey, have placed an emphasis on de-
veloping economic co-operation, and are unwill-
ing to face any challenges in the field of politics,
fearing that political disputes may have an ad-
verse effect on the economic results. The BSEC is
unable to resolve the most serious political prob-
lems, which has results in a lessening of its pres-
tige. At present, the major problem and chal-
lenge for the BSEC is developing a new concept
for the organisation’s functioning which could
allow it to overcome the crisis.
4.2. The Black Sea Forum
Holding the Black Sea Forum in Bucharest in
June 2005 was an attempt to find new platforms
for regional co-operation. The idea of the forum,
which was created on Romania’s initiative, was
not to establish another institutional structure,
but to create a permanent mechanism for consul-
tations among the countries of the region, as well
as between those countries and international or-
ganisations. The forum was intended to focus on
security issues, and to find solutions to problems
related to the ‘frozen conflicts’ and energy issues.
However the Romanian initiative, which was
strongly supported by the USA among other play-
ers, did not find approval from Russia. Although
Turkey joined the Forum, Ankara has been treat-
ing this initiative with some scepticism because
it is not interested in Romania’s role to grow.
Moreover, it believes that Romania has too small
a political potential to be able to successfully pre-
side over a regional organisation. Turkey’s par-
ticipation in the first summit of the Forum could
be seen as a goodwill gesture on its part addres-
sed to the United States. Due to the lack of inter-
est from the key regional players in the initiative,
the Forum has not been a success, and has not
become an important platform for regional co-
operation. In June 2007, during the BSEC summit
in Istanbul, Russia and Turkey did not agree to
include information on the role of the Black Sea
Forum in the version suggested by Romania in
the final communique.
4.3. Initiatives in the security field
Two initiatives related to security issues, Black-
seafor and Black Sea Harmony, have been imple-
mented in the Black Sea. Blackseafor was for-
mally established in April 2001 on Turkey’s initia-
tive. It comprises the six Black Sea littoral coun-
tries, and the goal of the initiative is joint action
in search & rescue operations at sea, humanita-
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rian aid and environmental protection. Common
maritime exercises have been held annually as
part of the initiative. Since January 2004, Turkey
has made efforts to transform the organisation
and successfully counteract new maritime threats.
A permanent operational centre has been created,
and co-operation in information exchange has
been improved, among other achievements. In
2005, the initiative was enhanced to include new
tasks linked to combating terrorism and the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
In turn, Operation Black Sea Harmony, which was
initiated by Turkey in 2004, is intended to sup-
plement the NATO-led Operation Active Endea-
vour in the Mediterranean Sea. Its field of action
is the southern coast of the Black Sea, and its goals
are similar to that of the NATO-led operation,
namely, to ensure the security of communication
routes and to monitor suspicious ships. Turkey
has invited the other littoral states to participate
in the initiative. Russia and Ukraine have declar-
ed an interest in joining it. Meanwhile, Romania
and Bulgaria have responded with restraint to
the Turkish initiative, seeing it as an instrument
for strengthening Turkey’s dominant position in
the region19. The two countries would rather
have a NATO-led operation in the region (and
permit US ships to operate on the sea).
5. The Black Sea region
as an aspect of Turkish foreign
policy20
5.1. The significance of Turkey
in the region
Turkey is one of the most important countries in
the Black Sea region. It has the longest coastline
of all the other littoral states, extending a total
of 1595 kilometres. Thanks to its geographical lo-
cation, Turkey is in the centre of the region, lying
at the crossing point of the major communication
routes running from North to South (such as the
transport routes from Ukraine and Russia which
lead through the Turkish straits, the Blue Stream
gas pipeline, etc.) and from West to East (the brid-
ge connecting Europe with the Middle East, the
Caucasus and Central Asia). The Bosporus and the
Dardanelles, which connect the Black Sea with
the Aegean Sea and constitute the only passages
into global waters, are under its total control. Tur-
key, preceded only by Russia, has the second larg-
est demographic potential21 and, unlike other
countries in the region, its population number
has been increasing.
Turkey is an important country in the region not
only because of its geographical situation but also
thanks to its military, economic and political po-
tential. The Turkish fleet deployed on the Black
Sea, along with the Russian Black Sea Fleet, rep-
resents the most substantial regional military
force.
The Turkish economy, which has been developing
at a fast pace (the predicted GDP growth is 5% in
2007 and 6% in 200822), is one of the strongest in
the region.
Turkey, which is a NATO member, and the EU’s
candidate country, has been maintaining rela-
tively good relations with Russia, and has some
influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia, has
been aspiring to the role of a regional leader.
This has been reflected by its participation in all
the regional co-operation structures, and in fact
initiating most of them. It was on Turkey’s ini-
tiative that the BSEC, Blackseafor and Black Sea
Harmony were established.
After Russia, Turkey is the only Black Sea country
to have very extensive economic contacts and
political relations with all the countries in the
region. This makes it the country which has the
most options for collaboration and activity on
the regional scale. Neither Romania nor Ukraine
(not to mention Georgia or Bulgaria), whose in-
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Country
Russia
Turkey
Ukraine
Romania
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Georgia
Moldova
Armenia
Population
142 million
71 million
46 million
21 million
8.3 million
7.6 million
4.6 million
4.3 million
3 million
Source: UN, national statistical offices (estimates)
Table 1. Population numbers (2007)
fluence and politico-economic impact on the re-
gion are much more limited, have such a potential.
In this context, it is worth paying attention to the
strong cultural and historical bonds which Tur-
key has with the Turkish & Muslim minorities
living in other countries in the region and with
other Turkic-speaking nations23. Many people live
in Turkey who come from other countries in the
region, a number estimated to reach several mil-
lions. Contacts between the Muslim communi-
ties in the region and their descendants living in
Turkey make this country special in the Black Sea
area. A great number of tourists and entrepre-
neurs from other Black Sea countries visit Turkey
every year, which is another important factor.
The impact of small trade exchanges on building
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Country
Russia
Turkey
Ukraine
Romania
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Armenia
Moldova
GDP value in US$ billion by purchasing
power parity (PPP)
2,087
888
320
245
86
65
20
17
10
GDP* per capita in US$
by purchasing power parity (PPP)
14,692
12,288
6,941
11,387
11,302
7,659
4,690
4,942
2,901
* IMF estimates
Source: International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org, data for 2007
Table 2. The economic potential of the countries in the Black Sea region (2007)
Turkey’s share in trade in %
3.9*
3.8*
14
4
6*
8.5
14
3
* data for 2006
Source: data gathered by the CES on the basis of statistical data for individual countries
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
http://tpb.traderom.ro
http://www.bnb.bg/
Table 3. The significance of Turkey as a trade partner for Black Sea states (2007)
Country
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
Romania
Ukraine
Number of citizens
53
435
1,234
631
145
2,465
390
593
Source: Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism
Table 4. Number of citizens who visited Turkey in 2007
(in thousands)
Country
Russia
Ukraine
Georgia
Moldova
Romania
Bulgaria
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Turkey’s position in trade in general
7*
5*
1
8
3 in exports and 5 in imports*
1 in exports and 3 in imports
1
12
people-to-people contacts between the societies
of Turkey and other countries in the region should
not be underestimated either. Turkey is the only
country in the Wider Black Sea area to be per-
ceived as an important or quite important desti-
nation for the residents of all the countries clas-
sified as belonging to it24.
The issue of the Turkish minority is the most sig-
nificant in bilateral relations with Bulgaria,
where 9.5% of the population are Turks and 12%
are Muslim. In the 1980s, Bulgaria adopted a poli-
cy of compulsory assimilation of the Turkish mi-
nority, which reached its peak in 1989, when near-
ly 350,000 Turks were forced to leave the country
by Bulgarian authorities. The policy caused a se-
vere worsening of relations between Turkey and
Bulgaria. Following the collapse of communism,
the new government in Sofia definitively chang-
ed its approach towards the Turkish minority, and
started respecting their rights. More than half of
the Turks who had left Bulgaria in 1989 came
back. The Turkish minority started to participate
actively in the socio-political life of Bulgaria, and
its political representative, the Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (DPS), became the third
largest party in parliament; it has participated in
almost all government coalitions. The positive so-
lution to the Turkish minority issue was the basis
on which good relations between Turkey and
Bulgaria were built25. The fact that in May 2006,
the Bulgarian parliament failed to pass a bill which
was expected to designate the massacres of Ar-
menians committed by the Young Turks regime
during World War I as acts of genocide seems to
prove that the political influence of the Turkish
minority in Bulgaria has increased, and that rela-
tions with Turkey have gained significance for
Sofia.
However, the engagement of the Turkish govern-
ment and society in developing contacts between
people in the region is mainly limited to business
contacts and issues of Turkish and Muslim mino-
rities. There is a lack of any broader activity direc-
ted to the societies of those countries as a whole.
Co-operation between the non-governmental sec-
tors of individual countries in the region is very
limited. The activity of Turkish NGOs does not go
beyond support to Turkish ethnic minorities or
to Muslim immigrants from Black Sea countries
living in Turkey. Co-operation between local com-
munities, local governments and cross-border
areas is conducted on a small scale, and is in fact
limited to economic aspects. In this context, it can
be concluded that social contacts in the Black Sea
region are not as intensive as in Central and East-
ern Europe26 or Western Europe, for example, and
as such do not have a significant impact on the
general shape of regional co-operation27.
5.2. The position of the Black Sea
region in Turkish policy28
Although Turkey plays a significant role in the
region, Black Sea issues are not high on its for-
eign policy agenda. Currently, Turkey’s top foreign
policy priorities are the Kurdish issue29, stabilising
the situation in the Middle East and relations with
the United States; European integration and bila-
teral co-operation with Russia are treated as slight-
ly less urgent tasks. The most important challen-
ges in Turkish foreign policy are the existence of
Kurdish guerrilla bases in northern Iraq, which
are used to launch attacks on Turkey, and the pos-
sibility of setting up an independent Kurdish state
as a consequence of the potential disintegration
of Iraq.
Ankara does not see the Black Sea area as a po-
tential source of serious threats to its state secu-
rity. Its strong military presence in the Black Sea
and good relations with all the littoral countries
make Turks feel very secure in the region30.
In effect, the Black Sea region appears in Turkish
policy not as a separate policy line, but rather
within the context of relations with such big play-
ers as the EU, NATO, the USA and Russia, as well
as in those areas which are of major significance
for Ankara, namely the energy sector, security is-
sues, economic co-operation and naval affairs.
5.3. The evolution of the Turkish
Black Sea policy
The Black Sea region was not a significant issue in
Turkish foreign policy from the establishment of
the Turkish Republic in 1923 until the end of World
War II31. Moscow’s demands to hand over control of
the straits to the USSR in 1947 made Turkey take
an active stance and join the Western bloc during
the ‘Cold War’ period. At that time, the Black Sea
region became a zone of conflict between the West
and the Soviet bloc for more than 40 years. Tur-
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key found itself in the first front line of this con-
flict. Regardless of the tensions which existed
then, the situation in the region was still quite
stable during the Cold War.
The situation seriously changed at the turn of the
1990s, when the USSR disintegrated and commu-
nism collapsed. Turkey tried to use the disintegra-
tion of the previous geopolitical system to become
the most important player in the region. One of the
effects of this was the political initiative to cre-
ate the regional co-operation organisation, BSEC,
which was founded in 1992 in Istanbul32. At that
time, the main driving force behind Turkish enga-
gement was the desire to develop economic co-
operation and use the opportunity which had been
offered by the opening of the post-communist
countries’ markets. The development in political
relations came as a natural consequence of closer
economic co-operation. The search for new poli-
tical partners in the region at that time was caus-
ed by tense relations with the EU and the search
for new markets for Turkish exports and invest-
ments, among other reasons33. However, Anka-
ra’s interest in the Black Sea area lessened in the
mid-1990s. This was an effect of the military con-
flicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Moreover,
Turkey started treating the Black Sea aspect of its
foreign policy as significantly less important
than the European aspect (specifically, its attempts
to win EU candidate status). Thereafter, the Middle
East became the key issue in Turkish policy after
the US intervention in Iraq in 2003.
However, other events which had a great impact
on the development of the situation also took
place in the Black Sea region after 2003, namely
the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine,
the accessions of Romania and Bulgaria to NATO
and then to the EU, increasing US influence (mili-
tary bases in Romania and Bulgaria), the growing
regional ambitions of Romania and the activation
of the EU (Black Sea Synergy). All this meant the
emergence of new actors in the region, where Rus-
sia and Turkey used to have the greatest influence.
The US efforts to enhance its influence made the
strongest impact. Turkey’s negative attitude to-
wards those efforts was to a great extent a con-
sequence of the clearly worsening relations with
the USA after the intervention in Iraq, which was
perceived by the Turkish ruling class and society
as a whole as an aggravation of the Kurdish pro-
blem. All this has brought Turkey closer to Russia,
which was equivalent to Turkey’s distancing
itself from US policy and NATO in the context of
the Black Sea region.
5.4. The Turkish perception
of the region
The Turkish perception of the Black Sea is based
on two fundamental principles. They are linked to
the historical tradition of the Ottoman Empire’s
domination of the region and the status of the
Black Sea straits34.
The historical awareness of the Sublime Porte’s
total control over the Black Sea region, which last-
ed for almost four centuries, has given rise to
a tendency to perceive the Black Sea as a ‘Turkish
lake’. However, this vision has been adjusted in
the face of Russian potential. In effect, in the Turk-
ish discourse on the region, the Black Sea is treat-
ed as a sphere of influence for those two coun-
tries35. This point of view implies a critical ap-
proach to the appearance of new actors in the re-
gion, who are seen as a threat to Turkey’s position.
The special status of the Black Sea straits is an-
other significant factor affecting the Turkish per-
ception. For many centuries, the Ottoman Empire
wielded absolute control over the straits them-
selves and over ship traffic in the straits (each fo-
reign ship had to obtain a special permit). In the
early nineteenth century, Turkish control of the
straits was gradually reduced as a consequence
of the increasing influence of Russia and European
powers on their administration. A special com-
mission was established to manage the traffic in
the straits after World War I. Turkey’s control over
the straits was confirmed and guaranteed under
the Montreux Convention as late as 193636. Exclu-
sive control of the straits allows Turkey to play
a key role in the entire Black Sea region. This is
why defending the order which was established
at that time is one of the major issues in the Turk-
ish foreign policy. This is not limited to the tech-
nical rules of ship traffic in the straits. The Mont-
reux Convention itself is perceived by Turks as
one of the basic legal documents which establish
and guarantee the sovereignty & security of the
Republic of Turkey.
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5.5. Characteristics of the Turkish
Black Sea policy
The two aforementioned aspects determine the
basic parameters of the Turkish policy; that is, in
terms of politics, maintaining the status quo in
the region (the de facto domination of Turkey and
Russia, because the other countries do not have
sufficient potential), and in terms of maritime
safety, maintaining Ankara’s exclusive control of
the straits and opposing the deployment of war-
ships belonging to countries which are not situ-
ated on the Black Sea37.
The Turkish policy makes a strong distinction be-
tween maritime safety issues and general securi-
ty problems (terrorism, ‘frozen’ conflicts, organis-
ed crime)38. Maritime safety plays a much more
prominent role. Different challenges are linked to
those two areas, which entails different kind of
actions for each of them. Moreover, different state
institutions are engaged in the two areas. The
army and the fleet command are the main au-
thorities in charge of maritime safety, whereas
issues linked to general regional security fall with-
in the jurisdiction of the government and the Fo-
reign Ministry.
Turkish policy on the Black Sea region is rather
passive, focused as it is on supporting general
principles such as stability and territorial integri-
ty. Turkey has been watching the events develop-
ing in the Black Sea area closely, without however
becoming actively engaged in stimulating chan-
ges or resolving local conflicts. This relatively cau-
tious and passive Turkish policy in the Black Sea
area is an effect of both the low priority granted
to this policy line by Ankara, and Turkey’s rela-
tively small real influence on the other countries
in the region.
Turkey has not developed a clear stance towards
the region. Ankara has adopted a ‘wait-and-see’
approach, to make sure in which direction the si-
tuation develops. As a consequence, Turkish Black
Sea policy is reactive, and consists rather in ad-
justing to circumstances than in actively making
changes. The situation in the Black Sea region is
likely to change gradually and slowly. Each of the
major players is either uninterested in, or unable
to, cause any quick changes in the regional situ-
ation39. The future of the region will depend on
whether the European Union becomes an impor-
tant regional actor (this depends on the success
of the European Neighbourhood Policy. and the
possible creation of the proposed ‘Black Sea di-
mension of the European policy’40), the implemen-
tation and success of the regional energy pro-
jects (Nabucco, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Odessa–
–Brody–P∏ock, etc.), stability in the region, deve-
lopments in the situation concerning the ‘frozen’
conflicts in the Caucasus and Transnistria, the de-
veloping situation in the Middle East and Central
Asia (Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and, last but not
least, developing relations within the EU–USA–
–Russia–Turkey rectangle.
Bilateral relations are the most important level
of contact for Turkey in the Black Sea area. Multi-
lateral structures play a significantly smaller part
due to their weakness. None of the multilateral
initiatives, be it the BSEC, the Black Sea Forum or
Blackseafor, has proven a success or has had any
major impact on the situation in the region. For
this reason, the Turkish Black Sea policy has main-
ly been implemented in direct relations with in-
dividual countries. This implies the predominant
position of bilateral issues over regional ones.
6. Turkey vis-a-vis the key
regional actors
6.1. External conditions
Over recent years, the shape of Ankara’s Black
Sea policy has been strongly affected by worsen-
ing relations with the USA, mainly as a result of
the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 and its con-
sequences (the strengthening position of Kurds
in the Middle East and the escalating conflict be-
tween Turkey and Kurdish guerrilla forces), cool-
ing Turkish-EU relations (since 2005) and impro-
ving relations with Russia. The latter situation is
mainly a result of the tensions in Turkey’s rela-
tions with the USA and the EU.
In an attempt to determine ‘external conditions’
for Turkish policy in the Black Sea region, one has
to keep in mind the global rivalry between the
United States and Russia, which is also being play-
ed out in this region. The USA has increased ef-
forts to strengthen its presence in the areas which
Moscow treats as its exclusive spheres of influ-
ence, and thus aims to reduce Russian political
influence. The collision of American and Russian
influences can be observed in practically the en-
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tire Wider Black Sea region, starting with the Cas-
pian Sea through the Caucasus and Eastern Eu-
rope (Ukraine and Moldova) to the Balkans. Since
this area lies in Turkey’s immediate neighbour-
hood, the development of relations between the
USA and Russia influence what kind of actions Tur-
key takes in this region. Moreover, Turkey itself
has become an object of specific rivalry between
the White House and the Kremlin in the context
of the Black Sea region.
6.2. Closer relations with Russia
Turkey and Russia have competed for influence in
the Black Sea area for many centuries. In the
1990s, the main arena of rivalry between Ankara
and Moscow was the Caucasus, which borders
on the Black Sea area. Turkey became engaged in
supporting the independence of the Southern
Caucasian nations; Ankara placed special empha-
sis on developing trade and military relations
with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and offered mili-
tary support to those states. Strengthening their
territorial integrity was especially important for
Ankara. To achieve this purpose, Turkey closely
co-operated with the United States, a policy which
led to confrontation with Russia. At first Moscow
took actions to prevent the secession of the South-
ern Caucasian republics from the USSR. Then, to
maintain its influence in the region, it encour-
aged separatisms in the region (the Abkhazian
and Ossetian nationalities in Georgia, and the Ar-
menians in Azerbaijan). The Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia
supported the Armenians and Turkey the Azer-
baijanis, became the main field for Turkish-Rus-
sian rivalry. Additionally, allegations that Turkey
unofficially supported the Chechens in their fight
for independence could be heard in Russia.
Relations between Ankara and Moscow started
improving in the late 1990s, the first effect of
which was the Eurasia Action Plan signed by the
two countries in 2001, envisaging co-operation
in combating terrorism. An important conse-
quence of that was the fact that Ankara limited
the activity of Chechen organisations in Turkey,
and Moscow did the same to Kurdish organisa-
tions in Russia; this enabled a political dialogue
between the two countries. Turkish-Russian re-
lations further improved after 2003, as Turkish-
US relations clearly worsened. The intensification
of Turkish-Russian co-operation in the Black Sea
area was accelerated by American pressure to in-
crease the role of the USA and NATO in this re-
gion41. Washington’s key goals are to weaken Rus-
sia’s position, support pro-US countries (first of
all Romania and Georgia) and guarantee its mili-
tary presence in the region, which could be used
to attack Iran or exert pressure on it. Different as
the motivations of Turkey and Russia had been,
the platform of their co-operation was built on
their distaste for the growing external influences
in the region. For Russia, the entry of the United
States and NATO onto the Black Sea area would
mean the presence of its main geopolitical rival
in its immediate neighbourhood, the area which
Russian foreign policy defines as its exclusive
sphere of influence. If the USA becomes estab-
lished in the Black Sea area, its position will also
be strengthened in other regions which are stra-
tegic for Russia, such as the Caucasus and Eastern
Europe.
The United States’ increasing significance in the
region has given rise to a feeling of ‘enclosure’42
and a loss of influence even in Ankara itself.
In its attempt to prevent the US and NATO from
strengthening their position in the Black Sea, Tur-
key wants to keep its own status as the main
Western country (i.e. NATO member) in the area,
and is thus striving to retain its monopoly on
the Alliance’s activities there. Turkey has been
making efforts to remain the only representative
and executor of the Alliance’s policy in the region.
This has been evidenced inter alia by Turkey’s
stance on the extension of the NATO-led Active
Endeavour operation from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Black Sea. Ankara insists that there is
no need to carry out such an operation in the
Black Sea, because such functions are already
being performed by Black Sea Harmony and Black-
seafor.
Turkey is of the opinion that none of the coun-
tries concerned can be excluded from any regio-
nal initiative, and therefore each of them must
include Russia. Ankara argues that if Russia is de-
prived of participation in and influence on such
co-operation, it will start sabotaging it and mak-
ing efforts to destabilise the situation in the
region, which will undermine regional security.
It is worth emphasising that Turkey does not per-
ceive Russia’s military presence in the Black Sea
as a threat to its interests. This has been reflected
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inter alia in its indifferent attitude towards the
presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea.
Ankara and Moscow have started perceiving the
emergence of external players in the region as
a threat to their interests. In addition to oppos-
ing the growing role of NATO in the region, Rus-
sia and Turkey have adopted the same stance on
keeping the Montreux Convention in force, which
the USA pressed to have amended in 2005 and at
the beginning of 2006.
Avoiding disputable issues linked to the Black Sea
region in bilateral relations (the Azerbaijani-Arme-
nian conflict and the integrity of Georgia & Azer-
baijan) and the implementation of some Russian
energy projects to the disadvantage of Turkish
interests (such as the Burgas–Alexandroupolis
pipeline), etc. is a significant feature of the new
Turkish approach towards Russia. However, the
relations between the two countries slightly wor-
sened in 2007, mainly as a consequence of con-
flicts of interests in the field of energy (for more
information on this issue, see the chapter dis-
cussing relations between Turkey and Russia).
6.3. Rivalry with the United States
Tensions between Ankara and Washington are
linked mainly to the Kurdish issue and the Middle
East, although they are also reflected indirectly
in relations in the Black Sea region, where the
major differences of opinion concern the charac-
ter of the US presence in the region and the sti-
mulation of democratic transformation.
Turkey has been critical of Washington’s efforts
to increase its presence in the region. So far, An-
kara has successfully withheld NATO operations
in the Black Sea, and withstood US pressure to
renegotiate the Montreux Convention and allow
the presence of forces other than those of the lit-
toral countries in the Black Sea. Washington,
which is unwilling to worsen its relations with
Turkey, relieved its pressure on these issues in
spring 2006; this has contributed to improving
the atmosphere in mutual contacts.
Turkey’s approach to the US policy of actively
stimulating democratic changes in the region’s
countries has been rather restrained. From An-
kara’s point of view, the most important issue is
regional stability rather than the democratic
transformation of the region’s countries. Turkey
is afraid that rapid changes could entail a real
threat of destabilisation. Iraq and the develop-
ment of events there since the US intervention
are often used as an example of such a policy’s
failure43. Therefore, Turkey has chosen a reserved
‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards the ‘colour revo-
lutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine, and did not en-
gage in supporting them. Similarly, Turkish non-
governmental organisations are not actively en-
gaged in stimulating democratic changes in the
region, thus representing a completely different
approach to that of the NGO sector in Central
and Eastern European countries.
7. Summary: Searching for
a political vision in the Black
Sea dimension?
The Turkish policy in the Black Sea region is strong-
ly dependent on how Turkey’s relations with the
United States, the European Union and Russia de-
velop. The Turkish Black Sea policy can be sum-
med up as ‘wait and see how the situation deve-
lops’44. In effect, it tends to react to developing
events rather than actively creating a reality. This
is a consequence of the desire to preserve the
geopolitical status quo in the Black Sea area,
where the dominant Turkish and Russian influ-
ences are balanced, as well as Ankara’s convic-
tion for the need of greater engagement in other
regions.
Turkey’s passiveness in the region is also reflect-
ed in the small number of institutions engaged
in regional activities and the limited number of
topics addressed as part of such activities. Tur-
key’s interests mainly boil down to maritime is-
sues (traffic and transit in the Black Sea and the
straits) and the economy (developing bilateral
trade relations). Practically, the tasks related to
them are implemented only by the navy (which
is part of the army) and the organisations of bu-
sinessmen with the Foreign Ministry’s support.
People-to-people contacts have been developed
to a limited extent, which is supported by NGOs
and local authorities. Such an approach, which
does not concern Turkey alone, can be seen as
a cause for the weakening of the region’s cultural
and historical identity.
However, it seems that inevitable changes in the
politico-economic situation in the region will force
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Turkey to modify its current policy, which aims
at maintaining the status quo. The major chal-
lenge for Ankara will be to define its stance on
the potential integration of the Black Sea area with
European and trans-Atlantic structures. The lack
of a clear position on this issue entails the passive
approach to projects implemented by the EU and
NATO in the region. Active support for the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy could be used to Tur-
key’s advantage in its ongoing membership nego-
tiations with the EU. The Central European coun-
tries, which were actively engaged in EU projects
addressed to Eastern European and Balkan states
before their accession to the Union, can be used
as an example. This enabled them to advance their
own interests and contributed to their integra-
tion with the EU. However, Turkey’s ability to
pursue a common regional policy with the Euro-
pean Union is limited, due to the fact that unlike
the case of Central European countries, its mem-
bership prospect is still uncertain. This results
from Turkey’s much graver internal problems and
tensions in its relations with EU member states,
as well as the significantly greater reservations
held regarding its accession within the EU. There-
fore, taking into account the ‘dignity’ factor in
Turkey’s foreign policy, a deep crisis in accession
negotiations may cause Ankara to torpedo any
initiative from Brussels, even if it might be objec-
tively advantageous. Considering Turkey’s regio-
nal potential, such a policy of obstruction may
significantly frustrate the implementation of EU
initiatives addressed to the Black Sea area.
Rafa∏ Sadowski
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CHAPTER VI
Towards a strategic
partnership? Turkish-
-Russian relations at the
turn of the twenty-first
century
Marek Menkiszak
Theses
1. Turkish-Russian relations significantly im-
proved at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. The breakthroughwas especially evident in
2003 and 2004. The two countries, which used
to be strategic rivals, have become partners en-
gaged in intensive political dialogue, rapidly de-
veloping trade and energy co-operation, and
have heightened their collaboration in the fields
of security and defence. These changes arose as
the result of a long-lasting process.
2. Many factors have led to this process. These
include the disappearance or weakening of
aggravating aspects in mutual relations; Tur-
key’s increasing frustration at both US policy
in Iraq and the European Union’s attitude to-
wards Ankara; and the growing political and
economic ambitions of the two countries. Eco-
nomic co-operation was the driving force behind
the improvement of Turkish-Russian relations,
in the forms of trade (including the so-called
‘suitcase trade’), investments (especially Turk-
ish investments in the Russian building indus-
try) and the development of Russian tourism.
However, it was the increasing ties in the ener-
gy sector which had the strongest impact. Tur-
key’s dependence on Russian gas imports and
the presence of Russian energy companies on
the Turkish market have both noticeably in-
creased. Ambitious plans for energy co-operation
brought the two countries closer. The building
of mutual trust and the expanding scope of Tur-
key and Russia’s common interests, especially
in the Black Sea region, also contributed to the
development of co-operation in the areas of se-
curity and defence. Last but not least, the in-
tensifying activity of the increasingly strong
pro-Russian lobby in Turkey undoubtedly ad-
vanced the improvement of relations between
the two countries.
3. However, there are some serious limitations
which prevent a Turkish-Russian alliance from
being formed. In particular, Turkey has not re-
vised the strategic pro-Western line of its policy,
and is deeply set in the Euro-Atlantic structures.
Nor has Turkey been offered a clear and suffi-
ciently attractive alternative to its bonds with
theWestern world. Turkish-Russian relations are
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still full of mutual distrust. Moreover, the two
countries’ interests regarding the transport and
transit of Caspian oil are substantially in con-
flict. It is worth emphasising that in 2007, a dif-
ference of interests emerged in the gas sector,
which used to be an area of close co-operation
between the two countries. Turkey seriously
fears dependence on Russian gas supplies as
well as the expansive plans of Gazprom.
4. Therefore, the improvement of Turkish-Rus-
sian relations seemed to be rather a tactical than
a strategic. It was selective and based on cur-
rent circumstances. Moreover, there are signs
indicating that it reached its apogee more or
less between 2005 and 2006, that the impetus
has been lost since then, and that relations be-
tween the two countries are cooling down.
5. Nevertheless, the situation may still change.
In particular, the improvement of relations be-
tween Turkey and Russia could continue as a con-
sequence of the Turkish army’s full scale inter-
vention in northern Iraq regardless of US and
EU protests, the disintegration of Iraq and the
emergence of an independent Kurdistan, a pos-
sible US attack on Iran, the breakdown of the
negotiation process concerning Turkey’s mem-
bership in the EU and a loss of perspective for
accession in the foreseeable future, and the EU’s
failure to create a common energy policy and
the diversification of energy supplies (especial-
ly natural gas) for EU member states.
1. General background
of Turkish-Russian relations
Turkish-Russian relations are set in geographical,
historical and politico-psychological contexts.
Therefore, it is worth starting an analysis of them
with a brief sketch of this general background.
Turkey and Russia have much in common. The geo-
graphical situation is the first and the basic exam-
ple. Although Turkey and Russia have not had
a common land border since the collapse of the
USSR in late 1991, they are neighbours through
the Black Sea; the two countries belong to the
Black Sea region. However, while this is one of
many regions (not necessarily the most impor-
tant one) for Russia, in the case of Turkey it is
a key geographical point of reference. Moreover,
Turkey and Russia both have a special, strategic,
bridging location. This bridge quality is present
in the geographical, cultural and civilisational
aspects. Russia, the largest country in the world,
which occupies a significant part of northern
Eurasia, connects Europe, Central Asia and East
Asia. In spite of the domination of the Russian
ethnic group, it is a multi-ethnic country, includ-
ing a substantial Turkic population and a signif-
icant percentage of Muslims1; it often emphasis-
es its role as a link between the European and
Asian civilisational traditions. In turn, Turkey is
strategically located in the natural land corridor
connecting Europe with the Middle East and the
Caspian, Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.
With its clearly predominant Turkic ethnic group,
it is a multiethnic, Muslim yet secular state, which
– albeit with some problems ñ is trying to com-
bine Islamic traditions with a Western democra-
tic system, sometimes holding itself up as a mo-
del for other Islamic countries.
Secondly, Turkey and Russia have shared a com-
mon, often very turbulent history. It is worth em-
phasising that both countries have strong impe-
rialistic traditions. The beginnings of both their
neighbourhood (since the late fifteenth century)
and their rivalry (since the late seventeenth cen-
tury) were closely linked to the expansion of the
Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and to the birth
of Russian Tsardom (and then the Empire) on the
other. A total of eleven Russian-Turkish wars were
fought between the late seventeenth century
and 1918. Although, from the beginning of the
18th century, the Russian Empire took the offen-
sive against the weakening Ottoman Empire, the
Russian strategic goal to gain control of the Black
Sea straits was never achieved. The Russian-Turk-
ish conflict reached its peak during World War I,
when the two countries were engaged in fierce
fights on the Caucasian front. The downfall of the
two empires as a consequence of the revolutions
in Russia and then Turkey in the final phase of
World War I (1917–1918) opened a new stage –
this time positive – in Turkish-Russian relations.
Soviet Russia, which was governed by the Bol-
sheviks, offered political and financial (including
military2) support to the Kemalists in their so-
called war of liberation, noticing an opportunity
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to weaken the position of the Western ‘imperia-
lists’ in the region, and to expand the revolution
to the Muslim Middle East. At that time, Turkey
and Russia established political, economic and mi-
litary co-operation3, although this did not trans-
form into a lasting alliance, mainly because of
Turkey’s generally pro-Western orientation. Mos-
cow and Ankara again found themselves on oppo-
site sides of the front after World War II. The threat
of Soviet expansionism hanging over Turkey was
one of the triggers of the Cold War4. One of its
key frontlines ran along the closely guarded bor-
der between Turkey, a NATO member state from
1952, and the Soviet Union, which was the lead-
er of the Warsaw Pact as of 1955. The situation
changed in the late 1980s, when relations be-
tween the East and the West were normalised.
A new phase in relations between the two coun-
tries opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union
at the end of 1991. This meant a real geopolitical
revolution for Turkey as well. The two countries
no longer had a common land border. Fifteen
new independent states, five of which (Azerbai-
jan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan) culturally belonged to the Turkic com-
munity, appeared on the map of Eurasia, thus ope-
ning up new perspectives for Ankara. The new si-
tuation also brought about a sharpening rivalry
between a weakened Russia, defending its sta-
tus as a global power, and Turkey, which had am-
bitions to become a regional power.
Geography and history have determined the mu-
tual perception of Turkey and Russia to an even
greater extent. Russian ethnic identity was form-
ed inter alia during battles against the Tatars, a Tur-
kic people. Meanwhile, Turks see the history and
culture of the Tatars as a part of their own heritage.
Between the late 15th and late 17th centuries, Rus-
sia was often attacked by Crimean Tatars, who
were vassals to the Ottoman Empire. Russian ex-
pansion into the Black Sea area and the Balkans
(in the late 17th to early 20th centuries) posed the
greatest threat to the existence of the Ottoman
Empire. The development of pan-Slavism5 in
19th-century Russia created an ideological base
for anti-Turkish expansion (the Russian wars
against Turkey were presented as a crusade for
the liberation of the Christian Orthodox Slavs in
the Balkans). In turn, the massacres (in the case
of the Caucasus, the more accurate word is geno-
cide) and displacements of millions of Muslims
from the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Balkans as
a consequence of wars fought with Russian par-
ticipation left a strong negative mark on Turkish
perceptions. The refugees found shelter in Ana-
tolia. Tatarstan (and its capital Kazan) played a key
role in the development of Pan-Turkism, from
which the modern Turkish nationalism, called Ke-
malism, evolved, albeit sometimes in opposition
to it. The shape of the movement was significant-
ly influenced by Tatars from Kazan, or who came
from the Russian Empire, such as Yusuf Akcura.
These bloody conflicts spread mutual distrust and
enmity among various social strata. It was not
easy to change the situation after World War I.
Although the Russian (Soviet) and Turkish ruling
classes had established close relations, especially
at the beginning, this distrust remained. Enmity
between Russians and Turks was rekindled after
World War II. Soviet propaganda presented Turkey
as an advocate of US interests and a ‘lackey’ of the
Western imperialism; Soviet Russia once more
became the main threat for Turkey. The legacy of
the Cold War period still affected the mutual per-
ceptions of Turkey and Russia after the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. This was
an effect of many, old and new, disputable issues.
However, this mainly concerned the political eli-
tes. For many Russians, political and economic
liberalisation in the USSR in the late 1980s and
the normalisation of relations with the West open-
ed up broad opportunities for travelling to Turkey
(usually to trade). The boom of ‘suitcase trade’
involving millions of Soviet citizens (and later of
the Russian Federation), and the subsequent boost
of real tourism contributed to a positive change
in Turkey’s image among broad groups of Rus-
sian society. The situation in Turkey was not so
clear, because the positive effect of the influx of
Russian tourists and traders was countered with
increasing fear of the ‘Russian mob’ and the aver-
sion caused by the influx of Russian prostitutes.
The improvement of Turkish-Russian relations at
the beginning of this century has changed the
mutual perceptions among the two countries’
elites for the better. Turkey appreciates Russian
efforts aimed at positive development of co-ope-
ration, and sees Russia as one of its key partners.
However, Russia’s increasing assertiveness in fo-
reign policy and Turkey’s dependence on Russian
energy supplies has raised anxiety among some
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of the Turkish ruling class. In turn, Russia appre-
ciates the ever-firmer independence of Turkish
policy from Western countries, and notes Tur-
key’s strategic location and important role in Rus-
sian plans. However, long-standing conflicts of
interests in some areas still cause distrust.
2. The evolution of Turkish-
Russian political relations
The geopolitical revolution which the disintegra-
tion of the USSR in December 1991 in fact was
initiated a new phase in the history of Turkish-
Russian relations. This phase can subsequently
be divided into two periods; the 1990s, when po-
litical rivalry between the two countries was do-
minant, and the period from the turn of the
twenty-first century, which saw a thaw in the
political atmosphere between Turkey and Russia.
2.1. The 1990s: from conflicts
to normalisation
The collapse of the USSR demanded the establish-
ment of a new legal basis for mutual relations.
When Turgut Ozal came to Moscow in March
1991, which was the first visit by a Turkish Pre-
sident to the Soviet Union in 23 years, a treaty on
friendship, good neighbourliness and co-opera-
tion between Turkey and the USSR was signed6.
That essential document became void nine
months later, in the light of the new political situa-
tion. Nevertheless, Turkey established relations
with the Russian Federation without any unnec-
essary delay. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet
Cetin visited Moscow in January 1992, and his
Russian counterpart, Andrei Kozyrev, paid a return
visit one month later. Another essential document
regulating bilateral relations, the treaty on the
principles of mutual relations, was signed during
the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman
Demirel to Moscow on 25 May 1992. Exactly one
month later, the Russian President Boris Yeltsin
came to Istanbul to take part in the summit of
Black Sea states, which inaugurated the activity
of the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Co-ope-
ration (BSEC). This structure, which was initiated
by Ankara, was used by Turkey in the early 1990s
in its attempt to take the initiative in the region,
especially in the new geopolitical situation ensu-
ing from the collapse of the USSR. The project
was supported by Russia, which in fact became
a co-coordinator of the BSEC. Turkish Prime Mini-
ster Tansu Ciller paid a visit to Moscow in Sep-
tember 1993.
Regardless of such signs of constructive co-ope-
ration, Turkish-Russian relations were not really
good in the 1990s, at least until 1997. This was
mainly an effect of various conflicts of interest
and tensions existing between the two countries.
Russia and Turkey adopted different stances on
post-Soviet countries, including in the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia, and on the conflicts
taking place in that area. Moscow treated the
area as its natural sphere of influence, and was
watching with anxiety as external actors, espe-
cially Western countries, engaged in activity there,
seeing this as a challenge to its vital interests.
Ankara, which established direct contacts with
former Soviet republics as early as the beginning
of 1992 (especially in Central Asia), supported
them in the process of strengthening their inde-
pendence, offered them economic assistance (es-
pecially to the Turkic countries) and developed
political, military and cultural contacts. This rais-
ed serious anxiety in Russia, which saw this either
as an attempt to materialise the ideas of pan-Tur-
kism, or (not completely unreasonably) as an ele-
ment for implementing such US strategic goals
as promoting the ‘Turkish model’ for the Islamic
states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and wea-
kening Russian influence there. Tensions over
these issues between Moscow and Ankara were
especially strong in the early 1990s, and but had
eased by the middle of the decade, when Moscow
noticed that Turkey had not succeeded in offer-
ing any serious alternative to Russian influences
in the Turkic-speaking former Soviet republics.
Russia and Turkey adopted different stances on
conflicts in the CIS area. This was manifested most
clearly in the conflict between Armenia and Azer-
baijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Following the dis-
integration of the USSR, Moscow granted politi-
cal support (and even military assistance, in some
sense, since the withdrawing Soviet Army had
left most of its military equipment behind) to the
Armenians. In turn, the Turks offered political
support to their kinfolk, the Azeris. The tension
reached its peak in spring 1992, when Armenia
launched an offensive against the Azerbaijani en-
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clave of Nakhchivan, shelling the enclave’s terri-
tory). Then Ankara made a public threat that it
would support Azerbaijan with military interven-
tion, to which Russia immediately responded with
a promise to use force in order to restrain Tur-
key7. Since the end of military activities in Nagor-
no-Karabakh in 1994, Turkey has supported Baku
by condemning the Armenian occupation of part
of Azerbaijani territory, and thus refusing to es-
tablish diplomatic relations and open its border
with Armenia. Although Russia is officially the
co-organiser of the peace process (as part of the
OSCE’s Minsk group) and maintains pragmatic
relations with Azerbaijan, it does not conceal its
alliance with Armenia. The Russian parliament
has passed several resolutions (in 1995 and 2005,
among other times) defining the Armenian mas-
sacres committed in Turkey in 1915 as acts of ge-
nocide.
As a rule, Turkey and Russia presented essentially
different stances on conflicts in former Yugosla-
via. To be more precise, Turkey offered political
support to the Muslim government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as well as to the Albanian minority
in Kosovo, and actively supported and participat-
ed in the UN and NATO operations in former Yu-
goslavia. Meanwhile, Russia sided politically with
the ‘new Yugoslavia’ (Serbia and Montenegro),
trying to hamper Western states’ engagement in
the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. How-
ever, when such engagements did take place, it
participated in operations with UN mandates
until as late as 2003.
Moscow and Ankara also had different opinions
on NATO enlargement towards the East. While
Turkey politically supported the idea of the acce-
ssion of Central and Eastern European countries
to the Alliance, Moscow (from when a real debate
on this issue started in 1993) embarked on a po-
litical campaign against the enlargement. The two
countries’ interests also clashed over the adap-
tation of the CFE Treaty (imposing limitations on
conventional weapons in Europe) signed in 1990.
Turkey firmly demanded that Russia should first
of all fulfil its obligation to reduce its armed forces
in the ‘flank’ zone in the Northern Caucasus,
which Moscow failed to do. However, under pres-
sure from its main NATO allies, Ankara agreed to
ease the provisions regulating this issue in the
Adapted CFE Treaty, which was signed at the
OSCE’s Istanbul summit in November 1999. How-
ever, in solidarity with other members of the
Alliance, it refused to ratify the treaty until Russia
fulfilled its Istanbul commitments to withdraw
its armed forces and military equipment from
Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova, a move
which has been sharply criticised by Russia ever
since8.
Moscow and Ankara also disagreed on the Cyprus
problem. Turkey, which launched a military inter-
vention in Cyprus in 1974 to defend the Turkish
population on the island, granted political sup-
port to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
which no other state but Turkey recognises. Rus-
sia not only recognised the Greek government in
Nicosia as the only legal government in Cyprus,
like the rest of the international community, but
it also developed very intensive co-operation with
the Republic of Cyprus, especially in the econo-
mic field. In January 1997, the decision of the Ni-
cosia government to buy S-300 missile systems
from Russia even caused a temporary crisis in
Turkish-Russian relations. Ankara saw that deci-
sion as an attempt to upset the military balance
in the region9 and threatened Cyprus with mili-
tary operations. This provoked sharp criticism
from Moscow. However, the Greek-Cypriot gov-
ernment was persuaded to change its decision
at the end of 1998 as a result of intensive diplo-
matic contacts (it was agreed that the missiles
would be deployed on the Greek island of Crete),
and so the crisis was resolved.
The Chechen and Kurdish issueswere other fac-
tors which caused serious irritation in Turkish-
Russian relations. The military operation Russia
launched in December 1994 against the break-
away Chechnya, together with the casualties
among the civilian Chechen population caused
by the brutal activity of the Russian army, pro-
voked extremely negative, emotional reactions
in Turkey. The Turkish authorities (especially the
parliament) criticised the Russian activity. Pro-
Chechen demonstrations were held in many pla-
ces in the country. The lobby of the Caucasian
diaspora (including Chechens), which is very in-
fluential in Turkey, played a prominent role (see
the text below). In turn, Moscow accused Ankara
of being overly lenient towards social organisa-
tions which, as Russians had been reportedly in-
formed, offered financial support to Chechen se-
paratists, smuggled volunteers and guns to Che-
chnya, and offered medical care in Turkey to
T
o
w
a
rd
s
a
s
tr
a
te
g
ic
p
a
r
tn
e
rs
h
ip
?
T
u
rk
is
h
-R
u
s
s
ia
n
re
la
ti
o
n
s
a
t
th
e
tu
rn
o
f
th
e
tw
e
n
ty
-f
ir
s
t
c
e
n
tu
r
y
74
C E S R e p o r t
wounded militants. Sometimes officials repre-
senting the Russian Federation made allegations
that the Turkish secret service was involved in
assisting such activities. Moscow’s anxiety and
critical reactions were also caused by pro-Che-
chen terrorist attacks in Turkey, especially the
hijacking of the Avrasia ferry in January 199610,
which provoked a short-lived diplomatic crisis be-
tween the two countries.
Turkey, for its part, accused the Russian authori-
ties of tolerating and even supporting the activi-
ty of Kurdish structures linked to the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), an organisation which was
waging a terrorist campaign on Turkish territory.
Ankara reacted with sharp criticism to such moves
as opening a so-called Kurdish House in Moscow
(December 1994) and a Kurdish training camp
(according to some sources, including a hospital)
near Yaroslavl (January 1995), which according
to Turkish claims were controlled by the PKK, as
well as pro-Kurdish resolutions and initiatives
taken by the Russian State Duma and its bodies,
especially the Committee for Geopolitics (in par-
ticular between 1995 and 1996) and the third
session of the so-called Kurdish parliament in exile
held in Moscow (November 1995). The chronolo-
gical coincidence of those events with the first
Chechen war leads to the conclusion that Mos-
cow was playing the Kurdish card in response to
the stance adopted by Turkey on the Chechen
issue (and probably also as a warning to Ankara
against more advanced moves)11.
One more area of dispute in Turkish-Russian rela-
tions covered the regulations for the transit pas-
sage of ships through the Black Sea straits. The
regulations were based on the international Mon-
treux Convention (1936), which provided for un-
restrained passage of merchant vessels through
the straits, and imposed limitations on the traf-
fic of warships. Both Turkey and Russia wanted
the main principles of the Montreux regime to be
upheld (for Turkey, this meant keeping control of
the straits; for Russia, this guaranteed the limi-
tation of Western military activity in the Black
Sea). However, the Turkish side pressed for the
imposition of additional restrictions. In 1993, An-
kara adopted new regulations for passage of com-
mercial ships through the straits, which came into
force on 1 July 1994, setting limitations on the
transport of so-called dangerous cargoes (includ-
ing crude oil). They argued that the ship traffic
was too heavy, and thus posed threats to the na-
tural environment and navigational safety12. Rus-
sia protested against the decision as being con-
trary to the Montreux regime, and following the
failure of bilateral talks, complained against it to
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
The conflict between the two parties ended in
1998, when Turkey eased tis navigation rules.
It is worth emphasising that in Moscow’s opi-
nion, Ankara’s stance on this issue resulted from
a desire to obstruct Russian projects aimed at
maintaining the Russian monopoly on Caspian
oil transit. Russia believed that this was espe-
cially closely linked to the project of building the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which is aim-
ed at breaking the Russian monopoly on oil and
gas transit from the Caspian Sea region, a move
strongly supported by the USA and Turkey. For
this reason the project was disputed by Moscow.
This issue was another very significant point of
dispute in Turkish-Russian relations.
Regardless of the numerous problems in the 1990s,
Turkey and Russia continued their political dia-
logue (for example, the Turkish Prime Minister
Tansu Ciller visited Russia in December 1996) and
to develop increasingly intensive economic, and
even military, co-operation. Turkish-Russian re-
lations started thawing at the end of 1997 and in
1998. Several simultaneous factors seem to have
contributed to that. Firstly, some elements caus-
ing irritation in mutual relations were soothed.
In particular, Russia noticed that Turkish activity
in Central Asia and Southern Caucasus was un-
able to pose a serious threat to Russian influence
in the area. The military phase of local conflicts
in the CIS area came to an end (1994), becoming
‘frozen’. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina end-
ed in a political agreement (1995). Russia and NATO
entered a short-lived phase of pragmatic relations
(1997–1998). The Cypriot missile crisis was resol-
ved (1998). The first Chechen war ended (1996).
Public support for the Kurdish issue in Russia
lessened slightly. The dispute over maritime traf-
fic in the Black Sea straits eased (1998).
In addition to these facts, two important events
took place. During a visit by Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin to Turkey, an agreement to build
the Blue Stream gas pipeline connecting Russia
and Turkey through the Black Sea bed, together
with another long-term contract on Russian na-
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tural gas supplies, was signed on 15 December
1997. This symbolised the strengthening of prag-
matic economic co-operation between the two
countries. Russia could thus demonstrate that it
treated Turkey as an important partner. In turn,
Ankara showed its openness to co-operation with
Moscow. According to some commentators, the
parties mutually agreed during the visit to refrain
from any actions aimed against each other’s ter-
ritorial integrity and vital economic interests13.
On the other hand, several days before, Turkey was
refused EU candidate status at the EU Luxemburg
summit, which caused great disappointment and
frustration in Ankara. As a consequence, the Turk-
ish government came to demonstrate a certain
diversification in its foreign policy, among other
moves.
However, the end of the 1990s was not free of new
problems in Turkish-Russian relations. The finan-
cial crisis in Russia (August 1998) was a serious
blow to the countries’ rapidly developing eco-
nomic co-operation. In turn, political relations
were adversely affected by the Kosovo crisis and
the second Chechen war.
It appeared impossible to settle the escalating Ko-
sovo crisis in 1998 at the negotiations table, and
in March 1999, in the face of a worsening huma-
nitarian crisis, NATO launched a military inter-
vention against Yugoslavia, which lasted for al-
most three months. Turkey and Russia took oppo-
site stances again; Turkey supported NATO and
Kosovo’s Albanians, while Russia condemned
NATO and sympathised with the Yugoslavian go-
vernment. The intervention gave rise to a crisis in
Russian relations with NATO and Western coun-
tries, which continued almost until the end of
1999.
In turn, Russia – which officially had been provo-
ked by a Chechen attack on Dagestan – resumed
military activities against Chechnya in October
1999. The use of force, and another wave of basic
human rights violations by Russian armed forces,
sparked criticism against Russia in the West, in-
cluding Turkey.
Interestingly, neither the Kosovo crisis nor the
Chechen war led to any significant deterioration
in Turkish-Russian relations. In the latter case,
the Turkish government acted with noteworthy
restraint, emphasising its support for the terri-
torial integrity of the Russian Federation14. This
showed that a certain positive revaluation had
taken place in Turkish-Russian relations, which
were no longer so easy to spoil. This had already
been proven during an earlier short-lived diplo-
matic crisis between Ankara and Moscow, caus-
ed by the temporary presence of the PKK leader,
Abdulah Ocalan, in Russia from October to No-
vember 1998; he had been seeking asylum fol-
lowing his deportation from Syria. However, un-
der Turkish and US pressure, Russia chose not to
grant asylum to Ocalan, a decision which Ankara
appreciated15.
2.2. Bilateral relations since 2000:
from good relations to a ‘strategic
partnership’ and back?
Turkish-Russian relations continued improving in
an atmosphere of trust built on mutual conces-
sions on the Chechen and Kurdish issues. Origi-
nally these improvements were mainly apparent
in the field of the economy, and economic topics
predominated during the visit of the Russian Pri-
me Minister Mikhail Kasyanov to Turkey in Octo-
ber 2000, when protocols on economic and de-
fence co-operation were signed, among other do-
cuments.
The two countries also began emphasising the
similarity of their stances on vital international
problems, including the situation in the Middle
East, the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as dur-
ing the visit by the Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov to Turkey in June 2001). In this context,
the document which the Turkish and Russian Fo-
reign Ministers, Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov, sign-
ed on 16 November 2001 during a meeting in
New York, the Action Plan for Co-operation be-
tween the Russian Federation and the Republic
of Turkey in Eurasia: from Bilateral Co-operation
towards Multidimensional Partnership16, gained
symbolic meaning. This document was signed in
the new international climate brought about by
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and
in it the common interests and the will to co-
operate on stabilisation in Eurasia (including the
Caucasus and Central Asia) were clearly declared
for the first time by the two countries. The action
plan was intended to symbolise the end of Rus-
sian-Turkish rivalry in the Caspian & Black Sea
regions (although it did not disappear completely)
on the one hand, and on the other to emphasise
both countries’ ambitions to be seen as power-
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ful nations. Although the Plan focused on co-ope-
ration in various fields, such as trade, tourism,
combating terrorism-related threats and ‘soft’ se-
curity, the impression could be gained that Mos-
cow and Ankara were aiming at building a spe-
cific co-dominion in this strategic region. The Ap-
pointment of a joint working group to implement
the Plan’s provisions was a practical consequence
of its signing. The group’s first meeting (at the le-
vel of deputy foreign affairs ministers) was held
in January 2002 in Moscow. At the same time, Turk-
ish-Russian military co-operation was intensified.
However, the true breakthrough in Turkish-Rus-
sian relations took place in 2003 and 2004. This
comprised several elements, which had a mutu-
ally reinforcing effect. The conservative Justice
and Development Party (AKP)17, which had its ori-
gins in Islamic circles, formed a new Turkish go-
vernment in autumn 2002. This coincided with
the worsening Iraqi crisis and Turkey’s growing
ambition in international politics. The Turkish par-
liament’s decision in March 2003 to refuse the
USA the right to use Turkish territory to launch
an attack on Iraq was a symbolic sign of the in-
creasing difference of interests between Ankara
and Washington. The intervention of the US-Bri-
tish coalition in Iraq in spring 2003, and espe-
cially the gradually worsening security situation
in that country, contributed to a rise in anti-Ame-
rican sentiments in Turkey. Russia saw that and
wanted to exploit it, since it was strongly oppo-
sed to the intervention in Iraq; to this end, it built
a diplomatic front with Germany and France
against the intervention. Moscow, whose ambi-
tions in international politics had been growing,
had ever worse relations with some Western
countries, especially with the USA (but also with
the EU), and was searching for allies in its policy
of opposing the ‘US hegemony’. This also con-
curred with the Russian diplomatic offensive, ini-
tiated in autumn 2002, to establish better rela-
tions with the Islamic world (a move which was
initially aimed mainly at cutting off channels of
aid for Chechen separatists). Russia, among other
efforts, applied for observer status in the Orga-
nisation of the Islamic Conference (Turkey took
over the rotational presidency of the organisation
in 2004 and, significantly, helped Russia achieve
this goal in August of the next year). All this cre-
ated favourable conditions for strengthening
Turkish-Russian relations, of which the opening
of the strategic Blue Stream gas pipeline run-
ning through the Black Sea bed in February 2003
was one of the symbolic manifestations. Although
the pipe soon became a subject of conflict be-
tween the two countries, this did not hamper the
intensification of Turkish-Russian co-operation.
Another political factor which drew Turkey closer
to Russia was Ankara’s fear of the consequences
of the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia (2003) and
Ukraine (2004), which were believed to destabi-
lise the regional situation (a feeling which was
much stronger in Russia)18, and the new wave of
NATO enlargement eastwards in March 2004,
when Bulgaria and Romania among other states
became members of the Alliance. Officially, Tur-
key supported both the democratic changes in
the CIS area and NATO’s enlargement; however,
it was concerned about the ëgeostrategic revo-
lution’ in the Black Sea region and the increasing
presence of ‘external’ actors (mainly the USA,
NATO and the EU) in the region. In this context,
both Turkey and Russia have defended the re-
gional status quo19.
The visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin
to Turkey on 5–6 December 2004 (this was the
first visit by a Russian president to this country),
when a joint declaration on the ‘deepening of our
friendship and multidimensional partnership’
and a number of agreements mainly concerning
energy and military/technical co-operation were
signed, symbolised a new phase in Turkish-Rus-
sian relations. The sections of the joint declara-
tion describing the role of the two countries in
Eurasia were especially noteworthy. It was stated
inter alia that Turkey and Russia were two Eura-
sian countries with ‘unique geopolitical loca-
tions’ playing the role of a civilisational bridge
between East and West, and had ‘special inter-
ests’ in Eurasia20. This kind of wording drew on
the concept of Eurasianism, which has been the
major ideological base of Russian foreign policy
over recent years, and has also became increas-
ingly popular (albeit in a slightly different version)
in Turkey21. In the case of Ankara, among other
reasons, this was an effect of the influence of
Ahmet Davutoglu22, a powerful advisor to Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Energy issues,
especially projects related to the transport of na-
tural gas (their interests converged to a great ex-
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tent at the time) and crude oil (the parties essen-
tially disagreed), were the main subject of the
visit. This was linked to Russia’s ambitious plans
for the European energy sector on the one hand,
and to the Turkish ambition to play the role of
a strategic linchpin for energy transit routes on
the other. President Putin’s visit initiated a period
when the political dialogue between the two
countries was especially intensive, reaching its
peak in 200523. The Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan came on a visit to Russia one
month later (10–12 January 2005). This was a to-
ken of increasingly specific talks, especially those
concerning infrastructure projects in the energy
and transport sectors, inter alia. Prospects for the
rapidly developing trade exchange and interna-
tional problems (including Cyprus, Iraq and Na-
gorno-Karabakh) were also discussed.
The trilateral meeting of President Putin, Prime
Minister Erdogan and the Italian Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi in Samsun on 17 November 2005
during the formal inauguration of the Blue Stream
pipeline (which had started operating at the be-
ginning of 2003) was a sign of Russian energy
plans involving Turkey becoming more active.
However, Turkish-Russian relations were not free
from discord. Ankara was especially disappointed
with Moscow’s stance towards the Cyprus prob-
lem. In April 2004, Russia vetoed an important
resolution concerning Cyprus at the UN Security
Council, as a consequence of which a referendum
of Greek Cypriots rejected a plan to unify the
island devised by the UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan. Thereafter, Moscow blocked approval of
a report on Cyprus. President Putin’s statement
in January 2005 that the economic blockade of
Turkish Northern Cyprus had to end was Rus-
sia’s only goodwill gesture towards Turkey.
Moreover, Russia still occasionally reproached
Turkey for the presence of Turkish citizens among
Chechen militants, especially since one of them
had been identified among the terrorists killed
in the fatal attack on the Beslan school in Sep-
tember 200424. In turn, Ankara appealed repeat-
edly but in vain for Moscow to include the PKK
on the Russian list of terrorist organisations.
Moreover, friendship with Russia did not prevent
Ankara from adopting stances on some issues
related to the post-Soviet area which fundamen-
tally clashed with the Russian point of view. For
example Turkey, aspiring to become an EU can-
didate, supported the European Union’s stance
on the political crisis in Ukraine in December
2004, and the massacre in the Uzbek city of An-
dijan in May 2005, among other cases. The good
relations between Turkey and Georgia stood in
stark contrast with the alarmingly bad Russian-
Georgian relations. The situation n the case of the
two countries’ relations with Armenia is almost
the diametric opposite. Ankara was concerned
about the build-up of the Russian military base
in the Armenian city of Gyumri (which came about
as a consequence of withdrawing Russian troops
from Georgia, among other reasons). In turn, Rus-
sia, with its desire to play the greatest possible
role in the Southern Caucasus, was dissatisfied by
Turkey’s increasing significance in this region.
Following the period of ostentatious friendship
in 2005, the bilateral contacts somewhat lost their
momentum in 2006. The only noteworthy diplo-
matic event, apart from foreign ministers’ meet-
ings, was the visit of the Turkish president Ahmet
Necdet Sezer to Russia on 29 and 30 June, the cha-
racter of which was rather symbolic than practi-
cal. This trend was continued in 2007, when con-
flicts of interests between the two parties, espe-
cially in the crucial energy sector, came to the
fore. Leaders of the two countries were mainly
meeting each other during international events
or making phone conversation since then. Pre-
sident Putin did travel to Istanbul on 25th June
2007 but the main occasion was his participation
in BSEC summit. Contacts on a lower level were
maintained. Still, signs of a clear cooling of Turk-
ish-Russian relations became evident in the mid-
dle of 2007.
The first signs of this appeared in autumn 2006,
when Turkey rejected Russia’s application for ob-
server status at the forum of Turkic states, which
met in November at a summit in Antalya.
The two parties essentially disagreed over the
Kosovo problem. Ankara sympathised with the
Kosovo Albanians’ drive towards independence,
and supported the peace plan devised by the UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which was pre-
sented in March 2007. Meanwhile, Russia sharp-
ly criticised the plan, and in fact linked its stance
to that of Serbia, warning that it could veto the
document at the UN Security Council. Moscow
has strongly criticised decision of major Western
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(including Turkey) states to recognize Kosovo’s
independence proclaimed 17th February 2008,
while Ankara unambiguously supported newly
independent state.
Additionally, Ankara reacted coolly to the Rus-
sian-Bulgarian-Greek agreement on the construc-
tion of the Burgas–Alexandroupolis oil pipeline
(omitting the Black Sea straits) signed in March
2007, which lessened the possibility of imple-
menting the Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline project,
promoted by Turkey.
The framework agreement concerning a new Rus-
sian project for building a gas pipeline running
through the Black Sea bed from Russia to Bulga-
ria, and then to Central Europe and to Italy
through the Balkans, was signed in late June
2007 between Russia’s Gazprom and Italy’s ENI.
This act spoiled the atmosphere of Turkish-Rus-
sian relations to an even greater extent. The pro-
ject bypasses Turkey, which means the end of pre-
vious concepts for transiting Russian gas through
Turkish territory, and so it adversely affects the
interests of Ankara, which had hoped to play the
role of an energy bridge (see the text below).
Another source of concern for Turkey was Mos-
cow’s decision (made on 13th July 2007 by the pre-
sident Putin and implemented on 13th December
2007) to suspend Russia’s participation in the
CFE Treaty (meaning effectively abolishing flank
limitations for Russia in the Northern Caucasus).
3. Turkish-Russian economic
co-operation
Economic co-operation has played a tremendous
role in building good relations between Turkey
and Russia. Intensifying activity in the fields of
trade, investments & services (mainly of Turkish
firms & entrepreneurs in Russia), Turkey’s in-
creasing popularity among Russian tourists, and
especially the growth in Turkish-Russian energy
co-operation, have contributed substantially to
this state of affairs.
A mixed Russian-Turkish intergovernmental com-
mission for trade and economic co-operation was
established at ministerial level as early as 1992.
It meets on average once every two years. In ad-
dition to that, there are five joint working groups
(for trade, investments, services and legal matters,
for energy, for transport, for industry, advanced
technologies and small- & medium-sized busi-
nesses, and for tourism).
Business structures like the Russian-Turkish Bu-
siness Council, which includes regional councils,
and was established in 1991 in Russia, and the
Turkish-Russian Business Council operating as
part of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of
Turkey (DEIK) are engaged in stimulating eco-
nomic co-operation.
The development of trade relations underpinned
pragmatic Turkish-Russian contacts even as early
as the early 1990s, when political relations be-
tween the two countries were rather cool. The
liberalisation of the Soviet economy and the sub-
sequent collapse of the USSR opened up broad
prospects to Turkish businessmen for making in-
roads onto new markets. However, the real phe-
nomenon of the 1990s was the unregistered trade
(or the so-called ‘suitcase trade’), i.e. private in-
dividuals (who did not run official businesses)
transporting and trading in goods which were in
short supply. Travelling to Turkey and bringing
consumer goods from that country became the
main source of income for millions of Russians25.
The estimated annual turnover on such trade in
the 1990s reached between US$5 billion to 15 bil-
lion26. In addition to the big economic impact
(which concerned not only Russia but also Tur-
key, where the economy was significantly boost-
ed as a result), the suitcase trade also had a great
social effect; it led to people-to-people contacts
on a mass scale, which contributed to building
a positive image of both societies. However, the
role of suitcase trade started lessening in the
second half of the 1990s, when Russia imposed
stricter customs regulations, and later on faced
a financial crisis in 1998. However, the turnovers
were still significant27.
Barter exchange was one of the characteristic
features of Turkish-Russian trade in the 1990s.
Turkey paid for raw materials imported from Rus-
sia with goods and building services, among other
commodities. However, this form of trade grad-
ually diminished because of the increasing dis-
approval it met with in Russia. Turnovers in ‘nor-
mal’ trade had been growing every year until
1998, when a temporary breakdown caused by
the financial crisis in Russia occurred (turnovers
dropped by US$3 billion). The crisis also inflicted
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heavy financial losses on Turkish entrepreneurs
operating in the Russian market. The Turkish cri-
sis of 2001 also had a negative effect, albeit on
a smaller scale. However, in subsequent years,
Turkish-Russian trade turnovers continued gro-
wing to reach the level of US$15.1 billion in 2005
(according to Turkish data, whereas according to
Russian sources, the value was US$12.6 billion)28.
The turnovers has increase to more than US$ 20
billion in 2007 (according to Russian estimates;
still it was below declared 25 US S billion target).
However, their trade has been unusual, and clear-
ly asymmetric. Firstly, while Russia will remain
a key trade partner for Turkey (currently the sec-
ond largest), Turkey is significantly less impor-
tant for Russia. After Russian raw energy mate-
rials (mainly natural gas) took a dominant share
in Turkish imports (which had been consistently
increasing), the Turkish trade balance deficit deep-
ened, reaching US$ 18 billion in 2007. This has
caused serious dissatisfaction in Turkey, which
has been raising this issue in its dialogue with
Russia. In turn, Moscow argues that income from
suitcase trade and Russian tourism largely com-
pensate for Turkey’s losses. Both countries are
hoping for a further increase in turnovers fol-
lowing Russia’s planned accession to the WTO.
In April 2005 the two countries signed a market
access protocol, which ended bilateral negotia-
tions on conditions of Russian membership. It is
expected that customs tariffs will be reduced
and that Russia will offer investment privileges
for Turkish businessmen.
Investments and services constitute another do-
main in the rapidly developing relations between
Turkey and Russia. While Turkey has invested
nearly US$ 5 billion in Russia by 200729, Russian
FDI in Turkey reached approximately US$150
million by 2005 (the value increased to US$3.5
billion one year later). Turkish investments in Rus-
sia are concentrated in trade, food & industrial
manufacture and banking services (five banks).
The main areas of investments are Moscow & its
surroundings and Tatarstan. In turn, Russian in-
vestments mainly cover the energy sector, tele-
communications (including a record-breaking in-
vestment by the Alfa group, which paid US$3.3 bil-
lion for a 13% stake in the Turkish cellular tele-
phone service provider Turkcell, however later
largely re-selled due to commercial disputes) and
the food industry. Russia was greatly dissatisfied
with the cancellation in November 2004 of the
tender procedure to sell a 66% stake in the Turk-
ish oil company Tupras, which the Russian oil
company Tatneft, Yefremov Kauchuk and the Turk-
ish holding Zorlu Grubu had won at the begin-
ning of 2004. This demonstrates that Russian in-
vestments in sensitive sectors of the Turkish eco-
nomy have been hampered.
Building contracts in Russia generate the largest
share of Turkish income from the service trade
(according to various data sources, between 120
and 145 companies are involved). According to
Russian data, the total income earned by Turkish
companies on such contracts reached US$ 17 bil-
lion30. Meanwhile, sixteen Russian building com-
panies earned as little as approximately US$360
million in Turkey by 200331.
Mutual investments and trade may develop more
rapidly since the agreements on double taxation
and mutual support of investments came into
force in 2000, the ratification of which Russia had
delayed for several years.
Russian tourism to Turkey, which has been deve-
loping especially rapidly in the first years of thist
century, is very important for Turkey. The two
countries signed an agreement on developing
tourism in March 1995. Turkey is currently the
most popular foreign holiday destination for Rus-
sians. In 2007, Turkey received nearly 2.5 million
Russian tourists, the second largest national group
(after Germans). The excursions are handled by
nearly 150 tourist firms (approximately 25% of
which have Turkish capital). According to esti-
mates, Turkey earned US$1.5 billion on Russian
tourism in 2004. The liberal Turkish visa regime
(banderole visas are granted immediately at the
border) have contributed to the development of
Russian tourism32.
Nevertheless, it is the energy sector which is the
key field of economic co-operation between Tur-
key and Russia. The two countries are interde-
pendent in this area. On one hand, Turkey imports
approximately 65% of its gas33 and over 10% of its
oil from Russia. On the other hand, Russia moves
40% of its oil exports through the Turkish Black
Sea straits, and Turkey is the third largest buyer
of Russian natural gas (after Germany and Italy).
This co-operation dates back to Soviet times. In
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February 1986, the Botas and Gazeksport com-
panies signed an agreement which provided for
the supply of 6 billion m3 of natural gas annual-
ly from the Soviet Union to Turkey for 25 years.
The agreed supply route ran through the eastern
Balkans; the first supplies were made in 1987.
A subsequent gas agreement between the Turkish
corporations Botas & Gama and the Russian com-
pany Gazprom, which formed a joint venture
named Turusgaz, was concluded in December
1997 for 23 years, and provided in prospect for
supplies of 8 billion m3 annually via the Balkan gas
pipeline. At the same time, Turkey started diver-
sifying its gas imports.
An important phase in the development of Turk-
ish-Russian gas co-operation began on 15 Decem-
ber 1997 during the visit of Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin to Turkey, when two agreements
were signed. One of them concerned the imple-
mentation of an ambitious project for building
the undersea gas pipeline named Blue Stream (in
co-operation with the Italian energy corporation
ENI). The pipeline’s route (Izobilnoye – Dzhubga
– the Black Sea – Samsun – Ankara) is 1213 km
long, including a 392-km section running under
the Black Sea bed (at a depth of nearly 2200 m)34.
The second agreement, which was concluded by
Botas and Gazprom for a term of 25 years, provi-
ded for supplies of Russian gas to Turkey via a new
gas pipeline. The annual quantity supplied should
have gradually grown from 2 billion m3 to 16 bil-
lion m3 (2007), with the application of the ‘take
or pay’ rule (the obligation to receive the amount
of gas as provided in the contract, with a simul-
taneous ban on its re-export). The Blue Stream
pipeline was completed in 2002 and launched in
2003. However, disputes over settlement of ac-
counts linked to the investment arose between
the parties. Moreover, Turkey demanded that both
the price of the Russian gas and the level of sup-
plies be reduced (due to a previous overestimation
of its demand for gas). The conflict led in March
2003 to Turkey’s refusal to receive gas via the
Blue Stream. The pipeline’s operation was resum-
ed in August that year, and the parties (Botas
and Gazprom) reached a compromise on revising
the conditions of the contract in November. Pur-
suant to the new version, gas supplies via the
Blue Stream would gradually increase from 6 bil-
lion m3 (in 2004) to 16 billion m3 (in 2010)35. How-
ever, the real amount of gas received through
the Blue Stream was smaller than planned (in
2007 around 9 billion m3 ). The compromise was
a success for the Turkish side, whose hard-line
approach in the negotiations let them change the
conditions of the contract to their benefit. When
the last technical work linked to Blue Stream
was finished, the official pipeline opening cere-
mony was held in November 2005, with the par-
ticipation of the Russian, Turkish and Italian lead-
ers. As a result, Turkey received in total nearly 23
billion m3 from Russia in 200736.
Both countries, especially Russia, have had ambi-
tious plans of further enhancing gas co-opera-
tion. Intensive talks on co-operation in develop-
ing the Turkish gas infrastructure took place in
2005. Russia wanted to build large gas storage
facilities near the Tuz lake in Turkey and a lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Ceyhan, devel-
op the network of Turkish gas pipelines, gain
access to direct gas distribution in Turkey and,
potentially, build jointly with Turkey an under-
sea gas pipeline running to Israel (through the
Mediterranean Sea), among other projects. The
most ambitious of the Russian ideas was to extend
the Blue Stream pipeline and build a link through
the eastern Balkans to Central Europe (Hungary
and Austria, the so-called south European gas
pipeline) or to Italy, which was presented at the
end of 2005. It was clearly intended to compete
with the Nabucco project (gas imported from
Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan, sent through
Turkey and the Balkans to Western Europe), sup-
ported by the European Union as part of its poli-
cy of diversifying its gas supply sources. Turkey
showed interest in the idea; however, it promot-
ed the concept of combining the two projects
(due to problems with gas supplies from the Cas-
pian region, a major part of gas would initially
have been fed to Nabucco through the Blue Stream
from Russia), which met initially with a positive
reaction from Moscow. If this scenario had been
realised, Russia would have taken over the main
role in the implementation of the Nabucco pro-
ject, the underlying idea of which was to give geo-
graphic diversity to the sources of natural gas
supplied to Europe.
A gradual increase in Russian gas imports, along
with intensifying pressure from Moscow to let
Russian companies take over assets in the Turk-
ish gas sector, started raising some anxiety among
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some of the Turkish ruling class. Russia’s energy
crises with Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia (2006–
–2007) had worsened, showing thus that Russia
was using its export of oil and gas as a tool for
achieving political goals. For its part, Moscow
was dissatisfied with the implementation of the
Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline building pro-
ject, which undermined its policy of maintaining
control over exports of Caspian oil and gas.
Moreover, signs of divergence in the two parties’
interests in gas co-operation, which hitherto had
essentially been similar, appeared in 2007. Al-
though Gazprom had gained access to the direct
sale of gasoin the Turkish market under an agree-
ment signed in May 200737, its scale was far
from satisfactory to Russian ambitions. Additio-
nally, in late June 2007 Gazprom and ENI signed
a preliminary agreement on a project to build
a South Stream gas pipeline, with a target capa-
city of 30 billion m3, intended to run from Russia
through the Black Sea bed to Bulgaria, and fur-
ther split into two pipes, one running to Hungary
and Austria, and the other to Italy through the
Western Balkans. On 22 November 2007, Gazprom
and Eni signed in Moscow an agreement about
establishing a joint project company for the com-
missioning of the marketing and technical feasi-
bility studies of the project.
The project, which omitted Turkey, was an un-
pleasant surprise to Ankara, and immediately
met with a negative reaction. If implemented, the
project would mean a significant divergence from
the previous Russian plans for gas transit through
Turkey (Blue Stream II and the South European
gas pipeline projects). Nevertheless, the deal be-
tween Gazprom and ENI (the latter being a part-
ner to Russian and Turkey in the Blue Stream
project) at that stage mainly served propaganda
purposes. This proved that Russia and Turkey,
regardless of their intensive dialogue, could not
reach a consensus on co-operation in the field of
energy, including natural gas.
Turkey and Russia are also partners in the oil sec-
tor. Turkey buys nearly 5 million tons of crude oil
annually from Russia. Oil export through the Black
Sea straits is a top priority issue for Moscow;
hence its dissatisfaction with Turkish attempts
to reduce the amount of ship transit passing
through the straits. The two parties have con-
ducted intensive talks on the common construc-
tion of the new Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline. Turkey
had long been working for this, as it wished to
reduce the amount of maritime traffic in the straits
while at the same time keeping control of oil tran-
sit. However, the parties failed to reach a mutu-
ally satisfactory agreement, and in autumn 2006
Russia forced an acceleration of talks on a com-
petitive project which would omit the Black Sea
straits (the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline,
which had been discussed by Russia, Bulgaria
and Greece as long ago as 1994). This led to the
governments of those three countries signing an
agreement in March 2007, to Ankara’s great and
unconcealed dissatisfaction38. In addition to that,
Russia could not accept the construction and (par-
tial) launch of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline,
which it had been trying to forestall for many
years because it undermines Moscow’s strategic
control over exports of Caspian oil.
Electrical power engineering is a separate field of
co-operation. Turkey imports over 3 million kW
of electric energy from Russia. The parties have
been negotiating increasing imports through the
Southern Caucasus (also as a part of Black Sea elec-
tricity ring proposed by Moscow in BSEC) as well
as Russia’s participation in Turkey’s investments
in this field (including nuclear energy cooperation).
4. Turkish-Russian security
and defence co-operation
Turkish-Russian security and defence co-opera-
tion can be considered from several viewpoints;
military-technical co-operation (including the pur-
chase of Russian weapons by Turkey), joint activi-
ty in the field of security, including in the Black
Sea region, and co-operation on combating ter-
rorism and ‘soft’ security issues.
Turkey was the first NATO member state to em-
bark on bilateral military co-operation with Rus-
sia following the collapse of the USSR. This sub-
ject was discussed during the visit to Moscow by
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in 1992, among
other occasions. Turkey’s first contract to pur-
chase Russian weapons was signed in 1993 (ar-
moured personnel carriers, Mi-7 and Mi-17 heli-
copters, machine pistols, machine guns and roc-
ket-propelled grenades)39. An intergovernmental
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agreement on military-technical and arms co-
operation was signed on 20 April 1994.
A joint commission for military and military-
technical co-operation was established in 2000
during Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit
to Turkey. Further supplies of Russian weapons
to Turkey were also discussed.
Two protocols on military-technical co-operation
were signed during the visit by the Russian De-
fence Minister Sergey Ivanov to Turkey in De-
cember 2004. They concerned the co-operation
of the two countries’ arms industries, the pro-
tection of confidential information during such
co-operation, and the protection of intellectual
property rights (concerning Russian licences on
equipment and military technologies).
The co-operation initiated between arms manu-
facturers from Turkey (including Nurol Makine ve
Sanayi) and Russia (the state-owned corporation
Rosvooruzheniye and the Volga plants, among
other companies) was focused mainly on the pro-
duction of tanks, armoured personnel carriers
and the arms used in them40.
Moscow believes that the level of military-tech-
nical co-operation is still insufficient, and it does
indeed have some reasons for dissatisfaction. Rus-
sia had been trying to win the tender to supply
combat helicopters for the Turkish army since
1997. When the offer concerning Ka-50 helicop-
ters from the Russian-Israeli consortium of Ka-
mov and IAI finally entered the last phase of the
tender procedure (competing with the US Bell
company offering Cobra helicopters), the tender
was suddenly cancelled in May 2004. This provo-
ked a critical reaction from Moscow, which be-
lieved that that was a consequence of unfair com-
petition and political pressure from Washington.
Since 2005, Russia has been vainly trying to re-
pay its relatively small debt (US$330 million) to
Turkey with weapons supplies (mainly aircraft
and helicopters)41.
Turkey, being a NATO member state, established
contacts with the USSR as part of the general po-
licy adopted by the Alliance in 1990. Consequent-
ly, it has taken part in NATO-Russian co-opera-
tion42, usually reacting with reserve to any at-
tempts to make the co-operation any closer.
Regardless of its membership in NATO, Turkey
had been watching the Alliance’s increasing ac-
tivity in the Black Sea region with a degree of
dissatisfaction. After 2000, the country initiated
regional co-operation in the field of security, the
main manifestation of which was the agreement
to create a Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task
Group (Blackseafor), signed on 2 April 2001 by
Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and
Ukraine43. The Black Sea Partnership exercises
have been organised every year. However, prac-
tical co-operation as part of Blackseafor is still
limited, and both Turkey and Russia want it to
become more active.
The Black Sea Harmony operation launched by
the Turkish navy in the Black Sea in March 2004
was a practical element of the regional co-opera-
tion. Its key goals included monitoring the Black
Sea waters and tracking suspicious ships (in-
cluding reserving the right to inspect them, sub-
ject to consent from the captain or the state
under whose flag the ship sailed). Turkey invited
other Black Sea littoral countries to join the ope-
ration in November 2004. Talks with Russia con-
cerning this issue started at the beginning of
2005, as a result of which the Russian Black Sea
Fleet joined the BSH in December 2006 (after an
agreement regulating this issue had come into
force). Russia agreed to carry out monitoring, ex-
change data on suspicious ships with other ope-
ration participants and, if necessary, take neces-
sary actions in the north-eastern part of the Black
Sea44.
Turkey’s active engagement (supported by Russia)
as part of its co-operation in the field of Black
Sea security was at odds with its critical reaction
to the proposal, repeatedly brought forward by
the US since 2003, to extend the maritime anti-
terrorist operation Active Endeavour in the Me-
diterranean Sea to the Black Sea. (Moscow was
even more critical of this plan.) The Turkish au-
thorities were similarly sceptical about Romanian
and US initiatives to establish a regional Black
Sea dimension under NATO auspices as part of the
so-called Wider Black Sea concept45. This clearly
proved that Russia and Turkey did not want coun-
tries which did not belong to the region to in-
crease their activity in the Black Sea basin.
Turkish-Russian co-operation in combating ter-
rorism was officially inaugurated on 30 October
1992, when a co-operation agreement was sign-
ed by the Interior Ministries of Turkey and Russia.
However, it was difficult to expect effective co-
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operation in a situation when in the 1990s (most
particularly between 1994 and 1996) the two
countries accused one another (not without good
reasons) of either directly or indirectly (including
with the aid of secret services) supporting struc-
tures which the other classified as terrorist, na-
mely the Chechen separatists in Russia and the
Kurdish separatists in Turkey. This became such
a burning issue that the two countries strove to
achieve a modus vivendi in this issue through
the bilateral withdrawal of such support. An in-
tergovernmental memorandum on co-operation
in combating terrorism, signed during Prime Mi-
nister Tansu Ciller’s visit to Russia on 18 December
1996, was a token of political will to solve the
problem. The document yielded a practical effect
when anti-terrorist consultations between the au-
thorities dealing with this issue were initiated,
coordinated by the two countries’ Foreign Mini-
stries46. The commitment linked to this issue, after
the outbreak of the second Chechen war, was
reiterated in the intergovernmental declaration
on co-operation in combating Chechen terror-
ism, which was signed on 5 November 1999 dur-
ing the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit in Russia. Only then did the effects of two
governments’ new approaches towards the Che-
chen and Kurdish issues (see above) became ap-
parent, although some doubts were later raised,
especially by the Russians (including in 2001, 2002
and 2004). Provisions on anti-terrorist co-opera-
tion were included in all the major political do-
cuments signed by the leaders of Turkey and
Russia, including the declaration of December
2004. To sum up, Turkey and Russia exchange in-
telligence information which may help in com-
bating terrorism. However, considering the nature
of the co-operation, its scope is difficult to assess.
The only information available is that some visits
by the heads of Turkish and Russian intelligence
services have taken place (including in 1995, 1999
and 2004).
Turkish-Russian co-operation in ‘soft’ security, i.e.
counteracting organised crime, drug & people
trafficking and illegal migration, is also based on
the aforementioned inter-ministerial framework
agreement of October 1992, supplemented with
a protocol on co-operation between the two coun-
tries’ Interior Ministries, which was signed dur-
ing the visit by the Russian Minister of Internal
Affairs Vladimir Rushailo in Turkey in February
2001. These issues were also significant elements
of the Eurasia Action Plan signed in November
2001. Co-operation also takes place as part of the
Blackseafor programme, although its exact effects
have not been apparent.
5. The cultural and social
aspects of Turkish-Russian
relations
The societies of Turkey and Russia are similar in
their considerable diversity. Notably, a significant
number of Russian citizens belong to Turkic na-
tions, 16 million people according to some esti-
mates. In turn, Turkey is home to the so-called
Caucasian diaspora, consisting mainly of descen-
dants of nineteenth-century refugees from the
Caucasus, whose estimated number is approxi-
mately 7 million people. These groups influence
Turkish-Russian relations in various ways. The
Turkish factor in Russia has a stimulating effect
on economic co-operation, especially with Tatar-
stan, whereas the Caucasian diaspora, most of
whose representatives are engaged in support-
ing the idea of an independent Chechnya, is an
antagonising factor in bilateral relations.
People-to-people contacts between Turkey and
Russia are still very intensive, mainly thanks to
suitcase trade and Russian tourism, and mixed
marriages occur; the estimated number of such
couples has reached approximately 80,000.
Cultural exchange is a part of bilateral relations.
The year 2007 was the Year of the Russian Culture
in Turkey, while in 2008 the Year of the Turkish
Culture was proclaimed in Russia.
The Eurasian idea and its effect on the respective
policies of Turkey and Russia can be classified as
belonging to the cultural dimension. What the
Turkish and Russian ‘Eurasianisms’ have in com-
mon is first of all emphasising their unique loca-
tion at the crossroads of civilisations, and their
important international roles resulting from that.
However, these concepts seem rather peculiar,
considering the strong anti-Occidental compo-
nent of the Russian Eurasianism and its links to
geopolitical concepts on the one hand, and the
Turkish Eurasianism related to Pan-Turkic and
neo-Ottoman ideas on the other. This element
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has played a certain role in mutual relations,
which has been demonstrated by some provi-
sions of the joint declaration made in December
2004, among other examples.
It is essential to consider the pro-Russian lobby in
Turkey in any analysis of the social aspect of Turk-
ish-Russian relations47. The circles supporting the
enhancement of co-operation with Russia seem
to have seriously influenced Turkish policy. Inte-
restingly, this group includes representatives of
various milieus, politicians (such as leaders of the
left-wing CHP party or the influential advisor to
the AKP’s leadership, Ahmet Davutoglu), business-
men (especially representatives of companies from
the building and energy sectors, such as Bospho-
rus AS, who are engaged in co-operation with
Russia to the greatest degree)48, members of such
structures as the Turkish-Russian Business Coun-
cil, military officers (including elements of both
the present and the former command of the arm-
ed forces, including the former Chief of General
Staff, General Kilinc) and, last but not least, rep-
resentatives of cultural elites (journalists, publi-
cists, writers and scientists). It is worth noting
that members of this informal lobby represent
various political options; from left-wing and left-
ist liberals, some of whom share a sentiment for
the former USSR or have friends in Russia, through
nationalist Kemalists, who may be impressed by
the assertive, ‘independent’ policy of Russia, based
on its native traditions, to moderate Islamists,
who are attracted to Russia by its anti-Western
rhetoric, anti-hegemonist slogans, and its policy
of establishing closer relations with the Islamic
world.
6. Summary
When comparing the relations between Turkey
and Russia at the beginning of the 1990s to the
situation which has obtained during recent years,
it is impossible not to notice a positive change.
The two countries which were once strategic ri-
vals have almost become allies, engaged in an
intense political dialogue, rapidly developing
trade and energy co-operation, and strengthen-
ing co-operation in the fields of security and de-
fence.
These changes did not occur suddenly; they re-
sulted from a long-lasting process. It seems that
the turning points happened in 1997–1998 and
2003–2004. The first one indicated a transition
from the period of problems predominating in
mutual relations towards normalisation and prag-
matic co-operation. The second one was a break-
through which initiated very close, multidimen-
sional co-operation between the two countries,
which however did not mean the disappearance
of discord from mutual relations.
The course of this process was affected by many
aspects. On the one hand, it was a result of the
disappearance or weakening of some irritating
factors in mutual relations. In particular, Turkey
noticed that its potential for influence in Central
Asia, and to an extent in the Southern Caucasus
was limited, while Russia saw the same in the
Balkans.
The parties also gradually ceased playing the Che-
chen and Kurdish separatism cards in the bilate-
ral political game, and embarked on anti-terrorist
co-operation instead.
The Turkish government and ruling class’s in-
creasing frustration at the US policy in Iraq (which
is believed to generate instability and a serious
challenge to Turkey’s vital interests, as a conse-
quence of Iraqi Kurdistan’s increasing indepen-
dence), together with the European Union’s atti-
tude towards Ankara (delaying the granting of
candidate status to Turkey and multiplying bar-
riers in the negotiations process), have played
an essential role in the improvement of political
relations between Turkey and Russia. Russia has
taken advantage of this by stimulating those ele-
ments of Turkish policy which were critical of the
West, and offering Ankara a very specific kind of
alternative.
The two countries’ growing political and econo-
mic ambitions, and their particular ideological si-
milarities (the increasing popularity of the Eura-
sian idea in various forms) have also contributed
to their establishment of closer mutual relations.
Economic co-operation has certainly been the
main driving force behind Turkish-Russian friend-
ship. Rapidly developing trade (including the so-
called suitcase trade in the initial phase) made it
possible to continue co-operation even in periods
when political relations cooled, and stimulated
it when the political climate became warmer.
As Turkish investments in Russia (especially in
the building sector) grew and Russian tourism
rapidly developed in Turkey, Russia gained eco-
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nomic significance for Turkey, and now it is cur-
rently very considerable.
However, energy co-operation between the two
countries was the most important issue. Turkey’s
dependence on Russian natural gas imports was
increasing, and Russian energy companies gain-
ed a larger share of the Turkish market. The two
countries had partly converging ambitious plans
in the energy sector (especially those pertaining
to natural gas).
Building trust and enhancing the scope of Turkey
and Russia’s common interests, especially in the
Black Sea area, also contributed to the developing
co-operation in the fields of security and defence.
Finally, the activity of the increasingly strong pro-
Russian lobby in Turkey, which has additionally
been supported by Russian activity (presumably
in the shadier spheres of business and politics
also), has certainly affected the improvement of
relations between the two countries.
Bearing in mind all those positive aspects, it has
to be stated that there are also some essential
limitations to any further improvement in Turk-
ish-Russian contacts. In particular, Turkey has not
revised the strategic, pro-Western line of its poli-
cy and is deeply set in the Euro-Atlantic structu-
res (without disregarding all its reservations in
this context). Turkey is an important and active
member of NATO, and EU accession is still among
its strategic goals. Moreover, the political, ideolo-
gical and even social ties between a major part
of the Turkish ruling classes and the West are still
strong. Turkey does not seem to have any clear
and sufficiently attractive alternative to its bonds
with the Western world.
Regardless of positive revaluations of the percep-
tion of Russia in Turkey, a significant part of Turk-
ish society still seems to distrust their big neigh-
bour. This feeling has been reinforced by the poli-
cy of Moscow, which has recently become in-
creasingly assertive and even aggressive. The Rus-
sian energy crises with Belarus and Ukraine and
the crisis in Russian-Georgian relations seem to
have had a strong psychological impact in this
context.
Additionally, Turkey and Russia seem to still have
essentially different interests in such an important
field as the transport and transit of Caspian oil.
While Ankara’s priority is to have the main trans-
port corridor running through its territory, Mos-
cow’s priority is to maintain maximum control
over the transport routes of Caspian oil.
It is worth emphasising that conflicts of interests
play a significant part in the gas sector, which is
perceived as an area for potentially intensifying
co-operation. Turkey fears becoming dependent
on Russian gas supplies and Gazprom’s expan-
sionist plans in its domestic market. In its desire
to integrate with the EU, Turkey is more inclined
to consider the interests of EU member states in
this area. In turn, Russia is clearly irritated with
Ankara’s wait-and-see strategy, and does not want
to make the implementation of its strategic plans
for expansion onto the European gas market de-
pendent on the stance of this country, which is
a relatively strong player and has proven on seve-
ral occasions that it is able to defend its interests
staunchly.
Therefore, it seems that the improvement of Turk-
ish-Russian relations should be perceived in terms
of a tactical rather than strategic alliance. It was
based on temporary conditions and was selective.
Moreover, there are signs indicating that it reach-
ed its peak in 2005/2006 and lost some momen-
tum since then, and that relations between the
two countries are cooling down.
However, the situation may still change. Circum-
stances may appear that will make Turkey and
Russia strengthen relations and co-operation
again.
In particular, relations between Turkey and Russia
may improve as a consequence of possible, dra-
matic events on the southern and eastern fron-
tiers of Turkey, especially in case of a Turkish full
scale intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan regardless
of EU and US protests, the disintegration of Iraq
and the emergence of an independent Kurdish
state, which may take over control of Kirkuk (if
Ankara does not choose to establish a modus vi-
vendi with the new geopolitical entity, and the
Kurdish issue is appeased in Turkey, and the US
does not prevent such a scenario from being rea-
lised). A possible improvement of relations could
also result from the potential consequences of
a US attack on Iran, which are difficult to predict.
Another factor which may push Turkey towards
closer relations with Russia could be a breakdown
of the negotiation process concerning Turkey’s
EU accession, and the loss of its prospects for
membership in the foreseeable future.
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Similarly, if the attempt to complete the reform
of the European energy market, develop a com-
mon EU energy policy and diversify energy sup-
ply sources (especially natural gas) for the Euro-
pean Union is unsuccessful, for example if the
Nabucco project fails, Turkey will not have any se-
rious alternative to implementation of gas pro-
jects jointly with Russia.
Marek Menkiszak
1 Russia is multiethnic in the sense that it is inhabited by
more than 100 peoples and ethnic groups. The estimated
number of Muslims in the overall Russian population of 143
million is at least 15 million (not counting immigrants).
2 Principally supplies of weapons, which essentially con-
tributed to the Kemalists’ victory in the wars against their
neighbours.
3 The warmth of Russian-Turkish relations in that period
was reflected even in the name of the basic treaty signed by
the two countries on 16 March 1921, the Treaty Of Friend-
ship And Brotherhood.
4 The Soviet Union demanded the right to set up military
bases next to the Black Sea straits, among other claims. The
promise of financial assistance for Turkey, which was endan-
gered by the USSR, was an essential element of the famous
address by US President Harry Truman in 1947, on which the
so-called doctrine of ‘containing communism’ was built.
5 The most radical version of the idea envisaged the creation
of a Russian-led ‘Slavic Empire’, with a capital city in Con-
stantinople. Popular as Pan-Slavism was among Russian eli-
tes, it never became an official doctrine of Russian policy.
6 Among other provisions, it confirmed the existing state bor-
ders, declared respect for territorial integrity and the will
to develop co-operation based on friendly relations, etc.
7 Statements by Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller (who
made reference to the Turkish guarantees for the autonomy
of Nakhchivan included in the Treaty of Kars signed in 1921)
and the Head of the Turkish General Staff General Dogan
Gunes on the one hand, and by the Commander-in-Chief of
the CIS Joint Armed Forces’ High Command, Marshal Yev-
geny Shaposhnikov and the Russian Defence Minister Gene-
ral Pavel Grachev on the other hand. See O. Kolobov, A. Kor-
nilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
8 In early June 2007, it went as far as to threaten (in a state-
ment by President Vladimir Putin) a ‘moratorium’ on Rus-
sia’s participation in the Adapted CFE Treaty and subse-
quent withdrawal from the treaty, as indeed took place in
December 2007.
9 It was argued that the missile systems, formally designed
for defence and having a 150 km range, would provide co-
ver for Greek fighter aircraft stationed in Cyprus pursuant
to the Cyprus-Greece joint defence pact signed in 1993, thus
allowing them to penetrate a significant part of Turkish air-
space with impunity. The thesis proposed by some Turkish
commentators, that the crisis was instigated by Russia to
cause a Turkish-Greek conflict with the intention of halting
NATO enlargement eastwards or frustrating the building of
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, is worth a deeper analy-
sis. See O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus
Iliskileri, op. cit.
10 A group of Chechens took over the Turkish ferry, demand-
ing that Russia stop the war in Chechnya. The crisis ended
in the hijackers’ arrest by the Turkish security forces. They
were sentenced later. However, Russia claimed that they had
been treated too leniently.
11 This opinion is shared among others by O. Kolobov,
A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
12 In comparison to 1938, the number of ships passing
through the Black Sea straits in 1996 had increased by more
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than 10 times, and the size of the cargoes they carried had
increased by more than 20 times.
13 This opinion is quoted among others by O. Tanrisever,
Turkey and Russia in Eurasia, in The Future of Turkish Fo-
reign Policy, ed. Lenore G. Martin, Dimitris Keridis, London
2004, pp. 127–156.
14 This stance was taken by the Turkish Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit, among others, during his visit to Moscow in
November 1999 (during which he was accompanied by the
head of Turkish intelligence). After the visit, when an agree-
ment on joint combating of terrorism was signed, Turkey
took actions to curtail the pro-Chechen activity of the Cau-
casian diaspora in Turkey, and the Russian authorities closed
the Kurdish camp near Yaroslavl in 2000.
15 According to some sources, Ocalan came back to Russia
in January 1999, but was forced to leave again. For more in-
formation on this case, see O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay,
Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
16 Plan deistvy razvitiya sotrudnichestva mezhdu Rossyskoi
Federatsiyei i Turetskoi Respublikoi v Yevrazii: ot dvusto-
ronnego sotrudnichestva k mnogoplannomu partniorstvu.
For the document text visit www.mid.ru
17 Its leader, Recep Tayip Erdogan, was received at the
Kremlin by President Putin in December 2002 before he
became Prime Minister of Turkey, which was an important
political gesture on Russia’s part.
18 See Suat Kiniklioglu, The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Rela-
tions, The Brookings Institution, Sabanci Universitesi (2006).
19 This has been emphasised among others by Fiona Hill and
Omer Taspinar, Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving
Together to Preserve the Status Quo?, Russie.Nei. Visions
No. 8, IFRI, Paris, January 2006; S. Kiniklioglu, The Anato-
my..., op. cit.; and Ognyan Minchev, Major Interests and
Strategies for the Black Sea Region. Framework Analytical
Review’ Institute for Regional and International Studies,
Sofia, September 2006.
20 The declaration also mentioned such issues as raising
mutual relations to the level of a ‘developed multidimensio-
nal partnership’, the activation of political dialogue, the simi-
larity of stances on major international issues, intensifica-
tion of the joint struggle against terrorism, activating eco-
nomic co-operation, consultations on the transport of Cas-
pian oil & gas and maritime traffic in the Black Sea straits,
and developing regional co-operation in the economy and se-
curity fields. Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya ob uglublenii druzh-
by i mnogoplanovogo partniorstva mezhdu Rossyskoi Fe-
deratsiyei i Turetskoi Respublikoi. For the text of the docu-
ment, see www.mid.ru
21 See Victor Panin, Henry Paniev, Turkey and Russia, in Turk-
ish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Idris Bal,
Boca Raton 2004, pp. 253–268.
22 Ahmet Davutoglu, a leading representative of the intel-
lectual circles linked to the ruling AKP. He fostered the con-
cept of ‘normalising relations with neighbours,’ entailing
among other things the increasing independence and diver-
sification of the Turkish policy. Cf. S. Kiniklioglu, The Ana-
tomy..., op. cit.
23 The Russian and Turkish leaders met up to six times
between the end of 2004 and the end of 2005.
24 Theodore George Tsakiris, The Strategic Framework of
the Russian-Turkish Relationship: Geopolitical Rivalries and
Geoeconomic Uncertainties, Hellenic Centre for European
Studies, http://www.ekem.gr/pdf/tsakiris.pdf
25 It is estimated that at the peak of the trade boom (1993–
–1994), the number of such individuals reached between
two and three million, and the total number of people going
on business trips to Turkey was nearly ten million. Data
quoted from O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-
Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
26 Ibidem.
27 According to Russian estimates, Turkey generated nearly
US$4 billion in incomes from Russian ‘suitcase trade’ in 2004.
Information from the Russian Foreign Ministry as of 18 No-
vember 2005, available at www.mid.ru
28 The rapid growth in Turkish-Russian trade turnovers
(over 30% annually), as is the case with other Russian part-
ners, is largely an effect of risingoil & gas prices, which con-
stitute a major part of imports from Russia.
29 Data quoted from an interview with Mikhail Kamynin,
spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry for RIA-Novosti
news agency, 18 February 2008, available at www.mid.ru
30 Ibidem. Data for a period of 10 years. Although co-opera-
tion in this field existed even in the Soviet times, the first big
contract for Turkish building companies in Russia provided
for building 15,000 flats for Russian officers returning from
Eastern Germany, which was credited by the government of
the Federal Republic of Germany. O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov,
F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
31 Data quoted from O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cag-
das Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
32 Data quoted from O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cag-
das Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.; information from the Russian
Foreign Ministry.
33 O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliski-
leri, op. cit.; S. Kiniklioglu, The Anatomy..., op. cit.; F. Hill,
O. Taspinar, Russia and Turkey..., op. cit.
34 The scandal over bribes taken by representatives of the
Turkish authorities from the Russians in connection with the
implementation of the project was uncovered years later.
35 Quoted from O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas
Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.
36 Data quoted from an interview with Mikhail Kamynin,
op.cit. For more on this subject, see the text by Marcin Piot-
rowski discussing energy issues.
37 A small part of the contract between Gazprom and Botas
was then taken over by the company Bosphorus Gas.
38 According to unofficial information, the main reason be-
hind Moscow’s support for the project competitive to the
Samsun–Ceyhan pipeline was the Turkish refusal to offer
majority stakes in the planned investment to Russian com-
panies.
39 The weapons, worth US$120 million, were used mainly
for clashes with Kurdish separatists between 1992 and 1994.
Data quoted from O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas
Turk-Rus Iliskileri, op. cit.; Cf. James Warhola, William Mit-
chell, The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives
and Implications, in Demokratizatsiya, Winter 2006.
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40 O. Kolobov, A. Kornilov, F. Ozbay, Cagdas Turk-Rus Iliski-
leri, op. cit.
41 Ibidem.
42 Its subsequent stages include the inauguration of the
NACC in December 1991 (which was transformed into the
EAPC in July 1997), Partnership for Peace (from 1995), the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC, from 1997) and
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC from 2002).
43 The agreement, which came into force on 2 November
2003, provided for parties’ co-operation in the field of secu-
rity, including joint exercises, search-and-rescue operations,
joint minesweeping, antiterrorist co-operation, preventing
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migra-
tion and organised crime, and counteracting ecological
threats.
44 Communication from the Russian Foreign Ministry as of
29 December 2006, available at www.mid.ru
45 The concept has been fostered since the middle of the first
decade of the 21st century by influential US analysts, first of
all by Ronald Asmus of the Marshall Fund, and by Romanian
authorities. See the text discussing the Black Sea issues by
Rafa∏ Sadowski.
46 The first consultations were held in 1997 in Ankara, the se-
cond in July 2000 in Moscow, and the third in January 2002
in Moscow again. Then the consultations became more re-
gular. Information on Russian-Turkish co-operation in com-
bating terrorism from the Russian Foreign Ministry, 26 Sep-
tember 2003, available at www.mid.ru
47 This subject has been discussed more thoroughly among
others by S. Kiniklioglu, The Anatomy..., op. cit.; and F. Hill,
O. Taspinar, Russia and Turkey..., op. cit.
48 40% of stakes are held by the German firm ZMB, which is
controlled by Gazprom, and the other 60% belong to Tur
Enerji, owned by Ali Haydar Sen, who is openly referred to
in the Turkish press as Gazprom’s representative in Turkey.
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CHAPTER VII
Turkey as the energy
bridge between the East
and the West
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Theses
1. Turkey does not have any native oil or gas
reserves, although it does have a very advanta-
geous geographical situation, as it borders with
key or important exporters of the resources.
This factor means Turkey is of considerable in-
terest to Russia, the EU and the US.
2. The Turkish ruling classes see their country
as a natural bridge between Europe and the
Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. This
assumption has resulted in the adoption of an
energy policy aimed at guaranteeing Turkey
the role of a transit country for exporters and
importers of hydrocarbons.
3. Another objective of Turkish policy is to use
the proximity of natural resource reserves to di-
versify its own imports.
4. Ankara’s ambitions are limited by economic,
technological and political barriers which are
found in the oil and gas exporters in the regions
of the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and in the
Middle East.
1. The main trends in Turkey’s
energy policy
Turkey’s large population and economy, coupled
with a lack of its own substantial hydrocarbon
reserves, make it an important market for oil and
natural gas. In the last few decades, energy con-
sumption on the Turkish market has been grow-
ing systematically, on average by 6% a year. In the
period from 1990 to 2003, there was a surge in
energy use of up to 58%, to 83.7 Mtoe (million
tonnes oil equivalent). In that period Turkey’s po-
pulation increased by 26% to nearly 71 million
inhabitants. As a result of these trends, the struc-
ture of energy consumption in Turkey has grad-
ually changed. Currently it is composed in the fol-
lowing way: 38% of oil, 32% of coal (67 million
tonnes a year), 23% of natural gas and 7% of ener-
gy generated by hydroelectric plants1.
Under the rule of the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) since 2002, structural changes in the
energy sector, which was previously strictly con-
trolled by the state, were accelerated. Now the
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sector and its responsibilities are organised as fol-
lows: the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resour-
ces (ETKB) and its dependent institutions are res-
ponsible for elaborating and implementing policy,
plans and governmental programmes. The State
Planning Organisation (DPT) fulfils an advisory
role to the cabinet and the ETKB, which for its part
defines and implements the objectives of Turkey’s
national energy policy, coordinates the private
and public sectors, develops and supervises the
relevant programmes, guarantees their imple-
mentation and oversees the exploitation and de-
velopment of resources, and the production and
distribution of energy2. The ministry and DPT ela-
borate five-year plans for Turkey’s economic de-
velopment. The Development Plan of the Republic
of Turkey for the years 2007–2013 has put for-
ward the same objectives as were set in the previ-
ous decade. There are three general goals3:
– ensuring sufficient, guaranteed and profitable
energy supplies for Turkey’s own needs;
– ensuring the security of energy supplies;
– stimulating investments to guarantee that
Turkey’s energy needs are met.
The Turkish authorities have declared that energy
security is a high priority for them, due to Tur-
key’s limited reserves, its increasing energy con-
sumption and its dependence on the import of
hydrocarbons. Turkey’s dependence on imported
resources is constantly growing. As a result of the
depletion of domestic reserves, the level of import
in terms of total primary energy supply (TPES)
has risen from 51% to 72%. The biggest increase
was observed in gas imports. Therefore efforts
are being made to diversify the structure of energy
consumption and the sources of supplies. Govern-
mental projections from 2004 forecast a growth
in GDP of 5.5% annually in the years 2005–2010,
and 6.4% in the period until 2020. If energy con-
sumption increased annually by 4-6%, that figure
would correspond to this level of growth. The po-
licies of successive governments have been domi-
nated by optimistic forecasts for the growth of in-
ternal demand for energy generated from natural
gas, as well as for Turkey’s role as a transit coun-
try. Turkey has an extensive energy infrastruc-
ture; most of its electricity is generated by fifteen
heat and power plants (fuelled by coal and gas)
and thirty hydroelectric plants, which altogether
have the power to produce 35,000 megawatts
(MW). The legal organisation of the sector is go-
verned by the electrical energy market law of
March 2001, which grants regulatory competen-
ces to the Energy Market Regulatory Authority
(EMRA). The law provides for the de-monopolisa-
tion, privatisation and division of the state-owned
corporation TEAS, which until recently was solely
responsible for the production, transport and dis-
tribution of electric energy4. The first genuine step
towards the de-monopolisation of TEAS was the
opening of a power plant with a capacity of 1200
MW in Iskenderun5. Turkish power plants still
use quite considerable coal reserves which gene-
rate 40% of the country’s electrical energy, (com-
pared to 40% produced from natural gas). The
existing coal reserves are being exploited by the
state-owned companies TTK and TKJ. About 20%
of energy is produced by the GAP project’s hy-
droelectric plant, as well as the still not fully used
potential of the sources of the Tigris and Euphra-
tes rivers in the southeastern part of the country6.
Assessments by the International Energy Agency
highlight the fact that the Turkish authorities
have not so far been sufficiently involved in the
full use of hydroelectric projects or protecting the
environment. Recently the prospect of Turkey de-
veloping nuclear energy has been growing. These
plans were abandoned in the second half of the
1980s, due to environmental safety reasons (fol-
lowing the disaster in Chernobyl) as well as the
general trend common to the majority of the OECD
states towards the increased use of natural gas.
They are motivated economically but also geopo-
litically, above all by progress in the nuclearisa-
tion of Iran and the proliferation of nuclear tech-
nology in the Middle East. In April 2006, the Turk-
ish government and the state Nuclear Energy
Agency (TAEK) chose the Black Sea port of Sinop
as the possible location for a 1800-MW reactor7.
Turkey is an important market for oil. The exploi-
tation of domestic reserves is systematically fall-
ing’; it is forecast that oil exploitation will drop
from the current level of 2.5 million tonnes a year
to 1.75 million tonnes in 2010. The remaining
identified oil reserves in Turkey are quite small.
Geological research into Turkish reserves at the
bottom of the Blackand Aegean Seas is being con-
ducted. At present, oil consumption in Turkey
stands at 30 million tonnes a year, which is
650,000 barrels a day8. 92.1% of the oil consumed
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is imported, and the Turkish authorities forecast
an increase in imports to 96% in 2010. Oil is im-
ported from a diverse range of sources; it comes
mainly from Iran (29%), Libya (19%) and Saudi
Arabia (16%), the countries that have tradition-
ally been supplying the Turkish market with oil
for many years. Other suppliers are Russia (12%),
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt and
Tunisia (24%)9.
2. The organisation of the
Turkish energy sector
Legal regulations on crisis management were in-
troduced recently, in 2003, together with the in-
troduction of the National Oil Reserve System.
By virtue of the related legislation the Joint Sto-
rage Organisation, dependent on ETKB, was set up.
The obligation to store strategic oil reserves was
imposed on refineries and oil and petrol distribu-
tors. Despite those measures, Turkish companies
have problems with maintaining a permanent
90-days’ worth of oil reserves. The Turkish oil sec-
tor is undergoing transformations following the
petroleum market reform bill passed in Decem-
ber 2003 and the lifting of restrictions on oil im-
port from the beginning of 2005. The main actors
in the oil sectors are the following companies:
Turkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortakligi (TPAO) –
a fully state-owned company responsible for ex-
ploration and exploitation of oil and gas reser-
ves10;
Turkiye Petrol Rafineleri AS (TUPRAS) – a com-
pany with mixed shares (49% shares held by the
state, 51% by private shareholders), in charge of
processing oil into petrol and other petroleum-
based products11;
Boru Hatlari Ile Petrol Tasima AS (BOTAS) –
a fully state-owned company responsible for trans-
porting oil and gas onto Turkish territory;
Petrol Ofisi AS (POAS) – a recently privatised com-
pany distributing and supplying oil and petrol12.
Turkish refineries can process 27.6 million tonnes
annually (613,000 barrels a day in 2005). Major
refineries are situated in Izmit (11.5 million ton-
nes), Izmir (10 million tonnes), Kirikkale (5 mil-
lion tonnes) and Batman (1.1 million tonnes).
These four refineries are owned by TUPRAS. The
only private refinery, which belongs to the ATAS
company in Mersin, has the capacity of 4.4 mil-
lion tonnes; however, it tends to be closed perio-
dically because of profitability and environmen-
tal issues13. It is planned to increase the capacity
of Turkish refineries up to 39.8 million tonnes of
oil by 2010 and 58.9 million tonnes by 202014.
There are as many as 21 companies, Turkish and
foreign, dealing with the distribution of oil and
petrol on the domestic market, although one-third
of the market is in the hands of POAS. Turkey also
supplies petrol to some Mediterranean countries.
Turkish oil companies are equally active abroad;
TPAO is a shareholder (6.75%) in the exploitation
of the Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli reserves, and in
2005 it also signed agreements with the Libyan
authorities to extract oil from three Libyan reser-
ves (Block 147, 188 and 189), as well as a memo-
randum with Syria to explore new oil reserves
there. TPAO also controls 49% of the shares in
a joint venture with the Kazakh Ministry of
Geology and Energy in KazakhTurkMunai (KTM),
which exploits small reserves in the Aktau and
Aktyubinsk regions. BOTAS has shares (9%) in
consortiums exploiting the Shah Deniz gas reser-
ves in Azerbaijan, and is building a pipeline to
transport the gas from there. TPAO, by virtue of
a memorandum of understanding between Tur-
key and Iran signed at the beginning of July 2007,
took over three out of 26 oil fields in the South
Pars region. Turkey does not have any natural gas
reserves that would be profitable for exploita-
tion15. Gas consumption started in 1987, togeth-
er with the exploitation of domestic reserves and
supplies from the USSR, which began in 1991.
In the period after 1990, consumption grew sev-
enfold. In the last two decades, Turkey has under-
gone accelerated gasification due to increased gas
consumption by the industry, gas electric plants
and individual recipients16. The Turkish govern-
ment has declared that the objectives of its gas
energy policy are as follows: to stimulate the use
of this resource, develop the country’s gas net-
work, create a competitive market, diversify gas
imports and extending the transit infrastruc-
ture. In 2005, natural gas consumption in Turkey
reached 27.03 billion m3 a year. It is assumed that
by 2010 the share of gas in the structure of ener-
gy consumption will have risen from 23% to 32%.
In the long term, demand for gas and its use may
triple, and could amount to over 50 billion m3 in
2010 and 82 billion m3 in 202017.
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The consequence of the depletion of Turkey’s gas
reserves together with its accelerated gasification
is a growing share of gas in the structure of ener-
gy consumption. So far Ankara has concluded
a series of contracts and framework agreements
for gas supplies (see Table 1). Experts point out
that in its plans Turkey has forgotten about effec-
tivness of the use of gas and saving of energy. The
weakness of Turkey’s policy in this area is the fact
that, despite diversifying the signed agreements
and contracts, the country remains dependent on
one supplier – Russia’s Gazprom (67% of imports
in 2007). In 2005 the structure of Turkey’s gas im-
port was as follows: 17.83 billion m3 transported
through pipelines from Russia, 4.32 billion m3
from Iran, the equivalent of 3.85 billion m3 in LNG
(liquefied natural gas) from Algeria, and 1.03 bil-
lion m3 from Nigeria18.
Turkey has contracted supplies for a total of up
to 51.8 billion m3 of gas in 2010. As a result of the
agreements already signed, and the consumption
being less than forecast, it may be forced to pay
penalties of over US$1 billion for resources which
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BOTAS’ contracts with:
Sojuzgazexport/Gazprom
(USSR)
Sonatrach
(Algeria)
NLNG
(Nigeria)
NIGC
(Iran)
Gazprom/Gazexport
(Russia)
Gazprom/TuRusGaz
(Russia)
Turkmengaz
(Turkmenistan)
SOCAR
(Azerbaijan)
Date of signing
the contract
14 February
1986
14 April
1988
9 November
1995
8 August
1996
15 December
1997
18 February
1998
18 February
1998
21 May 1999
supplemented
by a protocol of
12 March 2001
Planned volume
of supplies
6 billion m3
4 billion m3
1,2 billion m3
10 billion m3
16 billion m3
8 billion m3
16 billion m3
6,6 billion m3
Duration of
the contract
25 years,
until 2011
20 years,
until 2014
22 years,
until 2021
25 years,
until 2026
25 years,
until 2026
23 years,
until 2021
30 years,
has not come
into effect
15 years,
until 2022
Comments
Gas delivered through the
TransBalkan gas pipeline,
the Bulgaria–Istanbul–Ankara
section opened in 1992
LNG supplied to the BOTAS
terminal in the port of Marmara
LNG supplied to the BOTAS
gas-supplied terminal
in the port of Marmara
Gas delivered through the
pipeline on the Tebriz–Erzurum
route since January 2002;
initially at the level of 3 billion
m3. There are obstacles to
increasing its capacity.
Gas delivered since 2003
through the Blue Stream gas
pipeline; construction of the
Blue Stream’s second line plan-
ned; there are some problems
with increasing its capacity.
Annex to the contract
of 1986; up to 14 billion m3
altogether.
The framework agreement,
supplemented by a declaration
in 1999 about the TransCaspian
gas pipeline (TCGP).
The project has been abandoned
by potential investors.
Gas supplied through
the SCP/BTE gas pipeline,
its opening planned in 2007.
The additional protocol allows
for supplies to increase up to
the level of 8 billion m3 a year.
Sources: BOTAS Annual Report, Ankara 2001 and Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey Review, Paris 2005
Table 1. Supplies of natural gas to Turkey contracted by BOTAS
were contracted but not collected. Such take-or-
pay clauses are typically included in gas agree-
ments. There is a risk that penalties and surpluses
of supplies to Turkey could reach 20–25% of the
contracted amounts in the years 2010–2020. It is
now difficult to judge whether it was expected
domestic needs or anticipated EU needs that de-
termined the shape of the contracts; however,
many analysts have drawn attention to mistaken
projections and the corruption of ETKB officials19.
A solution to the situation would be to reexport
the surplus of gas, which is difficult without
new agreements with Russia and Iran, and also
because there is a lack of suitable warehouses in
Turkey. A likely way out of the problem may be
to reduce the volume of gas received through the
TransBalkan pipeline, and to transit gas from the
Blue Stream pipeline to different markets. Increas-
ing the capacity of the East-West Main Trunk Pi-
peline between Erzurum and Ankara, which cur-
rently has a capacity of up to 22 billion m3 a year,
will be of key importance to Turkey’s internal gas
network and transit projects. By around 2020,
BOTAS would like to send as much as 100 billion
m3 of gas from its surroundings to the EU through
this well-developed route (see more in the section
‘The gas and oil potential of Turkey’s neighbour-
hood’).
The gas sector in Turkey has undergone a trans-
formation following the natural gas market act
adopted in May 2001. However, distribution, im-
port, export and transport remain dominated by
the state-owned company BOTAS, which is also
responsible for building pipelines and the distri-
bution network20. According to plans, BOTAS
should be deprived of its current position by the
end of 2009, although it does not appear likely
that this deadline will be met. The prices and ta-
riffs of gas on the domestic market are determi-
ned by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority
(EMRA) which also supervises the gradual har-
monisation with EU regulations concerning gas
and electricity markets. EMRA applies preferen-
tial tariffs for individual recipients, and quite re-
gularly increases prices for the industry21.
The related legislation stipulates that no gas im-
porter or distributor should have a share of more
than 20% in the domestic market. Gas is distrib-
uted on the Turkish market by the following com-
panies, dependent on the local authorities: EGO
in Ankara, IGDAS in Istanbul, IZGAS in Izmit and
the private companies AGDAS in Adapazari, BUR-
SAGAZ in Bursa and ESGAZ in Eskisehir. The gas
network in Turkey is 6000 km long, and a further
2000 km are under construction22. Because of
seasonal fluctuations and penalties for contracted
surpluses of gas, there is also an urgent need to
build underground gas warehouses23. Under an
act of 2001, importers and distributors are obliged
to store 10% of the gas they have purchased. This
objective will probably not be achieved by the end
of 2009 as planned. TPAO is currently working
on the planned construction of such warehouses
in Marmara Degirmenkoy, Tuz Golu and Tarsu,
with an initial capacity of 1.6 billion m3 annually.
Ankara has been granted a US$325 million loan
from the World Bank to this end24.
3. The gas and oil potential
of Turkey’s neighbourhood
In terms of diversification of supplies and its role
as a transit country, Turkey’s greatest asset is its
decidedly advantageous geographical situation.
The ‘energy arc’ stretches within a 2000-km radius
from Turkey’s borders, it covers 76.3% of proven
oil reserves and 71.3% of the global reserves of na-
tural gas. This area includes North Africa, the Per-
sian Gulf, the Caspian Sea region and Russia25. Tur-
key imports resources from this ‘arc’, but its am-
bition is to become a bridge for other importers.
Due to Turkish control over the Black Sea straits,
through which at least 40% of Russian oil exports
come, Ankara has joined the competition for oil
pipeline routes from the Caspian region. Turkey
is emerging as a key country for projects to di-
versify gas imports to the EU. It wants to secure
profits from the transit fees, as well as to ensure
the participation of Turkish companies in the im-
plementation of particular gas pipeline projects.
The authorities in Ankara are convinced that
Turkey’s transit potential is one of the arguments
in favour of the country’s quicker integration with
the EU26. However, there are many political or
economic factors which make it more difficult to
take full advantage of Turkey’s beneficial geogra-
phical situation. Specific suppliers will still have
varied shares in meeting the needs of the global
economy (see Tables 2 and 3).
T
u
rk
e
y
a
s
th
e
e
n
e
rg
y
b
ri
d
g
e
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
E
a
s
t
a
n
d
th
e
W
e
s
t
94
C E S R e p o r t
The Persian Gulf still has enormous oil reserves,
and in the forthcoming decades it will remain the
key region for satisfying the growing world’s oil
consumption. Oil extraction in the region is ex-
ceptionally cheap, pays from its own investments,
and keeps exports profitable thanks to a well-de-
veloped network of oil terminals for huge ocean
tankers. The Persian Gulf states, particularly Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, are active OPEC players; thanks
to their surpluses of oil, they can jointly fix its
price27. Apart from Iran, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates, the region still does not exploit its gas
reserves, and can enter markets only after relat-
ed investments which must cover either the ex-
port of LNG or the extension of the Iranian and
Arab gas networks to Turkey. However, the Gulf
remains continually unstable. The Kuwait war in
1990 drastically reduced the export of Iraqi oil
through Turkey, and since the change of the re-
gime in Baghdad, the level of exploitation from
before 2003 is being maintained with difficulty.
Iran is quite a special case, as it is a potentially at-
tractive supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU (Iran
has the second largest gas reserves after Russia).
The sanctions imposed by the US in 1995 (the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA) deepened the cri-
sis in the country’s oil sector, thus making ex-
ploitation of gas more difficult28. Subsequent UN
sanctions imposed on Iran since 2006, related to
Iran’s nuclear programme, have also impeded (if
not totally halted) the flow of foreign invest-
ments into the export of Iranian gas.
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Country
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Iraq
Russia
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Algeria
Libya
Proven oil reserves
(percentage of global
oil reserves)
36.3 billion tonnes (22%)
18.9 billion tonnes (11.5%)
15.5 billion tonnes (9.6%)
10.2 billion tonnes (6.2%)
5.4 billion tonnes (3.3%)
1 billion tonnes (0.6%)
1.5 million tonnes (1%)
5.1 billion tonnes (3.3%)
Level of exploitation
in 2005 (percentage
of global exploitation)
526 million tonnes (13,5%)
200 million tonnes (5.1 %)
89.5 million tonnes (2.3%)
470 million tonnes (12.1%)
63 million tonnes (1.6%)
22.4 million tonnes (0.6%)
86.5 million tonnes (2.2%)
80.1 million tonnes (2.1%)
Projected
export level
in 2010
552 million tonnes
225 million tonnes
150 million tonnes
450 million tonnes
93 million tonnes
49 million tonnes
104 million tonnes
116 million tonnes
Projected
export level
in 2020
702 million tonnes
250 million tonnes
250 million tonnes
500 million tonnes
100 million tonnes
66 million tonnes
143 million tonnes
150 million tonnes
Table 2. Oil reserves and potential of selected countries and suppliers in Turkey’s surroundings
Country
Russia
Iran
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Algeria
Egypt
Libya
Proven gas reserves
(percentage of global
gas reserves)
47.82 trillion m3 (26.6%)
26.74 trillion m3 (14.9%)
3.17 trillion m3 (1.8%)
3 trillion m3 (1.7%)
2.90 trillion m3 (1.6%)
1.85 trillion m3 (1.1%)
1.37 trillion m3 (0.8%)
4.58 trillion m3 (2.5%)
1.89 trillion m3 (1.1%)
1.49 trillion m3 (0.8%)
Level of exploitation
in 2005 (percentage
of global exploitation)
598 billion m3 (21.6%)
87 billion m3 (3.1%)
No data available
23.5 billion m3 (0.9%)
58.8 billion m3 (2.1%)
55.7 billion m3 (2%)
5.3 billion m3 (0.2%)
87.8 billion m3 (3.2%)
34.7 billion m3 (1.3%)
11.7 billion m3 (0.4%)
Projected
export level
in 2010
185 billion m3
20 billion m3
10 billion m3
20 billion m3
76 billion m3
3–5 billion m3
14 billion m3
85 billion m3
26 billion m3
16 billion m3
Projected
export level
in 2020
220 billion m3
30 billion m3
17 billion m3
40 billion m3
93.4 billion m3
5 billion m3
30 billion m3
120 billion m3
31 billion m3
35 billion m3
Table 3. Gas reserves and potential of selected countries and suppliers in Turkey’s surroundings
Source: Data on the proven reserves and exploitation after British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy,
London June 2006; projections of export during the period 2010–2020 after the Observatoire Mediterraneen de
l’Energie; Medsupply: Final Report, Brussels June 2003, and sources cited in the present text.
Because of the routes tankers take on the Medi-
terranean Sea, Turkey will not be a transit coun-
try for oil from North Africa. Taking into account
the regional balance of forces, it is worth remem-
bering that Turkey and Israel dominate the east-
ern part of the Mediterranean Sea. This allows
Turkey, as a principal member of NATO, to con-
trol and protect marine routes between the oil
terminals in this area and tankers circulating
through the Turkish Straits and the Suez Canal
(heading towards Europe and Gibraltar). As the
Middle East is internally and geopolitically un-
stable, this role of Turkey’s is gaining key impor-
tance in the region. Turkey’s potential as a transit
country for North African oil, mainly from Egypt,
may appear more profitable; in the coming deca-
de, Egypt has an opportunity of becoming a sig-
nificant exporter of gas to the EU and an exporter
of LNG to other markets. Cairo’s decision on the
directions its gas export takes will depend on fur-
ther negotiations with BOTAS and potential gas
recipients; it will also be determined by the open-
ing of new connections between networks of Arab
countries, Turkey and the EU29.
Potentially the biggest opportunities for Turkey
are linked with resources from the Caspian Sea.
In the last decade, this region has become a new
exporter of hydrocarbons, although its reserves
have been overestimated. It was expected that
the contribution of Caspian oil would make it an
alternative to OPEC. Moreover, Caspian reserves
require further foreign investments, and options
of export routes are quite costly because there is
no direct access to open seas. The major reserves
of Caspian oil lie in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan,
and key gas reserves can be found in Turkmeni-
stan and Kazakhstan. These countries have the po-
tential for export to Western and possibly Asian
markets30. Given both the existing and planned
export routes, Turkey is of fundamental impor-
tance for routes circumventing Russia and Iran.
The implementation of the concept of a ‘corridor’
from the region, even though this would be more
beneficial to Turkey, forces Ankara to consider
the decisions of both investors and exporters, as
well as the policies of the US, the EU and Russia
(and to a lesser extent, the policy of Iran)31.
4. Turkey’s role in the energy
policies of the US, the EU
and Russia
US policy towards the Middle East has been per-
ceived since 2003 as complicating Turkey’s inter-
ests in the Kurdish question, relations with Iraq,
Syria and Iran. Ankara is the beneficiary of Wa-
shington’s strategy for the Caspian Sea region
since 1991. The issue of liberating the region’s
export potential has become an element of the US
and Turkey’s common interests in this area. Both
Clinton administrations declared their wish to se-
cure export of Caspian oil as a vital interest of the
US; in the years 1994–1998 the US was involved
in promoting routes to bypass both Russia and
Iran. That policy clearly encouraged Ankara’s am-
bitions to become a ‘bridge’ for Azerbaijan and
Central Asia, although most of Turkey’s projects
then did not meet with the understanding of com-
panies which were starting to explore the Caspian
reserves. In Afghanistan under the Taliban, the
project for pipelines from Central Asia to South-
ern Asia became unrealistic. In 1999 at the Orga-
nisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) summit in Istanbul, the presidents of the
US, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan pledged their support for projects
of pipelines going through the ‘Caucasian-Turk-
ish corridor’32.
The above-mentioned policy has been continued
with more success by the Republican Administra-
tion of President George W. Bush. The report pre-
pared by Vice-President Dick Cheney at the begin-
ning of Bush’s first term forecast the increased de-
pendence of the US on imported oil up to a level
of 70% of projected consumption for 2020. The
report recommended, among other points, that
the administration should give diplomatic back-
ing to the construction of pipelines crossing the
Southern Caucasus, connect the gas networks of
Turkey and Greece, and improve the investment
climate in the Caspian region33. The creation in
summer 2002 of the consortium for the Main Ex-
port Route from Azerbaijan (an oil pipeline from
Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey) was a great success
for Washington. The implementation of this pro-
ject would have been difficult without the pres-
ence of American military advisors in Georgia
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and Azerbaijan. The new situation in the South-
ern Caucasus allowed Turkey to put forward pro-
jects for connections of Caspian oil and gas sup-
plies to Israel34. The passage of time and Moscow’s
growing assertiveness lead to a rise tension in
Russian-American relations in 2006 due to the
Russian policy of energy blackmail towards its
neighbours. Washington is concerned about the
southern European countries and Israel’s inclina-
tion towards the Russian concept of using transit
through Turkish territory35.
Turkey’s transit role is even more significant in
case of the EU’s policy, particularly in connection
with ensuring the security of gas imports. Accord-
ing to the last European Commission (EC) Green
Paper, in the period until 2030 the EU’s depen-
dence on imported oil will increase from 82% to
93%, and from 57% to 84% in the case of gas.
The EC has called on its member states to coor-
dinate their energy policies, to act in solidarity
in relations with exporters, and to open new in-
ter-network connections, gas pipelines and LNG
terminals36. Previous documents by the EC and
the European Parliament have emphasised the
‘axial’ nature of Turkey’s geographical situation
in relation to the Caspian Sea region and the Per-
sian Gulf, and have emphasised the advantages
of the projects promoted by BOTAS. Turkey is also
seen by the EC as a partner in initiatives aimed
at the EU’s neighbours, such as the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the Euro-Med Energy Fo-
rum and the Black Sea Synergy. All these initiati-
ves contain elements of co-operation in increas-
ing competitiveness, security of supply and en-
vironmental protection37.
Given the EU’s interests, Turkey’s adoption of the
European Energy Charter Treaty in 2001 and the
implementation of the Gas Directive of 2003 is of
enormous importance. Brussels has equally em-
phasised that Turkey must introduce solutions
analogous to EU ones for the promotion of saving
energy, energy-effectiveness and environmentally
friendly use. The process of EU enlargement to the
east and south of Europe has enhanced the im-
portance of supplies from Russia, thus highlight-
ing the huge variety of approaches within the EU
to diversifying directions of supply. For obvious
reasons, the involvement of European importers
& companies and the opening of new supply
routes is crucial for Ankara. Turkey sees itself as
the ‘fourth gas artery’ of the EU, after the import
routes from Norway, Russia and North Africa. In-
tegration within the framework of the Regional
Energy Market for South-East Europe (REMSEE),
the regional oil and electricity market, has become
an element which fosters Turkey and the EU’s
common interests38. Thanks to REMSEE, the con-
struction of connections between the networks
of Turkey, Greece and Italy, the Turkey-Greece In-
terconnector and Poseidon, was launched. These
connections were named the Trans-European
Energy Networks (TEN-E), which are pan-Euro-
pean projects. Thanks to their opening, Caspian
and Middle East oil could gain access to EU mar-
kets, which would offer an alternative to increas-
ing imports from Russia.
In the last decade, Turkey’s role in Russian policy
grew equally in importance, including in several
energy- related aspects. The concept of the ‘Cau-
casian-Turkish corridor’ has been a challenge, if
not a threat, to Russian economic influences in the
countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central
Asia from its very beginning. Export plans pro-
moted and implemented by Turkey and the US
have gradually undermined the monopoly of Rus-
sian companies (Transneft and Gazprom) on con-
trol over the directions in which Caspian resources
have been exported. Russians have always treat-
ed Ankara’s arguments about the need to reduce
oil transit through the Turkish Straits with mis-
trust. In order to ease these tensions, Moscow
and Ankara are still looking for pragmatic com-
promises, and are avoiding adding any more fuel
to the fire, at least in terms of their rhetoric39. The
greatest concession Turkey could agree to is the
extension of the ‘North-South corridor’ for the ex-
port of Russian gas. Turkey would thus become
the bridge for export of Russian gas to markets
other than those in Western Europe, strengthen-
ing Russia’s position as the main supplier to the
Balkan countries and Southern Europe. Russia can-
not ignore Turkey’s potential as an attractive mar-
ket for its gas. Paradoxically, as a result of the
country’s economic problems, Turkey was becom-
ing more dependent on Gazprom supplies while
signing successive BOTAS contracts. Further re-
gulation of Russian-Turkish gas contracts will be
a strong factor in determining Turkey’s prospects
of being an ‘energy bridge’40. This issue may be
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closely linked to efforts made by Russian compa-
nies to become involved in the privatisation of
the Turkish energy sector, following the model of
their activities in the new EU member states41.
Further compromises could be difficult, as they
would be determined not only by bilateral rela-
tions, but also the wider geopolitical situation in
Turkey’s surroundings. For Ankara, too great con-
cessions to Moscow would imply the weakening
competitiveness of Azeri gas, and possibly of gas
from Central Asia and the Middle East. Turkey
would then lose the opportunity to make huge
profits from increased transit and economic & po-
litical influence in the region. From the point of
view of Turkey’s ambitions to control the gas tran-
sit, Russia’s efforts to deepen co-operation with
other suppliers to the EU, for example in the form
of a kind of ‘gas OPEC’, or Moscow’s new agree-
ments with the countries of Central Asia42, may
have a series of negative implications.
5. The operational and planned
elements of the East–West
and North–South corridors
From the geographical point of view, Turkey can
be crossed by routes along the East–West axis,
transporting hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea
region, Iran and Iraq. The other axis is constituted
by the existing or planned North–South routes
(mainly for resources from Russia) and planned
South–North routes (for resources from North
Africa).
5.1. Transit of oil through the Turkish
Straits and the Turkish territory
The Turkish Straits, i.e. the Bosphorus and the
Dardanelles, have a special significance in the
transit of oil from the ex-USSR area. They consti-
tute a narrow and constantly busy transit point
between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.
The Turkish Straits are one of the world’s most
difficult canals to navigate, with the risk of colli-
sion and an environmental threat to the Istanbul
area with a population of 12 million people. The
use of the Straits to transfer oil has also been
complicated by its special international status
based on the Montreux Convention of 1936 and
later UN conventions43. Over 50,000 ships sail
through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles annu-
ally, 5500 of which are tankers44. In order to bring
the situation under control, Ankara has moder-
nised the radar and navigation systems used in
that region, although this has not eased delays
in the maritime transit.
In the last decade, the Turkish Straits have been
‘jammed’ by the growing export of Russian, Ka-
zakh and Azeri oil from the Black Sea terminals
in Novorossiysk, and to a lesser extent from Odes-
sa, Tuapse, Supsa and Batumi. Technical, environ-
mental and legal arguments have provided sup-
port for Turkey to promote the concept of by-
passes, i.e. oil pipelines bypassing the Straits45.
The main option for Turkish transit from Azer-
baijan was the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline
opened in 2006, but Turkey would like to build
at least one bypass crossing its territory. Routes
circumventing both Turkish territory and the
Black Sea straits are an alternative to the Turkish
proposals. Meanwhile, the transit through the
Turkish Straits rose in the period 2000–2005 from
97 to 150 million tonnes a year. The level of future
transit will be determined by the growth of ex-
ploitation and exports from Russia and Kazakh-
stan. According to experts, the high level of the
Black Sea transit by means of tankers will be main-
tained at least until 2015. However, later (2015–
–2030), a fall in quantities of Russian oil delivered
through the Black Sea routes should be expected.
The greatest uncertainty surrounds decisions on
the export routes of resources from Kazakhstan.
When these many factors are taken into account,
the peak traffic of tankers is estimated to reach
180 million tonnes in 2015, followed by a gradual
decrease to the level of 90 million tonnes in 203046.
Undoubtedly, such forecasts have implications
for investors regarding the putative construction
of another bypass of the Black Sea straits.
The Kirkuk–Ceyhan oil pipeline, opened in 1976,
used to be the major export route for oil from
Iraq. The pipeline is composed of two parallel
lines running from the Kurdistan region of Iraq
to the Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan in Tur-
key. The operator of the Turkish section of the
route (656 km) from Kirkuk is BOTAS. The maxi-
mum capacity of both pipelines is up to 70 mil-
lion tonnes annually. After the Iraqi invasion of
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Kuwait and the sanctions imposed by the UN, the
route has been blocked many times. This pipeline
has never in practice even reached the level of
50 million tonnes, and after numerous acts of sa-
botage, now does not exceed 25 million tonnes.
The US intervention in Iraq has not eliminated
problems with its use. In spring 2003, pumping
stations along the pipeline were looted. One of the
Iraqi sections on the Tigris River was damaged
by US air forces, although the greatest destruc-
tion was caused by attacks from Iraqi insurgents
on 9 and 31 July 200647. This situation has also en-
couraged Turkey to promote several other routes
to Ceyhan, different from those running from Iraq
and Azerbaijan.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which
is already operating, is the most controversial and
difficult in terms of construction route from the
Caspian Sea region. The pipeline finally began
operations in July 2006 when the first ocean tan-
ker in Ceyhan was filled with oil. The route was
exceptionally problematic because of low oil pri-
ces in the last decade together with the high
project costs. Discussions over the project started
in autumn 1994, when the ‘contract of the cen-
tury’ was signed, and the Azerbaijan Internatio-
nal Operating Company (AIOC) consortium was
established48. These events were accompanied
by a series of intergovernmental declarations and
agreements. The BTC cost nearly US$3 billion, of
which up to US$2.3 billion was funded from loans
(mainly from the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion & Development and the World Bank)49. Tur-
key’s profits from transit fees, at a maximum ca-
pacity of 50 million tonnes annually, can amount
to as much as US$300 million. This corridor is
also important because of the operator (BP)’s in-
volvement in the construction of the Baku–Tbi-
lisi–Erzurum gas pipeline50. The BTC is of strate-
gic importance to the US and Turkey; by weaken-
ing the role of Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea
region, it has become the main export route from
Azerbaijan and has reduced the strain placed on
the Turkish Straits. This route has equally provi-
ded logistical information for the BTE gas pipe-
line. The BTC oil pipeline can also be used after
2010 to transfer Kazakh oil from the massive
Kashagan reserves. however, this depends on the
arrangements Kazakhstan makes with Caspian
consortiums about implementing one of the pro-
jects for routes bypassing the Turkish Straits. The
key to the project’s implementation is the cost of
its construction, the competitiveness of expenses,
and above all the guarantee of large quantities
of resources from Kazakhstan and Russia (com-
pare the listing in the Table 4.). Recently Kazakh-
stan has been opting for increasingly far-reach-
ing collaboration with Russia in this area.
The TAPCO oil pipeline project (Trans-Anadolu
Pipeline Company) could serve as a supplement
to the BTC in the section of the route between
the oil terminals of Samsun and Ceyhan. The
TAPCO pipeline would have a capacity of 55 mil-
lion tonnes a year; its target capacity is planned
at 70 million tonnes. The expected transit would
thus reduce the strain on the Turkish Straits by
about 50%. The cost of the route is today esti-
mated at US$1.5 billion. The project has been
promoted since 2003 by ENI, which holds shares
(18.5%) in the Agip-KCO consortium exploiting the
Kazakh reserves in Kashagan51. In spring 2006,
the Turkish government agreed to grant a licence
for the newly established TAPCO company to Tur-
kiye Calik Energy52 and Italian ENI. TAPCO has
invited new shareholders to join it53. In April 2007,
TAPCO announced the beginning of the constru-
ction work, and during the ceremony with the
participation of the Turkish and Italian authori-
ties, the pipeline’s opening in 2011 was announ-
ced54. The project will only have a chance to be
implemented if ENI brings the remaining KCO
shareholders round to it. From the point of view
of the Turkish authorities and the potential sup-
pliers, the operation’s advantage is that part of
the TAPCO route coincides with the BTC route.
Without co-operation from Russia, however, it
will be impossible to guarantee that oil would
be transported through this pipeline.
However, TAPCO and other options bypassing the
Black Sea straits have an important rival – the
Trans-Balkan oil pipeline. This has been promot-
ed by Russia since 1994, and recently the project
has made some considerable advances. The pipe-
line is intended to carry 37 million tonnes annu-
ally in its first phase, and its target capacity is
planned at 50 million tonnes a year. The cost of the
project is estimated at US$1.2 billion. The route
of the Trans-Balkan oil pipeline would run from
the Bulgarian terminal of Burgas to Alexan-
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droupolis in Greece. This option was studied from
2002, the governments of Russia, Bulgaria and
Greece held negotiations as of 2005 in order to
reach a transit agreement. On 15 March 2007, the
intergovernmental agreement was signed, and
the TBOPC consortium (with the majority of sha-
res held by a Russian company, BAPC) was set up55.
In May 2007, an agreement was concluded be-
tween Russia and Kazakhstan to increase the ex-
port of Kazakh oil to the terminal in Novoros-
siysk from the current level of 23 to 40 million
a year. In such a situation, the Trans-Balkan oil
pipeline would receive oil from the CPC route
(Tengiz–Novorossiysk), and challenge the ratio-
nale of implementing other projects56.
Since May 2006, the Turkish ETKB and the Israeli
Ministry of Infrastructurehave been declaring
their willingness to implement projects for sub-
marine connections for the transit of oil, gas,
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Name
Kirkuk–Ceyhan
BTC
Trans–Balkan
TAPCO
Kirkoy–Ibrice
Agva–Izmit
AMBPO
PanEuropean
Odessa–Brody
OBP
Druzba-Adria
EAP
Route
(length)
Kirkuk–Ceyhan
(1876 km)
Baku–Tbilisi–
–Ceyhan
(1768 km)
Burgas–Ale-
xandroupolis
(279 km)
Samsun–Ceyhan
(555 km)
Kirkoy–Ibrik-
baba (198 km)
Agva–Izmit
(40 km)
Burgas–Vlore
(900 km)
Constanta–Triest
(1310 km)
Odessa–Brody
(675 km)
Odessa–Brody–
–P∏ock
(745 km)
Szazhalom-
batta–Sisak
(200 km)
Eilat–Ashkelon
(254 km)
Annual
capacity
Realistically
up to 25 mil-
lion tonnes
Planned
capacity up to
50 million
tonnes
Planned capa-
city up to 50
million tonnes
Planned
55–70 million
tonnes
Planned up to
70 million
tonnes
Planned
11–12 million
tonnes
Planned
36 million
tonnes
Planned up to
40 million
tonnes
Realistically
up to 12 mil-
lion tonnes
Up to 25
million tonnes
planned
5–15 million
tonnes planned
20–55 million
tonnes possible
Operator
(cost)
BOTAS
(no available
data)
Consortium
BTC-BP
(US$3 billion)
Consortium
TBOPC
(US$1.2 billion)
Company
TAPCO
(US$1.5
billion)
Andalu–Trans-
neft (US$900
million)
TUPRAS–Tat-
neft (no data
available)
Consortium
AMBPO
(US$1.3 billion)
Consortium
PEOP (US$2
billion)
UkrTransNafta
(US$500
million)
UkrTransNafta
(US$450
million)
JANAF/MOL
(US$80-300
million)
EAPC/TCGP
(no data avail-
able)
Comments on the condition
of the pipelines and bypasses
Constant target of sabotage in Iraq,
which prevents the maximum capacity
of up to 70 million tonnes from running.
The largest operating bypass
of the Black Sea straits, it supplies
Azeri oil; Kazakhstanís contribution
is still being considered.
Planned to supply Kazakh oil
from CPC and Russia. As a bypass,
the most important threat to BTC.
Proposal, after an initial
feasibility study; will become
unrealistic if progress on the
TransBalkan route is made.
Feasibility study has been
concluded; lack of support from
the Turkish authorities.
An initial project of the route to the
refinery in Izmit; it would not consid-
erably reduce traffic in the Straits.
Initial feasibility study has been
concluded; unrealistic, given the
progress with the TransBalkan line.
Initial feasibility study has been
completed; unrealistic, given the
progress with the TransBalkan line.
Used in the ‘reverse mode’
to Odessa to supply oil from Russia.
Searching for project partners
for many years. Little chance of
Caspian supplies.
Feasibility study completed;
the ‘reverse’ project to Adria, to sup-
ply oil from Russia
Supplies oil from BTC; intended as
a competitor to the transit of oil
through the Suez Canal.
Table 4. The already-operating and planned oil pipelines to Turkey, and projects for bypassing the Turkish Straits
Sources: J. Roberts, Bypassing The Bosphorus, Platts Oil, London 2005 and materials quoted in the present text
electricity and potable water to Haifa. One ele-
ment of such a corridor would be the use of the
Israeli route between the Mediterranean Sea and
the Red Sea. The existing Eilat–Ashkelon Pipe-
line (EAP) can carry 55 million tonnes annually,
but its current capacity does not exceed 20 mil-
lion tonnes57. The EAP mainly serves to import
Russian and Azeri oil to Israel. It could also be
used to transfer oil to Asian markets. Israel is
ready to introduce a fee for using EAP at a rate
which will compete with the tariffs set for tan-
kers sailing through the Suez Canal and loaded
in Ceyhan. The terminal in Ashkelon would ser-
vice smaller tankers from Ceyhan, and the EAP
oil pipeline would be used to load large ocean
tankers in Eilat58. The European Investment Bank
has declared that it would finance the feasibility
study of the EAP and other-than BTC-EAP con-
nections between Turkey and Israel; the Turkiye
Calik Group has strongly committed itself to the
promotion of this corridor59.
5.2. The transit routes of gas
to Turkey and to other markets
The extensive network of export gas pipelines
running from and to Turkey (the LNG terminal
services the domestic network) is crucial to Tur-
key’s plans of increasing its role in transit to the
EU. Currently there are two connections from
Russia and one from Iran; the opening of the
route from Azerbaijan and the route to Greece is
imminent. The Nabucco project and the plans for
connections with Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkmeni-
stan are at various stages of advancement. Equ-
ally, there are offers of extending gas pipelines
which would transport Russian gas to Israel and
South Europe. Some of these projects may be
mutually exclusive, and it remains in Turkey’s
optimal interest to implement most of these pro-
jects (see the listing in Table 5.).
The Trans-Balkan gas pipeline started operating
in the years 1987–1988. The route was construc-
ted on the basis of agreements by BOTAS with
the Soviet Soyuzgazexport in 1986, and crosses
Bulgaria to get to Malkoclar60. In fact, it is an ex-
tension of the network of gas pipelines going
through Ukraine and Romania to Bulgaria. It car-
ries Russian gas to Turkey, and deliveries are car-
ried out by TuRusGas61. Between 1992–1999, the
trans-Balkan gas pipeline had the capacity of
6 billion m3 annually. Then, as a result of agree-
ments concluded between BOTAS and Gazprom
in 1997–1998, together with modernisation
work, the pipeline’s capacity increased to 20 bil-
lion m3 annually, 14 billion m3 of which now goes
to the Turkish market. however, this required
modernisation of the Ukrainian section, which
was used to transport 24 billion m3 of gas to the
Balkans and Turkey62.
The Iranpipe gas pipeline started operations in
January 2002. Its route runs between Tabriz in
Iran and the Erzurum junction, and currently
delivers 4 billion m3 a year. The construction of the
pipeline was initiated by agreements in August
1996 between the governments of Turkey and
Iran. It is operated by BOTAS and the Iranian sta-
te-owned company NIGC; the investments were
made despite initial opposition from the US. As
in the case of the Blue Stream line, the opening
of this route was delayed due to Turkey’s prob-
lems with receiving the contracted quantities of
gas. Iran obviously did not want to lose its pres-
ence on the Turkish market. It is also interested
in delivering its resources to EU markets through
Iranpipe. According to the contract with BOTAS,
the gas pipeline is intended to have a target ca-
pacity of 10 billion m3 in 2010, and up to 20 bil-
lion m3 when contracts with EU countries are
signed. NIGC is aiming to deliver its gas to Greece.
If Iranian gas enters EU markets, both the state
authorities and BOTAS & NIGC have declared
that they would like to further develop the Iran-
pipe’s capacity up to 30-40 billion m3 by 2020.
however, this depends on the situation in Iran’s
surroundings, the increased capacity of the Turk-
ish network, and the implementation of the TGI
projects Poseidon and Nabucco.
The Blue Stream Gas Pipelinewas built by the Blue
Stream BV Pipeline Company, set up in 1999. The
basis for the project was an agreement in Decem-
ber 1997 between the governments of Russia and
Turkey as well as between BOTAS and Gazprom63.
The cost of the construction amounted to nearly
US$2 billion, and its delayed opening took place
in 2003. The Blue Stream pipeline is one of the
more technologically challenging submarine con-
nections, as a 390-km section of it runs under-
neath the Black Sea, linking the Russian port of
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Name
Trans-Balkan
Gaspipeline
Iranpipe
Blue Stream-1
SCP/BTE
TGI
Poseidon
Nabucco
Two gas pipelines
from Iran and
Turkmenistan,
through Iran linked
with Nabucco
(no name)
TCGP
TransArab
(Turkish section)
Iraqpipe
South Stream
Blue Stream-2
(Israel option)
Route
(length)
Bulgarian network
Makoclar–Istanbul
(842 km)
Tabriz–Erzurum
(2577 km)
Dzhubga–Black Sea–
–Samsun
(1217 km)
Baku–Tbilisi–
–Erzurum
(1010 km)
Karacabey–
–Komitini
(286 km)
Stavrilimenas–Ionian
Sea–Otranto
(280 km)
Turkey–Bulgaria–Roma-
nia–Hungary–Austria
(3282 km)
The first – Turkmeni-
stan–Iran–Turkey
(approx. 2000 km);
the second one
from Iran (Persian
Gulf)–Turkey
Turkmenbashi–
Caspian Sea–
–Baku (230 km)
Aleppo–Isken-
derun (200 km)
Iraqi reserves–
Erzurum
Russia (across the
Black Sea)–Bulgaria
(two extensions)
a) Serbia–Hungary to
Austria or Slovenia–Italy
b) Greece (across the
Ionian Sea) to Italy
Samsun–
Ceyhan–Haifa
Annual
capacity
14 billion m3
4 billion m3;
possible capa-
city of up to 10
billion m3
1.3 billion m3;
planned capa-
city of up to 16
billion m3
Planned 7 bil-
lion m3; the
final target is
16 billion m3
Planned 3 bil-
lion m3; the
final target –
12 billion m3
8–10 billion m3
25–31
billion m3
Both gas
pipelines
intended to
transport about
50 billion m3
16–20
billion m3
Planned 4-6
billion m3, the
final target
18 billion m3
10 billion m3
30 billion m3
7–8 billion m3
Operator
(cost)
TuRusGas
(no data
available)
NIGC/BOTAS
(no data
available)
Gazexport
(US$2 billion)
Consortium
SCP (US$953
million)
BOTAS/DEPA
(US$300
million)
Poseidon Co.
(US$1.3
billion)
Consortium
Nabucco
(US$5.8 billion)
Iranian-Turkish
consortium
No operator
(US$2.5
billion)
BOTAS
project
BOTAS
project
Gazprom
and ENI
project
Gazprom
project
Comments on the condition
Built in 1987–1988;
opened in 1992.
Opened in 2002; Iran would
like to increase its capacity
to 20 billion m3..
Opened in 2003; Gazprom
aims for its development and
transit to the EU.
Opened in summer 2007.
Plans to increase capacity
to 22–30 billion m3.
Opened in autumn 2007;
will serve as an extension
of the SCP route.
Implementation planned
by 2012 as an extension
of SCP and TGI.
Feasibility study and negotia
tions with banks underway. Im-
plementation planned by 2015.
The memorandum of under-
standing between Iran and
Turkey signed at the beginning
of July 2007; very initial
stage. The US’s approach
is decidedly negative.
Not very realistic project,
without intergovernmental
agreements or consortium.
An extension of the networks
of Arab countries to Turkey
and the EU.
Not very realistic with Iraq’s
destabilisation.
The project is in competition
with the Nabucco route;
estimated costs of realisation
from 7 to 30 US$ billion.
The project would be
an extension of Blue Stream;
less realistic than SEGP.
Table 5. Operating and planned gas pipelines to Turkey and the EU
Sources: Materials cited in the present text
Dzhubga with the Turkish city of Samsun. In the
years 2003–2006, the pipeline delivered 1.3 bil-
lion m3 gas annually to Turkey, whereas its tar-
get capacity is intended to be 16 billion m3 after
2010. The transported gas is then sold on the
Turkish market by Gazexport64. Gazprom is conti-
nuing its efforts to extend the Blue Stream with
the aim of reaching Hungary and the EU markets
or/and Israel with the transported gas. Towards
the end of 2006, Gazprom completed a feasibility
study for a second line of the Blue Stream as well
as the option of extending the pipeline beyond
Turkey (see below). An increase in the pipeline’s
capacity itself would require an additional invest-
ment estimated at no less than US$1.3 billion65.
The Southern Caucasus Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum
Gas Pipeline (SCP/BTE) officially began operations
in December 2006, but supplies to Turkey actu-
ally started in June 2007. The pipeline runs through
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Erzurum; the Turkish
section is 318-km long66. From October 2000, ne-
gotiations were held about possible markets in
Georgia and Turkey. The plan is to exploit and
export 16 billion m3 annually. In the period from
2001 to 2002, intergovernmental agreements
were signed between Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey. Simultaneously, BOTAS contracted sup-
plies of 6.6 billion m3 annually for 15 years from
the Azeri state-owned company SOCAR. During
the negotiations, it was also decided that SCP
would guarantee 0.4–0.5 billion m3 of gas annu-
ally for Georgia at a preferential price. In Decem-
ber 2004, the SCP consortium was established,
and it completed the construction of the pipe-
line for US$953 million67. The construction pro-
cess was quite fast, as it was made easier by the
fact that the BTC infrastructure had already been
built, not to mention BP’s commitment. Depend-
ing on further decisions and investments, the
pipeline’s capacity could be enhanced from 7–8
billion m3 to 22 billion m3 in 2015, and even up
to 30 billion m3 in the longer term.
The Turkey-Greece Interconnector gas pipeline
(TGI) linking Karacabey (Turkey) with Komitini
(Greece) was opened in November 2007, and is
currently under construction. Its intended capa-
city in the first phase is 0.75 billion m3, and then
3 billion m3; its target capacity for 2012 is 12 bil-
lion m3. In February 2003, the governments of
the two countries signed the agreement to build
the pipeline; BOTAS and the Greek company DEPA
concluded the relevant agreement in December
2003. The TGI project was backed by the EU from
the very beginning, as the EU sees in it a mecha-
nism for diversifying supplies in the south of the
continent, as well as an instrument for building
trust between Turkey and Greece. The cost of con-
structing this submarine connection between
Turkish and Greek gas networks will reach about
US$300 million68.
The project of the Poseidon gas pipeline, previo-
usly called the Greece-Italy Interconnector, is an
extension of the TGI. In October 2006, DEPA and
the Italian Edison-Gas SpA signed the agreement
to construct the pipeline; it was supplemented
in January 2007 by agreements between the go-
vernments of Greece and Italy and the agreements
establishing Poseidon Company. The route of the
gas pipeline runs underneath the Ionian Sea be-
tween Stavrilimenas (Greece) and Otranto (Italy).
The cost of the project is estimated at US$1.3 bil-
lion; after 2012 it would have the capacity of
8–10 billion m3 69. The implementation of both
projects would imply the possibility of Turkey
sending resources to a much larger market than
the Greek one.
The planned Nabucco gas pipeline will supply
gas from the Caspian Sea region and Iran, and
possibly from Egypt and Iraq. Compared to the
routes of the TGI and Poseidon, Nabucco is inten-
ded to secure supplies to Austria, Hungary, Bul-
garia and Romania70. This project, promoted by
the Austrian OMV Gas company, has enjoyed EU
support since 200371. In the first stage, its inten-
ded capacity would be 15.5 billion m3 annually,
at the second stage 25.5 billion m3, and as a tar-
get in the third phase, 31 billion m3 (after 2020).
The cost of the project (the Turkish section, 1999
km) is estimated at US$5.8 billion. In June 2005,
BOTAS, Bulgargaz, Transgaz, MOL and OMV Gas
set up Nabucco Gas Pipeline International Ltd.72.
The new company has already devised a feasibili-
ty study, and is set to present a proposal for fund-
ing the project. By 2007, engineering studies had
been conducted along the Nabucco route. Under
the Austrian presidency of the EU, a proposal for
the European Investment Bank to finance 30% of
the project’s costs was put forward. Also in June
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2006, the European Commission and the energy
ministers of Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
and Turkey committed to accelerating work on
Nabucco. However, additional investors are still
being sought, so that construction could begin
in 2009, and the first supply of gas would be car-
ried through Nabucco in 201273. However, the
project has met with effective counter-measures
from Gazprom, as well as the opposition from the
US, which is against using the pipeline to import
gas from Iran. At the beginning of July 2007, in
order to ensure the supply of gas to the Nabucco
gas pipeline, Turkey signed a memorandum of
understanding with Iran to build two new gas
pipelines for US$2 billion, running from the bor-
der of Turkmenistan through Iran to Turkey (1500
km) and from the South Pars reserves to Turkey
(2000 km). These pipelines would be linked with
the Nabucco infrastructure. One of them would
carry Turkmen gas, although Turkmenistan is not
a party to this agreement. The conclusion of the
agreement was met with criticism from the US
and Russia74.
The reactivation of the plan for the Trans-Caspian
Gas Pipeline (TCGP) linking Turkmenistan with the
Caucasus still appears quite problematic. In Oc-
tober 1998, BOTAS signed an outline agreement
with the authorities in Ashkhabad about receiv-
ing Turkmen gas through the Trans-Caspian pipe-
line with a capacity of 16–20 billion m3. The ini-
tial costs of the TCGP construction underneath
the Caspian Sea between the ports of Turkmen-
bashi and Baku is estimated at approximately
US$2.5 billion. After the completion of the gas
pipeline and an increase in exports, a capacity of
up to 30 billion m3 could be achieved75. Turks and
potential investors assumed that the TCGP route
would be linked with the SCP/BTE gas pipeline
which was planned at that time. General Electrics,
Bechtel Group and RD Shell were interested in
the construction of the trans-Caspian route, but
in May 2001 they eventually withdrew from talks
with Turkmenistan about the establishment of the
PSG International consortium76. One of the legal
barriers for this submarine project was a lack of
a definite delimitation of the Caspian Sea sectors
of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Under the presi-
dency of Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenistan) and
Geidar Aliev (Azerbaijan), the countries could not
reach agreement over the size of their shares of
resources in transit to Turkey. In Ankara’s opinion,
the construction of the TCGP combined with that
of the SCP and Nabucco would be an optimal solu-
tion to the problems of diversifying EU supplies77.
Talks about Turkey’s participation in the project
of the Trans-Arab Gas Pipeline, linking Medi-
terranean Arab countries, are underway. The pu-
tative Turkish section of the trans-Arab gas pipe-
line would have the capacity of 4–6 billion m3
annually. BOTAS became involved in the feasibili-
ty study of gas supplies from Egypt by signing
the related protocol in February 2000. In January
2004, the authorities of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and
Lebanon concluded the agreement about the se-
cond phase of the project78. The third stage of the
project would be the construction of the connec-
tion between Aleppo in Syria and Iskenderun; this
is initially planned for 2008. Gazprom is interes-
ted in modernising and extending the Syrian
network. In March 2004, the Turkish Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources (ETKB) and the
Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum signed an outline
agreement to transit Egyptian gas through Tur-
key to the EU79. BOTAS assumes that, in the case
of agreements between exporters and recipients
in the EU, it would be possible to reach the target
capacity of 18 billion m3 of Egyptian gas in 2020
(and possibly also Iraqi gas). Gas from the trans-
Arab pipeline would then be supplied to EU mar-
kets through the TGI, Poseidon and Nabucco pipe-
lines.
The other idea of the Turkish companies, the pro-
ject of the Iraqpipe gas pipelinementioned in the
outline agreement of 1996 and with the capacity
of 10 billion m3, is also quite unlikely because of
the situation in Iraq. The route of the pipeline
would run along the yet unexploited reserves of
northern Iraq to the transportation junction in
Erzurum, partly along the oil pipeline from Kir-
kuk80. This concept has not gone beyond the de-
claration stage, and the companies initially in-
terested in it have not undertaken to prepare
a feasibility study. The major problem is consti-
tuted by the gas infrastructure in northern Iraq,
which has been damaged during the Iraqi-Ira-
nian war, and prevents exploitation of the gas
reserves in the provinces of Kirkuk and Mijala
from being launched. Due to constant trouble
with the transit of oil along the Kirkuk–Ceyhan
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route, it is difficult to consider the Iraqpipe pipe-
line as a realistic project before 2015. Since au-
tumn 2004, post-Saddam Iraq has been declaring
its willingness to participate in the trans-Arab
project, which seems more feasible than the Iraq-
pipe81.
Russia has proposed the extension of the Blue
Stream pipeline from Turkey, the South European
Gas Pipeline project (SEGP). This gas pipeline
would run from Turkey through Bulgaria, Serbia
and Croatia to Hungary, which plays a key role in
preventing Caspian and Middle East gas from
entering the EU. Whereas the target market and
distribution platform for Nabucco would be Aus-
tria, in the SEGP project this function would be
fulfilled by Hungary82. The project has been pro-
moted by Gazprom and the Hungarian MOL
since June 2006; its initial costs are estimated at
US$4 billion. In comparison with Nabucco, the
SEGP would not have problems with resource
supply, which in this case would certainly be
taken from Russia. The main arguments in favour
of this route are as follows: developing Hunga-
rian gas warehouses to 10 billion m3 in capacity,
the fact that Hungary alone imports 9 billion m3
of gas annually, and that MOL holds shares in gas
companies in Croatia, Slovakia and Bosnia-Her-
zegovina. The Hungarian authorities and MOL
have suggested the possibility of combining the
SEGP and Nabucco projects in one route to Hun-
gary to their potential partners83.
In Moscow, the Italian energy company Eni sign-
ed an agreement to establish a joint company
which will commission marketing and technical
feasibility studies for the project. In 2007, Russia
withdrew from plans to build the second leg of
Blue Stream, and presented a new project called
South Stream. The 900-kilometre-long offshore
section of South Stream would start from the
Beregovaya compressor station on Russia’s Black
Sea coast, and would run across the Black Sea to
Varna in Bulgaria. From Varna, the south-west-
ern route would continue through Greece and
the Ionian Sea to southern Italy, and the north-
western route would go through Serbia and
Hungary, and then on to either Austria or Italy
across Slovenia. The South Stream pipeline pro-
ject was announced in Rome on 23 June 2007,
when Eni and Russia’s Gazprom signed a memo-
randum of understanding. On 22 November 2007,
Gazprom and Eni signed an agreement in Mos-
cow to establish a joint company which will
commission marketing and technical feasibility
studies for the project.
There are also discussions over the extension of
the Blue Stream to Israel. In this project, it is plan-
ned firstly to build a gas pipeline with the capaci-
ty of 12 billion m3 from Samsun to Ceyhan. Then
two options of its extension have been consi-
dered: the construction of a submarine gas pipe-
line from Ceyhan to the port in Haifa, or the con-
struction of an installation to liquefy or re-gasify
LNG in these two terminals. The outline agree-
ment of February 2006 signed by Gazprom and
BOTAS suggests that the preferred option is that of
the gas pipeline with a capacity of 7–8 billion m3
annually, which corresponds to half of Israel’s
projected demand in 201084. The Russian and Is-
raeli authorities should settle the issue of a po-
tential contract for supplies from the Blue Stream
within 200785. Regarding these plans, the Iranian
authorities have warned Ankara and Moscow that
the planned connection could not be used to re-
export gas sent through the Iranpipe to Israel86.
Given the importance of EU markets to Gazprom,
it seems that the SEGP/Blue Stream to Hungary
has a better chance of being implemented.
6. Conclusions and forecasts
Turkey has been seeking for over a decade to be-
come the ‘bridge’ between Europe and the neigh-
bouring exporters of hydrocarbons. As it does not
have its own gas and oil reserves, Turkey is an
attractive market for them. Turkey’s diplomatic
and economic activity has allowed a substantial
diversification of oil imports. The country’s ac-
celerated gasification, combined with the econo-
mic crises of the 1990s and its high dependence
on Russian gas, have made the diversification of
gas supplies impossible. Reviewed forecasts for
domestic gas demand, the full implementation
of EU standards in the areas of energy security,
and the protection of the environment will be of
great importance to the success of Turkey’s ener-
gy policy.
In the light of the situation described above, Tur-
key is faced with the necessity of accelerating the
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construction (with potential partners) of new
routes to the country allowing for the re-export
and transit of gas onto EU markets. Even if only
part of the projects is implemented, Turkey will
be one of the major arteries of gas supply to the
EU, thus reducing volumes of transit through
Ukraine and Belarus. Ankara’s ambitions are limi-
ted by economic, technological and political bar-
riers arising with the oil and gas exporters in the
Caspian Sea & Black Sea regions and the Middle
East. The possibilities of overcoming these limi-
tations hinge on a series of agreements among
state authorities, investors and lenders. Turkey’s
calculations will still be largely influenced by the
politics and strategic interests of the US, the EU
and Russia.
In the future Turkey will be an important transit
country for oil from Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbai-
jan and Iraq. Between 2010 and 2015, the rivalry
between pipelines bypassing the Turkish Straits
and carrying oil from Kazakhstan and Russia is
likely to be settled. Currently, the construction of
the pipeline from Burgas to Alexandroupolis, cir-
cumventing Turkey and posing a real threat to
the BTC, is more probable. The future and volume
of gas transit to the EU is also unclear, although
its significance for the EU’s security and Turkey’s
regional position is undisputed. By 2015, gas pipe-
lines from Russia and Azerbaijan, together with
Turkey’s connections with EU markets, should be
operating at full capacity. Financial and political
obstacles may present a serious difficulty for the
transit of gas from Egypt, Iraq and Iran through
Turkey to the EU. These stumbling blocks could
be overcome thanks to a liberalisation of Iran’s
political system, an improvement in Tehran’s re-
lations with the US, and a stabilisation of the s-
tuation in Iraq. If reforms in Iran do not arise, the
EU’s approach to its collaboration with Tehran,
despite opposition from the US, will be vital to
the further development of the situation.
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
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three reactors (up to 5,000 MW) is also considered. Currently
in Turkey there is only one 250 kW research reactor in the
Istanbul ITI institute. See more: W. Broad, D. Singer, With Eye
On Iran, Rivals Also Want Nuclear Power, New York Times,
15.04.2007 and Caught In The Fray: Turkey Enters Debate On
Iran’s Nuclear Program, Christian Science Monitor, 2.02.2006.
8 The data on oil and gas consumption in 2005 quoted after:
British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of Word Energy, Lon-
don, June 2006.
9 Nearly analogous proportions apply to Turkish imports of
petroleum-based products.
10 In recent years, TPAO has established companies with RD
Shell, BP-Amoco, Chevron and ExxonMobil to explore subma-
rine reserves. See: http://www.tpao.gov.tr.
11 Since September 2005 shares in TUPRAS have been held by
Koc-Shell JV Group, the investor of US$4.1 billion. The com-
pany DITAS, which is responsible for supplying oil to refine-
ries, is part of the company. See: http://www.tupras.com.tr.
12 Since May 2007, 35.3% of shares in POAS have been held
by the Austrian OMV, 47% by the Turkish private company
Dogan Petrol Yatirimlari, and the remainder by maller in-
vestors and the ETKB.
13 Shareholders in ATAS are Exxon-Mobil (51%), RD Shell
(27%), BP Amoco (17%) and the Turkish Marmara Petrol (5%).
14 The possible new refineries will however be built by pri-
vate investors, not by the state-owned TUPRAS. The Indian
Oil Company and POAS are potentially interested in con-
structing new refineries in Ceyhan; the Russian company
Lukoil is interested in building refineries in Samsun or Zon-
guldak.
15 Domestic reserves are estimated at 8 billion m3 and ex-
ploited at the rate of 0.4–0.6 billion m3 a year. The reserves
are exploited by TPAO in the region of Gelibolu and the
southern part of the Black Sea. The latter are being exploit-
ed with the help of BP Amoco and Chevron.
16 Over 60% of Turkish households have access to gas.
T
u
rk
e
y
a
s
th
e
e
n
e
rg
y
b
ri
d
g
e
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
E
a
s
t
a
n
d
th
e
W
e
s
t
10
6
C E S R e p o r t
17 See more about trends and the government’s projections
until 2020 in O. Yilmaz, T. Usulu, Energy Policies of Turkey
during the period 1923-2003, Energy Policy, Volume 37,
No. 1, 2007, p. 258–264.
18 The LNG terminal in Marmara, Ereglisi, began operations
in August 1994; like the network of domestic gas pipelines
it belongs to BOTAS, and it has a maximum capacity of 5.2
billion m3 a year.
19 See more: A. Hakan, Energy Decision-Making: The Turkish
Case, Perceptions, Volume 5, No. 3, 2000, p. 170–179.
20 The natural gas market act allows for the full privatisa-
tion and liberalisation of the sector, increased foreign invest-
ments in infrastructure, and the harmonisation of the gas
policy with EU standards.
21 The Turkish VAT rate on natural gas and petroleum pro-
ducts is 18%.
22 Within 5–10 years of the opening of the planned gas pipe-
lines, the total length of the Turkish gas network may
amount to over 10,000 km. See: http://www.botas.gov.tr
23 Gas is mainly consumed (70%) in the winter season, be-
tween December and March.
24 World Bank, Recent Gas Dispute Stresses Importance Of
Gas Storage In Turkey, Ankara 2006.
25 Key oil reserves lie in the countries of the Persian Gulf (up
to 61% of global reserves), North Africa (4.4%), Russia (6.2%)
and the Caspian Sea region (4%). Reserves of natural gas in
Russia and the Persian Gulf are also very substantial (26.1%
and 40.1%respectively); gas reserves in North Africa (4.4 % of
global reserves) and the Caspian Sea (5.2%) are comparable.
26 Compare I. Cem, Turkey In the New Century, Rustem Pub-
lisher, Ankara 2001, p. 67–97.
27 Saudi Arabia has the biggest reserves in the world and sur-
pluses of capacity and export, which makes it the swing pro-
ducer of the oil market. From time to time, the approach of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states to the price policy is
subject to disputes with Iran. Riyadh is a traditional politi-
cal partner of Ankara in the region, and a key supplier of oil
to the Turkish market.
28 See A. H. Cordesman, K. R. Al-Rodhan, Iranian Nuclear
Weapons? The Options If Diplomacy Fails, p. 13–29, CSIS,
Washington DC 2006.
29 The foreseen export through gas pipelines or export of
LNG from Libya and Algeria will directly go to markets of
South Europe, mainly to Spain and Italy. See: Observatoire
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Energy Survey, IEA-OECD Publications, Paris 2000, p. 133–144.
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oil pipeline, Energy Business Review, 25 April 2007, and the
paper by C. Dima, Bapline: Why the Burgas–Alexandroupolis
Pipeline?, Vienna, November 2005.
55 BAPC is a company whose shares are held by Transneft,
Rosneft and Gazpromneft. Apart from them (51% in total),
the remaining shareholders in TBOPC are the Bulgarian com-
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tribution to the Trans-Balkan pipeline. Compare E. Watkins,
Kazakhstan, Russia Join In Oil Pipeline Project, Oil & Gas
Journal, 14 May 2007.
57 EAP can also be used again in ‘reverse mode’ to carry oil
from Eilat to Ashkelon. See papers on the EAPC website:
http://www.eapc.co.il/about.html
58 See more in J. Nanay, Azerbaijan: Israel Focuses On Pipe-
lines, PFC Energy Memo, 19 June 2006.
59 Compare E. Lefkovits, Israel And Turkey Plan Energy Pipe-
line, Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2006 and Turkey, Israel Agree
On Pipeline Linking Black Sea And Red Sea, Haaretz, 15 De-
cember 2006.
60 The gas pipeline was built by the Transbalkan AS compa-
ny, established by Sojuzgazexport and BOTAS.
61 The shareholders in TuRusGas are Gazprom (45%), BOTAS
(35%) and the Turkish company Gamma AS (20%).
62 To this end, the consortium Gaztranzyt was set up in
1997; its shareholders are Gazprom (37%), Naftohaz (37%)
from Ukraine, TuRusGas (18%) and Transbalkan AS (8%).
63 The Blue Stream BV Pipeline Company is a subsidiary of
Gazprom and Italian ENI, registered in the Netherlands.
It has provided suitable technologies and is responsible for
the project logistics. See more about the technical parame-
ters of Blue Stream on: http://www.gazprom.com/eng/
articles/article8895.shtml
64 Gazexport is obviously part of Gazprom.
65 Gazprom to Study Blue Stream-2 Pipeline By Year-End,
Turkish Daily News, 16 September 2006.
66 This is where the original name of the pipeline Baku–Tbi-
lisi–Erzurum (BTE) comes from. SCP services run exports from
the Azeri gas reserves of Shah Deniz, which are estimated at
about 625 billion m3.
67 The SPC gas pipeline’s operators are BP–Amoco and Stat-
oil (each holds 25% of shares), the remaining shareholders
are TPAO, SOCAR, Total, LUKoil and NICO (each has 9–10%).
The structure of shares in the SCP consortium is identical to
that of the consortium exploiting the Shah Deniz reserves.
68 The submarine section of the TGI would be only 17 km
long. See also the papers of the Turkey-Greece Natural Gas
Pipeline Project on the BOTAS website: http://www.botas.
gov.tr/eng/projects/allprojects/greece.asp.
69 See also the paper ‘Energy Affairs’ from the Greek Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.mfa.gr/
www.mfa.gr/en-US/Economic+Diplomacy/Energy+Affairs.
70 A substantial part of the gas carried through Nabucco
(10 billion m3 annually) is intended to be delivered to the
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gas transportation junction in Baumgarten in Austria; the
rest would be supplied to Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.
71 UE popiera gazociàg Nabucco z Kaukazu do Austrii [EU
supports Nabucco gas pipeline from Caucasus to Austria],
Gazeta Wyborcza, 26 June 2006.
72 A joint venture of five companies replaced the Nabucco
Company Pipeline Study Gmb, founded a year earlier.
73 See http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com
74 Iran gazi tartismasi sertlesiyor, Milliyet, 19 July 2007,
http://www.milliyet.com/2007/07/18/ekonomi/axeko02.html
75 Delivering gas exported from Kazakhstan through the
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76 See Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Natural Gas Pipeline
Project on the BOTAS website: http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/
projects/allprojects/trans.asp
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A Dream, Turkish Weekly, 30 April 2007.
78 In July 2003 the first part of the gas pipeline between
Egypt and Jordan was opened; it will then be extended to
Lebanon and Syria. Compare G. Butt, Will Mideast Gas Pipe-
line Spur Cooperation?, Daily Star, 20 July 2004.
79 See also Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline Project, avail-
able on the BOTAS website: http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/
projects/allprojects/egypt.asp
80 On the Turkish side, the project has bee promoted by
BOTAS, TPAO and Tekfen. ENI–Agip (a possible operator of
the reserves in Iraq) and Gas de France (a possible project
coordinator) were also interested in it. See also Iraq–Turkey
Natural Gas Pipeline Project at http://www.botas.gov.tr/
eng/projects/allprojects/iraq.asp
81 Energy Information Administration, Iraq Country Ana-
lysis Brief, Washington DC, June 2006, p. 10–11.
82 Rosyjska odpowiedê na projekt Nabucco [Russian response
to the Nabucco project], Tydzieƒ na Wschodzie, No. 33,
16 March 2006.
83 See J. Dempsey, Largest Energy Company In Hungary
Takes Practical Approach To Russia, International Herald Tri-
bune, 28 March 2007.
84 L. Ohrstrom, Turkey-Russia Seal Gas-Pipeline Deal, Daily
Star, 3 March 2006.
85 W ciàgu roku Izrael podpisze z Gazpromem umow´ o do-
stawach gazu [Within one year Israel will sign gas supply
agreement with Gazprom], Gazeta Wyborcza, 20 March 2006.
86 Tehran Fears Turkey Could Reexport Iranian Gas To Israel,
New Anatolia, 26 December 2006, s. 6–19.
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